William M. Reisinger

Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction?

The political science literature reflects two viewpoints regarding the formation of party systems in post-Soviet societies. Scholars drawing on traditional theories of party formation usually argue that the formation of institutionalized party systems in post-Communist states will be an extended process. However, newer studies reveal that parties, partisan support, and even party systems may form relatively quickly. To illuminate this debate, we offer analysis of both mass and elite cross-temporal data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. These data reveal a rapid rise in partisanship, strong partisan voting in parliamentary elections, a sharp differentiation on issues between members of various party blocs, a high degree of issue cohesion among those who identify with a given party, and a strong correlation between the policy views of elites and ordinary citizens identifying with the same party. In short, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that party systems are developing in the post-Soviet societies.

Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: a Further Commentary On Finifter and Mickiewicz

1V tSUnion. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), however, based on a 1989 survey in the Soviet Union, found that the less well educated were more supportive of individual locus of control than were the better educated. Examining survey data collected in the former USSR during 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1995, we find consistent reconfirmation of the modernization theory, despite a major decline in support for an opportunities society that occurs between 1992 and 1995. This recent increase in preference for socialism is explained by rising nationalism, growing nostalgia for communists, and disillusionment with certain aspects of the market economy, particularly the perceived growth of social inequality.

Eroding Democracy: Federal Intervention in Russia's Gubernatorial Elections

Under some conditions, electoral politics may undermine democratization, even when the elections themselves adequately meet the usual standards. To illustrate this point, the article examines the dynamics of gubernatorial elections held in the 89 regions that comprise the Russian Federation during the first term of President Vladimir Putin. The analysis considers whether pressure from the federal executive and strategic changes in election timing influenced the results of these elections. The study contends that Putins experience with gubernatorial elections led him to question their value and, ultimately, to eliminate them. Meanwhile, several of Russias governors sent clear signals that they did not value free and fair elections. Since governors presiding over Russias poorest regions were also the ones most likely to be insulated from public accountability, voters saw little value in defending the institution of gubernatorial elections. This helps explain the lack of public outcry following Putins decision.

The Road to Post-Communism Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991,

The beginnings of independent political activity the evolution of independent political movements after 1988 the rebirth of politics in Russia the return of St Petersburg the Russian labour movement 1989-91 - the mirage of a Russian Solidarnosc the rise and fall of the Georgian nationalist movement popular movements in Estonia triumph and foreboding. Appendix: list of organizations.

Political norms in rural Russia: Evidence from public attitudes

IN ANY COUNTRY, the citizens who reside in cities, as opposed to towns and villages, are likely to have a disproportionate visibility in public life and in the mass media. This greater visibility translates into greater influence over perceptions (domestic and foreign) about the nature, pace or style of life characterising that country. Yet paying insufficient attention to rural citizens may bias ones understanding of political dynamics. Certainly, that possibility exists for analysts of political change in the former Soviet Union. During much of the Soviet period, few Western scholars had access to the countryside and few rural Soviet residents could travel to the West. Both the Harvard Interview Project and the Soviet Interview Project, which surveyed emigres from the USSR, included predominantly former residents of Soviet cities. Some of the first Western-sponsored direct surveys of Soviet publics were conducted only in Moscow or by telephone, which leaves the small town and rural populace underrepresented. Even now, in post-Soviet Russia, the dramatic changes in the two largest cities of Moscow and St Petersburg-the cities which most Western scholars frequently visit-may convey a misleading impression about the depth of support for market reforms and democratic institutions. Thus great care must be taken to place rural outlooks and behaviours in the proper relationship to urban ones. In a recent article in this journal, Stephen K. Wegren argues for the importance of analysing political values among Russias rural population.1 We agree with his call for greater scholarly attention to this important segment of the Russian populace. The evidence that Wegren is able to present, however, relates only indirectly to such values. We shed additional light on the state of rural Russian political norms using data from large-scale surveys of randomly selected citizens. We focus on the values of rural Russians (350 were interviewed in 1991 and 284 in 1992) but contrast them with the values of urban Russians as well as with those of respondents in Ukraine and Lithuania.2 The ability to provide these contrasts permits us to assess the particularity of Russian rural outlooks and therefore reexamine several of Wegrens conclusions. We find that, while Russian rural political preferences are not distributed in the same way as among urban dwellers, they actually have shifted in response to changing conditions. In fact, the distributions we find lend little support to Wegrens culturalist approach and much stronger support to theories that stress the varying political

The Gender Divide in Russian Politics

Abstract In this article, we revisit the question of the gender divide in Russian politics. The starting point of our analysis is the observed gender differences in voting in the 1995 parliamentary elections. The article is devoted to an evaluation of the reasons for the observed differences in party support. We document the fact that women, on average, believe more strongly than men that women should play an equal role in running the state. In addition, women are significantly more likely than men to reject the notion that women would stay home if given the choice. These attitudes are significantly related to party choice in the 1995 parliamentary election in Russia. The probability of voting for the political party titled Women of Russia is not only related to a strict demographic gender division, but also to the level of adherence to a “womens equality” identity dimension.

The Russian 1996 Presidential Election: Referendum on Democracy or a Personality Contest?

Abstract Assessments of the 1996 Russian presidential election have produced a cacophony of theories concerning the factors that led to Boris Yeltsins victory over his second-round opponent, Gennaddii Zyuganov. As scholars have attempted to put the development of Russian elections into perspective, many have used this election as a means of unearthing the factors that may prove vital for the sustenance of democracy. Examining survey data collected in Russia during the spring of 1997 and comparing it with other pre- and post-election data, we find that the election can be understood as reflecting short term performance, candidate images and economic orientations rather than a profound referendum on the type of political system preferred by the Russian people.

Establishing representation in post-Soviet societies: change in mass and elite attitudes toward democracy and the market, 1992–1995

Abstract Competitive elections and a competitive party system are two institutions presumed to promote responsive government and democracy. Building on a survey design conceptualized by Donald Stokes and Warren Miller in the 1960s, this study examines the congruence between the policy preferences of parliament members and their constituents in post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. The evidence suggests that the newly competitive and democratic elections, as well as the rise of political parties that occurred after the collapse of Communism, were indeed enhancing political representation in these post-Soviet societies. Given the policy orientation of the newly elected leaders, however, the outcome does not necessarily imply a consolidation of support for democracy and a market economy.

Mass and Elite Political Outlooks in Post-Soviet Russia: How Congruent?

Political scientists have long sought to understand the representation of mass publics by their political leaders. Empirical research has primarily focused on patterns of representation in industrial democracies with es tablished democratic traditions. Post-communist countries like Russia, by contrast, provide the opportunity to examine patterns of and attitudes toward representation in a society in which the electoral institutions and the attitudes are newly emerging. We employ survey data from coordinated samples of Russian elites and the mass public carried out in 1992 to address the following questions: Who are the elites in todays Russia? Are their views different from those of the public? In particular, where are the critical pressures for change in Russian politics and society coming from and who is resisting change-those at the top or the bottom of the political hierarchy? How do cleavages among different elite groups relate to the atti tudinal cleavages among the general public? To what extent did the first competitive elections in Russia produce attitudinal correspondence be tween Russian citizens and their representatives in the legislature? We ana lyze elite and mass outlooks on key political and economic dimensions, first for the country as a whole, then within different districts. We show that Russian elites differ in social background from the mass public in the same manner as Western elites differ from the public. Russian elites also differ attitudinally from the Russian populace by being, on average, more reformist (politically and economically). The correspondence, or con gruence, between Russian elite and mass views-overall and region by region-is only moderate but of roughly the same magnitude as that found in Western democracies.

Defense allocations in Eastern Europe: Alliance politics and leadership change∗

To investigate the influence of international and domestic factors on the defense spending of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, we evaluate competing hypotheses of 1) intra‐alliance dynamics and 2) the effect of changes in political leadership. We analyze data from 1965–1982, both pooled and for each state individually. We conclude that the defense spending of the Pact members does not go primarily toward the purchase of Pact‐wide deterrence and that models based upon the public‐goods approach have little explanatory power when applied to Eastern Europe. Additionally, we find that East European leadership changes produce only a small impact on military spending levels.