D. Wade Hands

The Handbook of Economic Methodology

This handbook is a multidisciplinary reference work on the developing field of economic methodology. There are over 100 commissioned essays on the subject, along with biographical information. Topics covered include: analytical Marxism, bounded rationality, hysteresis, and supervenience.

Caveat emptor: Economics and contemporary philosophy of science

The relationship between economics and the philosophy of natural science has changed substantially during the last few years. What was once exclusively a one-way relationship from philosophy to economics now seems to be much closer to bilateral exchange. The purpose of this paper is to examine this new relationship. First, I document the change. Second, I examine the situation within contemporary philosophy of science in order to explain why economics might have its current appeal. Third, I consider some of the issues that might jeopardize the success of this philosophical project.

Philosophy and Economics

The literature on philosophy and economics has traditionally been divided into two areas: economic methodology, which connects economics and epistemology/philosophy of science, and the literature on economics and moral philosophy/ethics. Recent developments in both of these areas are discussed in detail.

The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics

Science is science and ethics is ethics; it takes both to make a whole man; but only confusion, misunderstanding and discord can come from not keeping them separate and distinct, from trying to impose the absolutes of ethics on the relatives of science . [ Friedman, 1955 , p. 409]

Did Milton Friedman's methodology license the Formalist Revolution?

This paper examines two conflicting views that have emerged within the recent methodological literature regarding the relationship between Friedmans famous essay and the formalist revolution. I focus on three influential contributors to this ongoing debate: Mark Blaug, Terence Hutchison, and Thomas Mayer. Blaug and Hutchison have argued repeatedly that Friedmans essay licensed the formalist revolution while Mayer has argued precisely the opposite; the formalist revolution was a result of not following Friedmans methodological advice. The juxtaposition of these views is particularly interesting since the authors disagree sharply about the impact of Friedmans essay, and yet seem to agree about most other aspects of economic methodology.

Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory

This paper examines methodological issues raised by revealed preference theory in economics: particularly contemporary revealed preference theory. The paper has three goals. First, to make the case that revealed preference theory is a broad research program in choice theory—not a single theory—and understanding this diversity is essential to any methodological analysis of the program. Second, to explore some of the existing criticisms of revealed preference theory in a way that emphasizes how the effectiveness of the critique depends on the particular version of revealed preference under consideration. Finally, three additional criticisms are presented that are aimed specifically at contemporary revealed preference theory.

Back to the Ordinalist Revolution: Behavioral Economic Concerns in Early Modern Consumer Choice Theory

The paper argues that theoretical work on consumer choice theory during the early 20th century addressed some of the same issues discussed in recent behavioral economics. This is not generally recognized because the discussion was tied up with the integrability question, the theoretical framework did not involve risky choice or expected utility theory, and the relevant evidence was introspective rather than experimental. The paper makes the case for the similarity and discusses why it is important.

The Structuralist View of Economic Theories: A Review Essay: The Case of General Equilibrium in Particular

Particles of metallic sodium or potassium are placed on a wood substrate which has been pre-heated. When the wood substrate is introduced subsequently into a steam zone the sodium or potassium, as the case may be, reacts exothermally with the water vapor, melts and burns, charring the wood in localized regions. The particles of sodium or potassium are confined by grains of sand which are subsequently brushed away with any loose charcoal to produce a distressed surface to the wood.

Social epistemology meets the invisible hand : kitcher on the advancement of science

Philip Kitchers new book is very ambitious in scope, more ambitious, certainly, than any of his previous books. Unlike Kitchers Abusing Science: The Case against Creationism (1982), this is not a book that focusses on just one single issue in contemporary science or educational policy; nor is it, like his The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (1983) and Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature (1985), a book that emphasizes just one relatively narrow philosophical topic. The Advancement of Science presents a complete, and quite general, position within the philosophy of natural science. Its purpose is much closer to Poppers The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) or even to Nagels The Structure of Science (1961) than it is to any of Kitchers earlier books. Kitcher starts off with an explicit epistemology, moves to a “goal” for science based on that epistemology, and then uses this epistemic goal as the target for the various methodological and social or institutional strategies that he offers.

Frank Knight and Pragmatism

Abstract One of many controversies surrounding the work of Frank Knight involves the question of whether, or to what degree, his ideas were consistent with those of American pragmatism. Substantive textual evidence can be found to support almost any simple answer to the question. This paper argues that while Knight was quite (often aggressively) opposed to a particular set of pragmatic ideas alive in the scholarly and social debates of his day, this fact says more about Knights historical context than it does about the broader relationship between his philosophical position and pragmatism. Knight was opposed to the social control pragmatism of his day, but at the same time his general philosophical position has much in common with the features of the pragmatic tradition that are most emphasized in the recent philosophical literature.