Bruce R. Reichenbach

Omniscience and deliberation

ConclusionTo sum up, we have argued that if deliberation is incompatible with (fore)knowing what one is going to do at the time of the deliberation, then God cannot deliberate. However, this thesis cannot be used to show either that God cannot act intentionally or that human persons cannot deliberate. Further, we have suggested that though omniscience is incompatible with deliberation, it is not incompatible with either some speculation or knowing something on the grounds of inference.Funding for writing this article was provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities through its institute on human action conducted by Robert Audi at the University of Nebraska.

Monism and the possibility of Life after death

Traditionally, when man was viewed as a psycho-physical unity, life after death was deemed quite impossible, particularly in the face of universal human mortality and inevitable bodily corruption. However, some modern anthropologically monistic philosophers, including most notably John Hick, have argued that life after death is possible.

Karma, Causation and Divine Intervention

According to the law of karma, our actions have consequences which affect not only our dispositions and tendencies (saṃskāras), but also the non-dispositional aspects of our being (for example, our genetic make-up, our physical characteristics, our social status at birth, our length of life) and our environment. The environment is affected in such a way that in some future life it will be instrumental in rewarding or punishing us according to the merit or demerit resulting from our acts. For example, a person might be mauled by a grizzly bear either in retribution for a particular violent act he committed or because of his pool of accumulated karmic residues.

Karma and Fatalism

A common criticism of the doctrine of karma is that it entails fatalism. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan writes, ‘Unfortunately, the theory of Karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his best’.1 Another philosopher writes, ‘If we are justified in our acceptance of the causal dogma, there does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid fatalism. If the present is determined by the past, so as to admit of an accurate prediction of the past (the failure of accuracy being due solely to our ignorance of the data), how can we avoid the conclusion that the future is similarly determined by the past and the present?’2 And A.B. Keith echoes the same theme: The conception of Karman serves indeed in an excellent way to defend and protect the established order of things, but it is essentially fatalistic; and fatalism is not for a normal mind a good incentive to moral progress. If, on the one hand, the doing of an evil deed is restrained by the thought that it will be punished in another life, it is equally true that reflection shows that the actor has really no option in his act and is an absolutely predetermined person, whose former acts produce his present motive and reasonings without the possibility of intervention of any kind on his part.3

Finding a Locus for Dialogue between Genetics and Theology

When geneticist Bill Oetting asks provocative questions like: ‘‘How should we respond to this increased information about our DNA sequencing?’’; ‘‘How do we determine what is normal [especially when we develop the capacity intentionally to alter our genetic composition]?’’; and ‘‘How should we respond to this new way of looking at or categorizing individuals?’’, he introduces the opportunity to think about genetics theologically. The answers to these questions push us into a region beyond a mere description of genes, their expression and the resulting protein changes, and our use of technology to manipulate genes. These questions encourage us to think about humans normatively (What is it to be human?), ethically (What ought we to do with our genetic information? How ought we treat other organisms with whom we share genetic heritage?), and relationally (How are we to understand humans not merely in terms of their genetic composition and biophysical functions, but also in terms of their interactions and relationships to others?). And while each of these dimensions—normative, ethical, and relational—are not intrinsically theological, they can be discussed within the context of a theological understanding of our relation to God and others and of God’s relation to the world in general and to humans in particular. The questions asked in the context of genetics research and practice invite us to think about humans normatively, in that they leave open or do not directly address the issue concerning to what extent we are defined by our genes. That humans possess a particular DNA structure and that they are genetically both like and unlike other organisms suggest that being human is in part reflected in and by our genetic heritage. Similarly, that each person has an individualized DNA structure or that each has genetic mutations, some having a more significant impact on quality of health and life than others, suggests that genetics tells us something important about our individual identity. At the same time, reflecting on Oetting’s third case study (in which he provocatively raises the question of whether, under pressure from the competing candidate, the politician should reveal his personal genome to the public), the politician should reject any attempt to box himself, his personality, his political abilities, or what he can do and is interested in accomplishing politically into his genetic description. It conveys to the public the mistaken idea that who he is and what he can accomplish is already Theology and Science, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011

The hermeneutic circle and authoral intention in divine revelation

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a solution, but this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts.

Metaphysical Presuppositions of the Law of Karma

To achieve understanding of a concept, it is often helpful to discern something of its origin. However, considerations of origins can be misleading, for concepts change both in content and function. Hence, to avoid any taint of the genetic fallacy, origins must be considered for the insights they can render, not for any evaluative conclusions which can be drawn from them. On the other hand, it is not merely helpful but necessary to ascertain the concept’s metaphysical presuppositions. In this chapter we shall begin with a short discussion of the possible origins of the doctrine of the law of karma and then consider some of its presuppositions.

Karma and the Problem of Evil

The doctrine of karma continues to be significant because it provides an explanation for both pain, suffering and misfortune on the one hand, and pleasure, happiness and good fortune on the other. Consequently, an assessment of the success of the doctrine in resolving the problem of good and evil will go a long way in enabling us to evaluate the doctrine itself, for should it fail to resolve satisfactorily the problem which it is intended to meet, since as we have seen the law is an explanatory hypothesis proposed to resolve a problem and not empirically verifiable, there would seem to be little reason to advocate the doctrine.

Karma and Liberation

Our discussion of the law of karma would be incomplete without consideration of the relation of the law of karma to human liberation. Our current existence, governed by the law of karma, must be transcended into something higher. The goal of life is liberation from the misery and suffering which accompany the cycle of rebirths. This can only occur when we have exhausted our accumulated karma and have terminated that with which we are afflicted: ignorance (which takes the non-eternal, impure, painful and not-self to be eternal, pure, pleasurable and the self), egoism, attachment to pleasure, aversion to pain, and love of life.1 Termination of these occurs by removing ignorance2 (attaining knowledge of ourselves in regard to our true nature and knowledge of the causes of birth, becoming, grasping, craving, feeling, consciousness3), attaining freedom from desires, cravings, and passions, and eliminating egoism and self-concern. Karma, then, is not the final word, only the preliminary word, the word characterizing conscious existence apart from or prior to final liberation. What more can be said about the relation of the law of karma to liberation? The answer to this will occupy our attention in this chapter.

Karma, Justice and Motives for Right Action

It is reasoned that ‘if the law of Karma is rejected, the moral law itself will have to be rejected’.1 To accept the moral law, which affirms that acts are objectively right and wrong, is to accept the law of karma. In other words, acceptance of the moral law is sufficient for accepting the law of karma, whereas acceptance of the law of karma is necessary for accepting the moral law. Given this assertion about acceptance, how are we to understand the connection between the laws themselves?