Bryan W. Van Norden

Virtue ethics and consequentialism in early Chinese philosophy

In this book, Bryan W. Van Norden examines early Confucianism as a form of virtue ethics and Mohism, an anti-Confucian movement, as a version of consequentialism. The philosophical methodology is analytic, with an emphasis on clear exegesis of the texts and critical examination of the philosophical arguments proposed by each side. Van Norden shows that Confucianism, though similar to Aristotelianism in being a form of virtue ethics, offers different conceptions of “the good life,” the virtues, human nature, and ethical cultivation. Similarly, Mohism is akin to Western utilitarianism in being a form of consequentialism, but it is distinctive in its conception of the relevant consequences and in the specific arguments that it gives on its own behalf. The author makes use of the best current research on Chinese history, archaeology, and philology. His text is accessible to philosophers with no previous knowledge of Chinese culture and to Sinologists with no background in philosophy.

The ways of Confucianism : investigations in Chinese philosophy

Confucianism is one of the most influential philosophical traditions in the world, with profound and challenging insights on human nature, virtue, ethical cultivation, and the foundations of morality and civilization. In this collection of essays, most never before published, Nivison presents nuanced and subtle interpretations of key thinkers from over two thousand years in the Confucian movement.

Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming

Preface Classical Confucian Philosophy The Background for the Emergence of Confucian Philosophy Confucius Mencius The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean The Book of Changes The Transformation of Confucianism since Han Dynasty Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy The Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy On Chu Hsis Search for Equilibrium and Harmony Chu Hsis Understanding of the Mind, the Nature and Feelings The Problem of Orthodoxy in Neo-Confucian Philosophy The Sources and the Proper Understanding of the Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming The Last Neo-Confucian Philosopher: Huang Tsung-hsi Epilogue Selected Bibliography Index

Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World (review)

At an international conference in 1991, people began to refer to Robert Neville and his colleagues as ‘‘Boston Confucians.’’ At first the phrase was used as affectionate teasing and tongue-in-cheek self-description. However, Neville reports that, by the end of the conference, the phrase ‘‘Boston Confucianism’’ had come to be used as a semi-serious label for a particular view: the position that ‘‘Confucianism is not limited to East Asian ethnic application’’ and that it ‘‘has something genuinely interesting and helpful to bring to contemporary philosophical discussions’’ (p. 1). Neville’s book, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, is a defense of these claims. In the process of defending his theses, Neville makes a number of points that I think are utterly incontrovertible. I shall note five of his insights. The first three I shall just mention, but then I shall proceed to two that are particularly worthy of more extensive discussion. First, one need not be ethnically East Asian to be a Confucian. To deny this claim is as absurd as suggesting that one must be Greek in order to be a Platonist or an Aristotelian (p. xxii). Second, in order to be a viable, contemporary ‘‘world philosophy,’’ Confucianism must have (and has yet to develop) ways to accommodate cultural diversity and pluralism in practice. Third, Confucianism must show that it is not inconsistent with the insights of modern science. (This is particularly an issue if, like Neville, one is attracted to the more metaphysically baroque forms of Confucianism that developed in the Song and later dynasties.) Neville’s fourth insight is that the Confucian notion of ‘‘ritual’’ is a category that could significantly deepen and broaden Western philosophical discussions. Neville suggests that the semiotic work of the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce provides a useful framework for understanding and enriching the Confucian emphasis on ritual. Neville’s comments on Peirce are suggestive, but I wonder what Neville would say about the ‘‘functionalist’’ approach to ritual pioneered by Emile Durkheim. Durkheim argued, in works such as The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, that participation in ritual activities functions to express and (more importantly) maintain the individual’s commitment to society.1 Several commentators, including A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (who independently developed an approach to ritual similar to that of Durkheim) and more recently Robert F. Campany, have noted that this sort of functionalist interpretation of ritual is quite similar to that advanced by Xunzi more than 2,500 years ago.2 Functionalism helps us to understand (in naturalistic terms) why ritual is so important, why it is perfectly acceptable for it to take different forms in different societies, and why the decay of ritual leads to excessive individualism and, in Durkheim’s phrase, ‘‘anomie.’’ As far as I can see, all of this is at least con-

Han Fei and Confucianism: Toward a Synthesis

In this chapter, I begin with an acknowledgment of the differences between Han Fei’s political discourse and that of Confucians. In particular, the Confucians believed in the political efficacy of the transformative power of the ruler’s Virtue. Han Fei, in contrast, regards Virtue as exceedingly rare and impractical. However, despite these substantive disagreements, I contend that both Confucianism and Legalism have a place in today’s society. On the one hand, we would hope that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations will “do the tasks that have been assigned to [him or her]—and resolutely to refuse to do anything else,” just as Han Fei’s Supervisors of the Hat and Robe should stick to their own responsibilities and not meddle with anyone else’s. On the other hand, laws need to be interpreted: “Judges and juries must apply concepts like ‘informed consent,’ ‘reasonable doubt’ and ‘preponderance of evidence.’ And when they apply these concepts they are exercising wisdom” (emphasis in original). A little bit of virtue helps.

Zhuangzi’s Ironic Detachment and Political Commitment

Paul Gewirtz has suggested that contemporary Chinese society lacks a shared framework. A Rortian might describe this by saying that China lacks a “final vocabulary” of “thick terms” with which to resolve ethical disagreements. I briefly examine the strengths and weaknesses of Confucianism and Legalism as potential sources of such a final vocabulary, but most of this essay focuses on Zhuangzian Daoism. Zhuangzi 莊子 provides many stories and metaphors that can inspire advocates of political pluralism. However, I suggest that Zhuangzi is ultimately an “ironist” in Rorty’s sense. Many intellectuals assume there is something progressive and liberating about broadly ironic stances like relativism and skepticism. Ethically, though, irony is “the night in which all cows are black”: since it regards all positions as equally undermined, an ironic stance cannot be enlisted in support of tolerance or humanitarianism or in opposition to absolutism or cruelty.

Principles, Virtues, or Detachment? Some Appreciative Reflections on Karen Stohr’s On Manners

Karen Stohr’s book On Manners argues persuasively that rules of etiquette, though conventional, play an essential moral role, because they “serve as vehicles through which we express important moral values like respect and consideration for the needs, ideas, and opinions of others” (Stohr 2012: 3–4). Stohr frequently invokes Kantian concepts and principles in order to make her point. In Part 2 of this essay, I shall argue that the significance of etiquette is better understood using a virtue ethics framework, like that of Confucianism, rather than the language of Kantianism. Within the Chinese tradition, Daoists have frequently been critics of Confucian ritualism. Consequently, in Part 3, I shall consider some possible Daoist critiques of Stohr’s work.