Bruce J. Dickson

Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation

The political implications of Chinas economic reforms center on the adaptability of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). Can it successfully adapt to the new economic and social environment that its reforms are creating? Or is its ability to cope being undermined by these changes? In the midst of rapid economic change, scholars have identified trends that may be evidence of potential political transformation. Entrepreneurs and skilled expertise are being recruited into the party. Cooptation facilitates adaptation by bringing in new elites who may invigorate the party with new ideas and new goals. In addition, local party and government officials are developing corporatist arrangements to promote economic change. These trends give hope to some that economic reform will eventually lead to gradual political change, allowing Chinas transition from communism to be more like Hungary or Poland (or even Taiwan) and thereby avoid the turmoil that accompanied political change in the rest of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Along with these promising signs of rejuvenation are contrary signs of disintegration. Large numbers of party members are abandoning their party responsibilities to pursue economic opportunities. The nonstate sector of the economy is growing so fast that most enterprises do not have party organizations within them, and few new members are being recruited from their workforce. In some rural areas, party organizations are paralyzed, recruitment of new members is difficult, and lineage-based clans are competing with the party for influence. These are warning signs of disintegration, of a party unable to manage its members, to have direct institutional links with the most dynamic sectors of the economy, or to control its society.

Membership Has Its Privileges: The Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communist Party Members in Urban China

This article compares the relative importance of political capital (in the form of membership in the Chinese Communist Party) and human capital (in the form of higher education) in urban China. Survey data from urban China strongly support two key elements of the intellectual New Class theory: intellectuals will have privileged access into the party, and the importance of education relative to political reliability will increase over time. The data also show how political capital and human capital are converted into high paying and prestigious jobs. There is also evidence of a separate path of career mobility: for the most socially prestigious jobs, a college degree—not a party card—is the key. Economic reforms of the post-Mao era are creating a gap between political power, on one hand, and social prestige and economic power, on the other. This gap can be expected to grow as the reforms continue.

Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party's Embrace of the Private Sector

Is privatization in China leading to political change? This article presents original survey data from 1999 and 2005 to evaluate the Communist Partys strategy towards the private sector. The CCP is increasingly integrating itself with the private sector, both by co-opting entrepreneurs into the Party and encouraging current Party members to go into business. It has opened the political system to private entrepreneurs, but still screens which ones are allowed to play political roles. Because of their close personal and professional ties, and because of their shared interests in promoting economic growth, Chinas capitalists and communist officials share similar viewpoints on a range of political, economic and social issues. Rather than promote democratic governance, Chinas capitalists have a stake in preserving the political system that has allowed them to prosper, and they are among the Partys most important bases of support.

Democratization in China and Taiwan : the adaptability of Leninist parties

Introduction: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties PART I: ESTABLISHING LENINIST PARTIES Creating a Leninist Party on Taiwan The CCPs Transition to a Ruling Party PART II: ADAPTING LENINIST PARTIES Changing Elite Characteristics and Party Adaptability Monitoring Party Performance The Environmental Context of Party Adaptation Conclusion

Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China *

This article analyses trends in the Chinese Communist Partys recruitment strategy and the composition of Party members. Based on original survey data, it analyses the motives for joining the CCP, the consequences on career mobility, and the effects of Party membership on political beliefs and behaviour in contemporary China. These data reveal three key findings. First, for those who aspire to positions in the Party/government bureaucracy or SOEs, Party membership is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition; for those in the non-state sector, it is youth and college education that are the keys to top jobs, and not Party membership. Second, CCP members are more likely to donate time, money, and even blood, for various causes, and to vote in local peoples congress elections. This behaviour demonstrates mobilized loyalty: the CCP mobilizes its members to participate in these activities to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime and to serve as examples to the rest of the population. Third, Party members are not more likely to support and trust their state institutions: while they do have higher levels of support for the centre than the rest of population generally, Party membership does not produce increased support for the local state. Nor does economic development: all else being equal, support for central and local party-state institutions is lower in the most developed cities. These findings call into question the Partys recruitment and development policies, as well as the conventional wisdom on the link between economic development and popular support for the status quo.

Updating the China Model

China’s development model is undergoing dramatic change. No longer relying solely on cheap labor to manufacture exports, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is updating its approach in three distinct but interrelated ways. First, it is actively trying to create ‘‘national champions’’ so that Chinese brands not just Chinese goods can compete in the global market. Second, it is moving away from its reliance on low-wage, low-skilled labor and encouraging the growth of a middle class and increased domestic consumption to spur economic growth. Third, long accustomed to investing vast amounts of capital on infrastructure projects, it is now devoting more resources toward other types of public goods in order to improve the quality of local governance. Each of these endeavors presents major challenges as well as opportunities for China, its neighbors, and other countries, including the United States. Collectively, they represent a significant updating of the now familiar China model based on export-led growth and a strong state. These changes are happening for a mix of reasons. From an international perspective, the recent financial crisis revealed China’s vulnerability to an economic downturn, which worried the CCP because it relies so much on growth to generate popular support. The global economic slowdown reduced demand for goods produced in China, and because China relies so much on exports for economic growth, the country’s rate of growth slowed (although to a still impressive ninth percent in 2009). Many businesses failed, and many workers lost their jobs. Therefore, the financial crisis gave support to those within China who

The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52

Few political parties have the opportunity to make a fresh start in a new location. An organization is rarely able to leave the environment in which its lessons are learned and apply them in a new one. However, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) encountered this situation after its defeat on the Chinese mainland and retreat to Taiwan. From 1950 to 1952, the KMT underwent a thorough organizational restructuring. The result was a renewal of its Leninist origins from the previous reorganization in 1924. During 1950–52, the KMT created a network of Party cells throughout the government, military and society to which each Party member had to belong. The principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, hierarchical authority, and Party authority over the government bureaucracy and the military were reasserted.

Threats to Party Supremacy

����� �� With the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) having emerged from its Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002 with a new leadership and an updated program, what is the outlook for the political system that it controls? The ease with which the recent turnover of power was handled bespeaks an unprecedented degree of institutional stability within China’s political elite. And yet the CCP has for some time now been watching its grassroots organizational strength ebb away, the victim of a number of stresses that have been generated by the Party’s progressive integration with a rapidly changing society. The CCP’s policies of “reform and opening” have meanwhile had unintended consequences that have further weakened the prospects for its continued political monopoly: Due to an expanding private sector, the Party no longer controls where people live and work; due to the spread of internet access, satellite television, and alternative media, it no longer controls what information people have or how it is disseminated; and due to a combination of larger disposable incomes and political liberalization, it no longer controls what people do with their spare time. To manage these consequences, the Party has adopted a new strategy of control. As necessary as this strategy has been, it has effectively reoriented the Party relative to Chinese society, and in a way that raises a question of long-term survival common to many a liberalizing authoritarian regime dominated by a single party: Will adapting to a new economic and social environment strengthen or actually weaken the Party’s hold on power? Bruce J. Dickson is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (2003) and Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (1997), and is associate editor of the journal Problems of Post-Communism.

Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in Urban China

ABSTRACT By most accounts, nationalism in China is on the rise, as seen in both patriotic displays and anti-foreign protests. This article disaggregates two types of nationalism: patriotism and victimization derived from the ‘century of humiliations’. An original, nationwide public opinion survey of urban China shows that these two types of nationalism are derived from similar attributes and attitudes (causes) but have dissimilar impacts on views toward foreign countries (effects). In order to understand properly the causes of rising nationalism in China and its possible implications, observers must begin with the recognition that patriotism and anti-foreign sentiments are not simply two sides of the same coin, but two separate and distinct types of nationalism.

Public Goods and Regime Support in Urban China

Why do authoritarian regimes try to improve the quality of their governance? In the absence of democratic institutions to monitor, reward and punish their performance, authoritarian politicians are normally expected to seek their self-interest through corruption and rewards to cronies, rather than providing for the public welfare. However, the Chinese state has actively promoted improved governance in recent years, with greater attention to quality of life issues to balance the primary focus on sustaining rapid economic growth. This paper analyses intra-national variation in the provision of public goods in urban China and the impact of public goods on regime support. Does better governance lead to higher levels of public support for the regime, even in the absence of democratic elections? Our evidence suggests that it does, with a greater impact for the local level than for the centre.