Joost Berkhout

Measuring the size and scope of the EU interest group population

We present a new data set enumerating the population of organizations listed and/or registered as lobbyists in the European Union. In the first part of the paper we describe how we arrived at the population data set by drawing on three independent sources (CONECCS; Landmarks; European Parliament registry). We briefly discuss the validity of these registers in the context of recent substantial changes to each of them. In the second part, we present descriptive information on the number and type of groups as well as their territorial origins. In the final section, we outline potential research questions that can be addressed with the new data set for further research on the role of groups in the EU policy process.

Counting organized interests in the European Union: a comparison of data sources

ABSTRACT In contrast to large-n research on US interest organizations using lobby registration data, European Union (EU) scholars have used a variety of data sources, including registries maintained by the European Commission, directories of interest organizations active in Brussels, and data on access to the European Parliament (EP). This diversity of sources raises important questions about their comparability. To what extent do these different EU sources actually measure the same population of interest organizations? We find that the several data sources vary markedly over EU institution and publisher. The paper discusses the methodological and substantive causes of these differences and their implications for further development of large-n research on interest organization politics in the EU.1

The Density of the EU Interest System: A Test of the ESA Model

To evaluate calls for a more theoretically generalizable, large- N study of EU interest representation, we adapt the ESA model of interest system density, originally developed to study the interest communities of the American states, to the EU case. We necessarily modify both model and measures in order to account for the unique features of the EU policy process. We test the model with OLS regression using data on the density of different types or guilds (economic and social sectors) of organized interests in the European Union. We use the findings to discuss the viability of inter-system transfers of theories about the politics of interest representation.

The changing demography of the EU interest system since 1990

European Union scholars have used a variety of data sources to assess the contours of the EU interest community, including directories maintained by the European Commission and commercial directories of interest organizations active in Brussels. Scholars have typically relied on only one of these sources, the least comprehensive, to assess demographic change in the EU population. We construct and then use a patched-up design focused on the more comprehensive data provided by several directories of interest groups to provide a more valid assessment of demographic changes in the EU interest system since 1990.

The European Union Interest System in Comparative Perspective: A Bridge Too Far?

Can we meaningfully compare within a single theoretical framework the politics of interest representation in the European Union with its counterparts in the United States and other national political systems? We address this question by first considering several candidate explanations for the lack of broad-ranging comparative research on interest representation, focusing in the end on the problem of context. We then argue that much of the recent progress in the literature is a result more of segmentation of theoretical issues. The third section discusses how this successful strategy of segmentation has unfortunately raised new theoretical barriers to comparative analysis. This argument is explored by comparing work on organised interests in the EU with two other cases – the hyper-pluralistic interest politics of the United States and the neo-corporatist politics of the Netherlands.

Short-term volatility in the EU interest community

We know remarkably little about the volatility of vital rates of organizations lobbying the European Union (EU), in large part because of the limited and problematic nature of data on the EU interest community. After discussing these problems, we try to develop a better assessment of the short term – 2003 to 2009 – volatility of birth and death rates of the EU interest community using data from the Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society (CONECCS) lobby registration system of the European Commission and the door pass system for lobbyists of the European Parliament. We find that the EU interest system is surprisingly volatile even over the short term.

Interest organizations across economic sectors: explaining interest group density in the European Union

ABSTRACT The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the ‘supply’ of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce ‘demand’ for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions.

Images of an unbiased interest system

ABSTRACT Since political scientists were introduced to the concept of ‘the scope and bias of the pressure system’ by Schattschneider more than half a century ago, we have grappled with the lack of a standard against which to assess bias. Still, scholars have continued to address Schattschneiders provocative claim. This means that they must have in their minds at least implicit images of the unknown state of an unbiased interest system. We uncover these implicit images in this analysis both for their own intrinsic interest and perhaps as a foundation for more progressive research on biases in interest representation. Ten scholars who have done considerable work on the politics of interest representation were asked to provide a brief description of what he or she would see as an unbiased interest system. After presenting each, we summarize the themes that emerged and discuss possible avenues for empirical research on bias.

Is the EU different? Comparing the diversity of national and EU-level systems of interest organisations

Abstract The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We differentiate system, policy domain and organisational factors and examine their effects on interest group diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These findings suggest that the EU is less of a sui generis system than commonly assumed and imply the need for more fine-grained analyses of interest group diversity.

Making Inference across Mobilisation and Influence Research: Comparing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Mapping of Interest Systems:

Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.