Caelesta Braun

Legislative lobbying in context : towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union

ABSTRACT We outline a conceptual framework that identifies and characterizes the contextual nature of interest group politics in the European Union (EU) to better understand variation in interest group mobilization, lobbying strategies and interest group influence. We focus on two sets of contextual factors that affect EU interest group lobbying. First, we argue that interest group activities are shaped by several policy-related factors, namely the complexity, the policy type, the status quo, the salience and the degree of conflict characterizing legislative proposals and the associated issues. Second, we posit that lobbying in the EU is affected by institutional factors that vary within the EU political system, such as the institutional fragmentation within the European Commission and the European Parliament and across different national political systems depending on the patterns of interest intermediation or the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers. Finally, we theorize about the interrelationship between contextual features and interest group properties and summarize the findings of the collection.

Open the door to more of the same? The development of interest group representation at the WTO

The openness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) towards non-state actors has led to much debate among scholars and practitioners. The objective of this paper is to add empirical knowledge to this ongoing debate. In particular, we examine the effects of allowing interest groups to participate at WTO Ministerial Conferences (MCs) during 1996–2009 by analyzing a novel dataset of 1992 interest organizations that attended seven MCs. The data we present demonstrate that, in contrast to what many expected, the WTO did not attract a more diverse population of interest groups since these organizations were allowed to participate at MCs. Moreover, we observe an increasing overrepresentation of some specific issue-related interests, especially agriculture, and a strong presence of Northern American and European interest organizations attending MCs. Another important observation is that MCs are not particularly dominated by business interests at the expense of NGOs (non-governmental organization), who are also consistently well represented at the WTO meetings. Yet, the high levels of volatility observed at the level of individual organizations suggests that, although it is rather easy to start lobbying at WTO MCs, only a relatively small number of interest organizations keep a long lobbying presence at this level.

Interest organizations across economic sectors: explaining interest group density in the European Union

ABSTRACT The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the ‘supply’ of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce ‘demand’ for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions.

The domestic and global origins of transnational advocacy: explaining lobbying presence during WTO ministerial conferences

This article explains varying levels of transnational advocacy initiated by domestic organized interests. Theoretically, we integrate the constraining and enabling impact of the domestic context with factors related to global opportunity structures. We test our hypotheses with an original data set consisting of all national organized interests that attended the Ministerial Conferences of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the period 1995 through 2011. Instead of viewing transnational advocacy as a reaction to a lack of domestic political attention and an attempt to compensate for domestic deprivation, our analyses actually show the opposite. Organized interests that originate from democratic, mostly wealthy countries, and that enjoy robust access to domestic resources, are much more responsive to shifts in the global policy agenda. More generally, our analysis of the factors that drive transnational advocacy point at the irrelevance to artificially juxtapose domestic and global explanations.

The Driving Forces of Stability Exploring the Nature of Long-Term Bureaucracy–Interest Group Interactions

This article explores the nature of long-term interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups by examining two behavioral logics associated with stability in public policy making. In addition to the implicit short-term strategic choices that usually feature in resource-exchange explanations of interest group access to policy makers, this article shows that bureaucracy–interest group interactions are likely to be dictated by routine behavior and anticipating future consequences as well. By drawing on survey and face-to-face interview data of Dutch senior civil servants and interest groups, the analyses reveal that a practice of regular consultations, the need for political support, and a perceived influential position together explain why bureaucrats maintain interactions with interest groups. The combination of these behavioral logics adds important explanatory leverage to existing resource-exchange explanations and shows that organizational processes as well as long-term strategic considerations should be taken into account to fully explain bureaucracy–interest group interactions.

Is the EU different? Comparing the diversity of national and EU-level systems of interest organisations

Abstract The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We differentiate system, policy domain and organisational factors and examine their effects on interest group diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These findings suggest that the EU is less of a sui generis system than commonly assumed and imply the need for more fine-grained analyses of interest group diversity.

Making Inference across Mobilisation and Influence Research: Comparing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Mapping of Interest Systems:

Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.

Stakeholders wanted! Why and how European Union agencies involve non-state stakeholders

ABSTRACT This article examines why and how European Union agencies involve non-state stakeholders – such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business associations or trade unions – via three access instruments: public consultations; stakeholder bodies; and representation in management boards. We assess how the use of these instruments varies across agencies, and how they are linked to different motivations driving the demand for stakeholder participation. We present two alternative sets of hypotheses, first focusing on agencies’ need for information, organizational capacity and reputation, and second, considering stakeholder involvement as an instrument of legislative control. We draw on a new dataset of stakeholder involvement practices of the full population of EU agencies, compiled via document analysis and interviews. Our findings indicate that stakeholder involvement is a double-edged sword, contributing to agency accountability and control, but with an inevitable risk of dependence on the regulated industry.

Mapping the WTO Interest Group System: Exploring Density, Diversity, and Stability Over Time

The relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and interest groups has been and still is a contentious topic in many political and scholarly debates.1 One of the key issues in these debates is the access that the WTO offers to a variety of interest groups wanting to participate in trade policy making. Although access to the WTO’s predecessor, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), was always limited, since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 the number of access opportunities has slowly grown. Despite these new opportunities the level of openness of the WTO to societal interests is still among the lowest of all international organizations (Van den Bossche 2008). Many interest groups, in particular nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have consequently contended that the WTO needs to become more responsive to their input (Steffek and Kissling 2006).2 The call for more openness to interest groups on the part of the WTO has been much discussed in academic circles, attracting both proponents and opponents. Many students of international trade argue that in order to increase its expertise, accountability, and legitimacy, the WTO should allow a higher number of more diverse societal interests access to its decision-making process (Charnovitz 2000; Robertson 2000; Scholte 2000).3 Opponents contend that the WTO should uphold its system of limited access for interest groups. Given the inherently biased nature of interest group systems, they argue, interest groups from developed countries would likely dominate the scene (Fried 1997; Spiro 2000).

On the forces of policy change and joint causation: insights from the banker’s bonus case:

One of the few robust findings in the public policy literature is that policy dynamics are both a function of stability and volatility. And although most theories of public policy making posit the occurrence of policy junctures as necessary conditions for significant change, studies that set out to unravel the underlying mechanisms of such policy junctures remain relatively rare. This article further develops the idea of policy junctures, commonly hypothesized to initiate significant change, as essentially entailing joint causation. We illustrate the joint and reinforcing nature of forces of change with a case study of bonus regulation. Based on document analysis and a political claim analysis, this article shows that most changes in bonus regulation were of a marginal nature. We argue that the intrinsically attractive nature of performance rewards that a bonus practice entails combined with a sheer lack of alternatives supported by a strong coalition on how to curb risk appetite in financial markets seem to count for the resilience of bonus practices. Theoretically, the case study contributes to theory development on joint causation that causes major policy change. Empirically, it unravels a key mechanism employed by the financial sector to resist reforms: offering an alternative no one can refuse. Points for practitioners There is a broad consensus in the policy literature that policy change usually results from multiple forces. We identify this crucial jointly causal nature of policy change and suggest that among the forces of change a strong policy alternative capable of uniting a broad coalition of stakeholders is a necessary condition for policy change. Financial reforms, in particular the practice of bonus payment, are thus not likely to result from tight regulation, but rather from real alternatives on how to reward professional excellence and curb risk appetite.