C. E. M. Hansel

The risk taken in driving under the influence of alcohol.

The hazards of inducing anaesthesia in patients with a full stomach are now widely appreciated, and for this reason the pre-operative preparation of diabetic subjects with oral glucose is deprecated. Other problems which anaesthetists may encounter are the incompatibility of pitocin with light cyclopropane anaesthesia and the possibility of citrate intoxication as a differential diagnosis for cardiovascular collapse after massive transfusion of stored blood. In very few of the cases reported did the anaesthetist know of the use of various drugs before operation, or associate hypotension or prolonged unconsciousness with any form of routine medical treatment. It is hoped that this publication will focus the attention of all medical practitioners on the fact that during anaesthesia unexpected adverse effects may be produced by drugs which do not appear to have any side-effects in the conscious subject. It is to be expected that many additions to the list of drugs discussed above will be noted in the future.

The time taken to decide as a measure of subjective probability

Abstract An attempt has been made to obtain a measure of subjective probability without requiring the subject to estimate what proportion of successes (or failures) he would achieve in a given number of attempts at a particular task. The measure consisted of the time taken by the subject to say “Yes” or “No”, thereby indicating whether or not he could hit a ball through a gap of given width. These decision times were determined at varying levels of subjective difficulty and probability. An examination was also made of the differences between the times taken to make estimates and times taken to decide “Yes” or “No” at corresponding levels of subjective probability.

Subjective probability, gambling and intelligence.

WE do not make a general statement to the effect that subjective probabilities in all situations diminish with increase in age, but merely refer to the subjective probability of winning the uncertain prizes in our particular experiments. Secondly, we do not speak of subjective estimates of probability but of ‘subjective probability’. That is, our subjects do not make any estimates of probabilities. Indeed, these are explicitly stated to them. What they do is make a choice or express a preference; and this choice or preference is perhaps influenced by their subjective assessment of the value of the prize—the point which Prof. Heath emphasizes—as well as by how likely they think they are of getting it. We have no indication that our subjects distinguish between these two components in making their choice. We referred in particular to the second component but do not wish to deny the possible significance of the first. Indeed, we explicitly stated in the last sentence of our communication that the subjective probability on which the preference is based is affected by the value of the prizes offered. On the other hand, if the explanation rested only on the supposed reduction with age in the “imagined appetite for sweets”, we should also have to conclude that this appetite increases with intelligence.