C. Daniel Batson

Empathy and attitudes: can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group improve feelings toward the group?

Results of 3 experiments suggest that feeling empathy for a member of a stigmatized group can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. In Experiments 1 and 2, inducing empathy for a young woman with AIDS (Experiment 1) or a homeless man (Experiment 2) led to more positive attitudes toward people with AIDS or toward the homeless, respectively. Experiment 3 tested possible limits of the empathy-attitude effect by inducing empathy toward a member of a highly stigmatized group, convicted murderers, and measuring attitudes toward this group immediately and then 1-2 weeks later. Results provided only weak evidence of improved attitudes toward murderers immediately but strong evidence of improved attitudes 1-2 weeks later.

Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus Imaging How You Would Feel

Although often confused, imagining how another feels and imagining how you would feel are two distinct forms of perspective taking with different emotional consequences. The former evokes empathy; the latter, both empathy and distress. To test this claim, undergraduates listened to a (bogus) pilot radio interview with a young woman in serious need. One third were instructed to remain objective while listening; one third, to imagine how the young woman felt; and one third, to imagine how they would feel in her situation. The two imagine perspectives produced the predicted distinct pattern of emotions, suggesting different motivational consequences: Imagining how the other feels produced empathy, which has been found to evoke altruistic motivation; imagining how you would feel produced empathy, but it also produced personal distress, which has been found to evoke egoistic motivation.

Prosocial Motivation: Is it ever Truly Altruistic?

Publisher Summary Prosocial motivation is egoistic when the ultimate goal is to increase ones own welfare; it is altruistic when the ultimate goal is to increase anothers welfare. The view that all prosocial behavior, regardless how noble in appearance, is motivated by some form of self-benefits may seem cynical. But it is the dominant view in contemporary psychology. Most contemporary psychologists who use the term have no intention of challenging the dominant view that all human behavior, including all prosocial behavior, is motivated by self-serving, egoistic desires. Contemporary pseudoaltruistic views can be classified into three types: altruism as prosocial behavior, not motivation, altruism as prosocial behavior seeking internal rewards, and altruism as prosocial behavior to reduce aversive arousal. If altruistic motivation exists, then one has to make some fundamental changes in the conception of human motivation and indeed of human nature. As yet, the evidence is not sufficiently clear to justify such changes. If the conceptual analysis and research outlined in the chapter have merit, then the threshold of an empirical answer to the question why one care for other will be reached.

Empathy, Attitudes, and Action: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Motivate One to Help the Group?

Research reveals that inducing empathy for a member of a stigmatized group can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. But do these more positive attitudes translate into action on behalf of the group? Results of an experiment suggested an affirmative answer to this question. Undergraduates first listened to an interview with a convicted heroin addict and dealer; they were then given a chance to recommend allocation of Student Senate funds to an agency to help drug addicts. (The agency would not help the addict whose interview they heard.) Participants induced to feel empathy for the addict allocated more funds to the agency. Replicating past results, these participants also reported more positive attitudes toward people addicted to hard drugs. In addition, an experimental condition in which participants were induced to feel empathy for a fictional addict marginally increased action on behalf of, and more positive attitudes toward, drug addicts.

Is Empathy-Induced Helping Due to Self-Other Merging?

Two experiments tested the idea that empathy-induced helping is due to self–other merging. To manipulate empathy, half of the participants in each experiment received instructions to remain objective while hearing about a young woman in need (low-empathy condition), and half received instructions to

Neural Responses to Ingroup and Outgroup Members' Suffering Predict Individual Differences in Costly Helping

Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The present study investigates the neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team (outgroup member) experience pain. They were subsequently able to choose to help the other by enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the others pain. Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens activation and the degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the propensity to help.

Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that prosocial motivation associated with feeling empathy for a person in need is directed toward the ultimate goal of benefiting that person, not toward some subtle form of self-benefit. We explored two new egoistic alternatives to this hypothesis. The empathy-specific reward hypothesis proposes that the prosocial motivation associated with empathy is directed toward the goal of obtaining social or self-rewards (i.e., praise, honor, and pride). The empathy-specific punishment hypothesis proposes that this motivation is directed toward the goal of avoiding social or self-punishments (i.e., censure, guilt, and shame). Study 1 provided an initial test of the empathy-specific reward hypothesis. Studies 2 through 4 used three procedures to test the empathy-specific punishment hypothesis. In Study 5, a Stroop procedure was used to assess the role of reward-relevant, punishment-relevant, and victim-relevant cognitions in mediating the empathy-helping relationship. Results of these five studies did not support either the empathy-specific reward or the empathy-specific punishment hypothesis. Instead, results of each supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Evidence that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation continues to mount.

Empathic joy and the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Three experiments tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victims joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victims welfare (the empathy-altruism hypothesis). In Experiment 1, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy persons condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the persons condition having improved--and of their experiencing empathic joy--was 20%, was 50%, or was 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Measuring Religion as Quest: 1) Validity Concerns

In this paper, concerns are addressed regarding the validity of the Quest scale introduced by Batson (1976) and Batson and Ventis (1982). Some have wondered whether this scale might be more a measure of agnosticism, of anti-orthodoxy, of sophomoric religious doubt, or of religious conflict, if indeed, it is a measure of anything religious at all. We have reviewed the available evidence regarding validity, much of which has appeared in unpublished research reports, theses, dissertations, or convention papers, and thus has not been widely available. Based on the evidence, we have concluded that the Quest scale does indeed measure a dimension of personal religion very much like the one it was designed to measure: an open-ended, active approach to existential questions that resists clearcut, pat answers. Concerns regarding the reliability of the Quest scale, which have proved more persistent, are addressed in a companion paper.

An additional antecedent of empathic concern: valuing the welfare of the person in need.

Two experiments examined the role of valuing the welfare of a person in need as an antecedent of empathic concern. Specifically, these experiments explored the relation of such valuing to a well-known antecedent--perspective taking. In Experiment 1, both perspective taking and valuing were manipulated, and each independently increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping behavior. In Experiment 2, only valuing was manipulated. Manipulated valuing increased measured perspective taking and, in part as a result, increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping. Valuing appears to be an important, largely overlooked, situational antecedent of feeling empathy for a person in need.