Philip J. Ivanhoe

A Question of Faith: A New Interpretation of Mencius 2B.13

This paper discusses some of the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of Mencius 2B. 13. After considering the most important traditional Chinese commentaries, the author discusses the interpretations of a number of modern scholars, from both the East and the West. He then offers two new interpretations and concludes that the second is the most appropriate.

Lu Xiangshan’s Ethical Philosophy

Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1193), courtesy name Zijing 子靜, literary name Xiangshan 象山, was born in the town of Jinxi 金谿 in Jiangxi province. He was the youngest of six brothers, two of whom, fourth brother Jiushao 九紹 (fl. twelfth century), courtesy name Zimei 子美, literary name Suoshan 梭山, and fifth brother Jiuling 九齡 (1132–1180), courtesy name Zishou 子壽, literary name Fuzhai 復齋, were impressive philosophers in their own right. As we shall discuss below, Jiuling was present at and participated in the extended discussion and exchange Jiuyuan had with Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) at Goose Lake Temple (E hu si 鵝湖寺) in 1175; Jiushao initiated an important and extended scholarly debate with Zhu over the interpretation of a number of metaphysical issues central to daoxue philosophy at the time.

The Historical Significance and Contemporary Relevance of the Four-Seven Debate

This essay concerns some of the ways that the Four-Seven Debate, as represented by the extensive and systematic exchanges between Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪) (1501–1570) and Gi Dae-seung 奇大升 (Gobong 高峰) (1527–1572) and further developed in the correspondence between Seong Hon 成渾 (Ugye 牛溪) (1535–1598) and Yi I 李珥 (Yulgok 栗谷) (1536–1584), has been and remains philosophically significant for people today. It first attempts to describe why those involved in the Four-Seven Debate took it so seriously and were inspired to produce such a remarkable legacy. It then endeavors to show how the debate relates to issues that have been explored by important thinkers within the Western philosophical tradition and how these remain problems for contemporary moral metaphysics and moral psychology.

Historical Understanding in China and the West: Zhang, Collingwood and Mink

AbstractThis essay describes and compares three attempts to provide accounts of the nature of historical consciousness, along with accompanying explanations of how one comes to have historical knowledge. It explores, compares, and contrasts the views of the late Qing dynasty Chinese philosopher Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738–1801) and two Western philosophers – R.G. Collingwood (1889–1943) and Louis O. Mink (1921–83). These three thinkers all present historical understanding as a distinctive type of knowledge and share the aim of defending the discipline of history as a special, independent field of intellectual endeavor. Aside from analyzing these aspects of their respective theories, this essay aims to stimulate extensive and nuanced comparisons between Chinese and more recent Western forms of historical consciousness. While the comparison presented here is but one way forward, it not only seeks to offer specific insights generated by the comparative project but also to set forth a range of themes worthy of future study. For example, the analysis presented here shows that Zhang’s reflections on how historians relate to the past can contribute to current discussions of epistemic virtues.

Shifting Contours of the Confucian Tradition

Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics, edited by Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng, and John Henderson, is an anthology containing nine original essays plus an introductory chapter written by two of the three editors. The essays offer contemporary theoretical accounts of the practice of Confucian interpretation, examine traditional Chinese views on orthodoxy and heresy, and explore issues regarding syncretism and the struggle for self definition among a range of Confucian thinkers. The volume offers a rich resource for students of the Confucian tradition, and a number of the essays will be appreciated by anyone interested in the general or comparative study of traditions and their interpretation. I learned something important from every essay in this book, and each made me think about new issues in new ways. Some left me with questions as well as answers, which is often a mark of the best original scholarship. In ‘‘A Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now,’’ Michael Nylan argues that there was no orthodox synthesis in the Han and that for most of the period the notion of what constituted being a Confucian was in a fluid state, much as it was during the late Warring States period. One of the first claims Nylan musters in defense of this view is the inherent vagueness of the term ju. This is a very good point, and one might support it further by noting that such vagueness can be found even within the Lunyü itself. If we consider Confucius’ various ‘‘disciples’’—several of whom he criticizes and some of whom he denounces in the course of the Lunyü—we find examples of all three senses of the word ju that Nylan describes (pp. 18–19). Nylan also is surely right to claim that contemporary scholars tend to read too much Neo-Confucianism back into the tradition, often accepting the accounts of later Confucians as accurate history. I wonder, though, whether her standard of ‘‘a single synthesis’’ (p. 23) might represent an example of reading later, idealized Confucian views back into the tradition. The ideal of ‘‘a single synthesis’’ strikes me as offering too high a criterion for any period of the Confucian tradition. Nylan begins by citing ‘‘the Ch’eng-Chu masters’ palpable distaste for Han Confucianism.’’ However, no one should accept the idea that the ‘‘Ch’eng-Chu masters’’ ever represented all of the Confucian tradition. Not only was there the competing Lu-Wang