William Hasker

A Refutation of Middle Knowledge

The theological doctrine of middle knowledge attributes to God a particular kind of knowledge concerning the future, knowledge which would be denied to God by theists who do not hold this doctrine. Consider the case of Elizabeth, a graduate student in anthropology. Her adviser is wondering whether to recommend her for a foundation grant in support of an exciting but potentially risky field work assignment among a tribe who have only recently renounced their ancestral bent for head-hunting and cannibalism. He asks himself whether, if offered the assignment, she would accept it, or whether she would prefer a safer but less challenging assignment studying a relatively placid group of South Sea islanders. Now Elizabeths advisor may find himself unable to decide what Elizabeth would do if offered the foundation grant, or he may reach the wrong conclusion about what she would do. But God, it may be thought, surely must know what Elizabeth would do: he knows whether, if offered the grant, she would accept it or reject it. Still, this conclusion is not inevitable, not even if one accepts that God has comprehensive knowledge of the future. To be sure, if Elizabeth is in fact offered the grant then either she will accept it or she will reject it, and God, who is assumed to have comprehensive foreknowledge, will know what it is that she will in fact do. But (it might be argued) what God knows in this case is Elizabeths actual decision either to accept the offer or to reject it. But if the offer is never made, then neither does Elizabeth make a decision whether or not to accept it: there is no such decision for God to

Can God Be Free? : Rowe's dilemma for theology

In his book, Can God Be Free?, William Rowe has argued that if God is unsurpassably good He cannot be free; if He is free, He cannot be unsurpassably good. After following the discussion of this topic through a number of historical figures, Rowe focuses on the recent and contemporary debate. A key claim of Rowes is that, if there exists an endless series of better and better creatable worlds, then the existence of a morally perfect creator is impossible. I show that this argument is unsound, since a key premise can be proved false from propositions Rowe himself accepts.

Objections to Social Trinitarianism

This article reviews a number of objections to Social Trinitarianism that have been presented in the recent literature, especially objections alleging that Social Trinitarianism is not truly monotheistic. A number of the objections are found to be successful so far as they go, but they apply only to some versions of Social Trinitarianism and not to all. Objections to Social Trinitarianism as such, on the other hand, are not successful. The article concludes with a proposal for a Social Trinitarian conception of the unity of God.

Defining ‘gratuitous evil’: a response to Alan R. Rhoda

In his article, ‘Gratuitous evil and divine providence’, Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil.

The Critique of “Mental Illness”: Conceptual and/or Ethical Crisis?

Thomas Szasz’ critique of the concept of mental illness centers on the claims that (a) mental illness is diagnosed on the basis of objective medical criteria, and (b) mental illness is something which happens to the patient rather than something done by him. Neither of these claims, according to Szasz, is true: mental illness, in this sense, is a “myth.” Various attempts to meet Szasz’ critique and to define mental illness are examined and found to be unsatisfactory. The attempt to develop a limited conception of mental illness (Flew) shows some promise but has received little support from the mental health professions. Biblical and theological considerations underline the importance of the problem about “mental illness,” but do not provide a solution. Thus, it would seem that the critique of “mental illness” constitutes a conceptual crisis in psychiatry and possibly an ethical crisis as well.

A new anti-Molinist argument

An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, or are entailed by, part of the causal history of the world. A further argument is given that these counterfactuals are entailed by events intrinsic to the worlds history. If this is so, then we cannot bring about the truth of these counterfactuals; the anti-Molinist argument succeeds, and Molinism is refuted.

Deception and the Trinity: a rejoinder to Tuggy

Dale Tuggy argues that his divine-deception argument against Social Trinitarianism remains unscathed, in spite of my recent objections. I maintain that his argument is question-begging and exegetically weak, and does not succeed in refuting Social Trinitarianism.

Is Christianity probable? Swinburne's apologetic programme

Richard Swinburnes tetralogy on Christian doctrine, together with his earlier trilogy on the philosophy of theism, is one of the most important apologetic projects of recent times. This paper focuses on some difficulties with this project that stem from Swinburnes use of confirmation theory. Arguably, the problem of dwindling probabilities, pointed out by Plantinga, has not been solved. The paper is principally focused, however, on the ways In which Swinburnes confirmation theory contributes to his comparative neglect of the personal, existential dimension of Christianity. A solution for these difficulties is suggested but not elaborated.

Are alternative pasts plausible? A reply to Thomas Flint

Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a ‘seemingly irreparable logical gap’. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that ‘something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past’. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the assumption in question, the assumption is indeed extremely plausible. Thus, the argument creates difficulties for Molinism that are more severe than Flint is willing to admit.

Providence and Evil: Three Theories

The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical possibility of divine timelessness, and so on. Far less attention, in contrast, has been devoted to the broader theological ramifications of these theories. Yet insofar as they are theological theories, they are properly appreciated and indeed fully understood only when placed in the appropriate theological context.