Bryon J. Moraski

Eroding Democracy: Federal Intervention in Russia's Gubernatorial Elections

Under some conditions, electoral politics may undermine democratization, even when the elections themselves adequately meet the usual standards. To illustrate this point, the article examines the dynamics of gubernatorial elections held in the 89 regions that comprise the Russian Federation during the first term of President Vladimir Putin. The analysis considers whether pressure from the federal executive and strategic changes in election timing influenced the results of these elections. The study contends that Putins experience with gubernatorial elections led him to question their value and, ultimately, to eliminate them. Meanwhile, several of Russias governors sent clear signals that they did not value free and fair elections. Since governors presiding over Russias poorest regions were also the ones most likely to be insulated from public accountability, voters saw little value in defending the institution of gubernatorial elections. This helps explain the lack of public outcry following Putins decision.

Mandating Party Development in the Russian Federation: Effects of the 2001 Party Law

Abstract For the first 10 years of competitive elections, Russian party development remained behind party development in many Central and East European states, let alone the rest of Europe. Perhaps not surprisingly then, one of President Putin’s first reforms entailed requiring political parties to register regional branches in a majority of Russia’s 89 regions. While the declared intent of the law was to spur the development of a national party system, the requirement – 100 registered members in at least 45 regions – appeared more like a formality than either a carrot or a stick motivating parties to develop regional organization. Moreover, the Putin administration has pursued various other reforms widely considered undemocratic. Given the ambiguity of Putin’s actions while president of the Russian Federation, this paper takes a closer look at one of the most commonly overlooked presidential reforms – the 2001 law on political parties – to determine whether the legislation correlated with greater party organization during the 2003 Duma election.

Closed-list proportional representation in Russia The fates of former district deputies

This work considers how a ruling party in an increasingly authoritarian regime utilizes legislative electoral system changes. It argues that the placement of former district deputies on the list of Russia’s ruling party after the move to a PR-only system reflected an interest in expanding its presence in the countryside as well as the attractiveness of the ruling party to the former district deputies themselves. It submits that both the party’s willingness to place former district deputies on its list and the willingness of the deputies to accept positions should vary by previous party affiliations, yielding predictable patterns in the aggregate. In terms of list ranking, it finds that the ruling party’s district deputies received significantly better placement than previously independent deputies, but not better placement than district deputies who made the list but had competed under a different party label in the previous election.

Prospects for professional parliaments in Russia's regions

The executive–legislative framework employed in the republic of Udmurtia throughout the 1990s distinguished it from other regions in Russia, making it a crucial case for analysis. While Udmurtias parliamentary executive should have dampened incumbency rates in the republic, the number of incumbent legislators winning re-election has increased significantly over time. At the same time, the proportion of business and industrial interests in parliament has also increased. With this set of politicians representing broader societal interests in the republic, these findings provide some hope for the rise of minimally responsive, increasingly professionalized regional legislatures in Russia, as opposed to government by apparatchiks. In this context, Putins decision to appoint governors should spur political conflict in Russia as regional elites with personal stakes in their regional economies and vested interests in democratic institutions confront an encroaching federal government.

Adapting to closed-list proportional representation: lessons from Ukraine

ABSTRACT This paper examines the implications of Ukraine’s move from a mixed electoral system to one of proportional representation in the 2006 parliamentary elections. In particular, it seeks to understand how the elimination of district contests affected the two major parties’ strategies in selecting candidates. Two strategies are outlined: prioritizing inclusion and prioritizing cohesion. Under the former, parties co-opt unaffiliated district deputies to improve their electoral fortunes despite potential costs to party discipline. The latter involves parties selecting affiliated deputies on the expectation of greater loyalty if elected. The analysis reveals that while the ruling party, Our Ukraine, employed a cautious version of inclusion, its opponent, the Party of Regions, emphasized cohesion. The findings show that “one size does not fit all” when it comes to how parties react to the introduction of list-only systems. Furthermore, given the greater subsequent success of The Party of Regions in gaining office, the results question the degree to which ruling parties benefit electorally from greater inclusion when responding to the advent of more proportional electoral rules.

Reverse coattail effects in undemocratic elections: an analysis of Russian locomotives

ABSTRACT This article argues that the effectiveness of the tactics ruling parties use to control the electoral arena may depend on the electoral experience of its subordinates. To substantiate this point, the work examines Russia’s “locomotives” – the practice of placing regional governors on the list of the ruling party, United Russia, during national legislative elections. It argues that electoral payoffs also came from select regions without locomotives. Given the move to appointed governors, list exclusion likely indicated gubernatorial vulnerability. As a result, governors left off United Russia’s list may have responded by seeking to demonstrate their electoral utility, and those with longer tenures were more likely to succeed in these efforts. An analysis of the 2007 Duma elections shows that United Russia’s vote share was higher in regions where long-serving governors were left off the list. Since Russia’s appointment system dramatically changed the gubernatorial corps between 2007 and 2011, the article also considers changes in the effects of list placement over time. It finds that the relationship between list exclusion and higher vote shares for United Russia disappears as governors with electoral experience were removed from office.