Cameron Ross

The transition from communism to capitalism : ruling elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin

Introduction Soviet Society: Institutional Polyarchy PART I: POLITICAL ELITE DIVISION IN THE LATE USSR The CPSU Ruling Elite 1966-1991 The Central Committee Apparat 1981-1991 The Government Bureaucracy The Supreme Soviet of the USSR: From Fusion to Fission The Political Elite under Gorbachev: Cohesion and Division PART II: THE POST-SOVIET GOVERNING ELITES The Ascendant Elite: Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation 1990-1993 Mutation: The Political Elite 1991-1995: Reproduction or Circulation? Transition under Yeltsin: Elite Values Conclusions Appendices Index

Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia

IN THIS STUDY I TEST THE DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY of regional assembly elections which were conducted in Russia over the period from December 2003 to March 2009. Whilst we should not fall into the electoral fallacy of equating the instigation of elections with democracy, ‘the right to vote in free and fair elections and to hold those in office accountable is surely an essential, if not a sufficient condition for the development of a consolidated democracy’ (Sisk 2001, p. 115). For Schedler, ‘the democratic ideal requires that all citizens enjoy unimpaired opportunities to formulate their political preferences, to signify them to one another, and to have them weighed equally in public decision making’ (Schedler 2002, p. 40). For Diamond, ‘Elections are ‘‘free’’ and fair when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, where there is substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices’ (Diamond 2002, p. 28). In turn, free and fair elections are impossible without the instigation of other key aspects of ‘liberal democracy’, such as respect for the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and the instigation of basic human rights: such as, freedom of the press, assembly, and association. However, as I demonstrate below, regional elections in Russia are still a long way from meeting such criteria. As Petrov concludes, ‘the fate of elections in Russia is more and more often decided not at the polling stations, but in Kremlin offices, courtrooms, and election commission headquarters’ (Petrov 2003, p. 2). For Alexander Lukin, ‘electoral clanism’ rather than electoral democracy, dominates the political landscape in Russia. Here, ‘elections are not a means of selecting public officials according to law, . . . rather they are merely the means of settling disputes among post-totalitarian clans that generally operate outside the law’ (Lukin 1999, p. 108). In democracies, according to O’Donnell (1994, p. 61), ‘accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 63, No. 4, June 2011, 641–661

Sub-National Elections in Russia: Variations in United Russia's Domination of Regional Assemblies

This study examines the support for United Russia in 43 regional assembly elections which were conducted over the period from March 2008 to March 2011. In contrast to previous studies, which have tended to focus on the overall results of regional elections or just on the party-list votes, it provides a quantitative analysis of the votes for United Russia in the plural single member district contests. By widening the traditional focus on the aggregate results and party-list voting the study brings to light important variations in the patterns of United Russias electoral domination of regional assemblies. The specific form of United Russias domination depends on the configuration of regional elites and their strategies. Social and economic features of the regions have little impact on the degree and modes of United Russias electoral domination, but influence the ability of regional leaders to ensure electoral mobilisation in the regions and this is more significant the higher the level of the election.

Federalism and democratization in Russia

Abstract The scholarly literature on democratic transitions has largely ignored developments at the local level and the relationship between federalism and democracy. In this work I examine the development of federalism in Russia and I assess the impact of Russias highly asymmetrical form of federalism on democratisation. The study shows that federalism far from promoting democracy has allowed authoritarianism to flourish in many of Russias eighty nine regions and republics. Federalism and democratization in Russia exist in contradiction rather than harmony. In a vicious circle, authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by authoritarianism in the region and vice versa. “Elective dictatorships” and “delegative democracies” are now well entrenched in many republics, and mini-presidential systems are firmly established in a majority of the regions.

Putin’s federal reforms and the consolidation of federalism in Russia: one step forward, two steps back!

Abstract This paper provides a detailed analysis of Putin’s radical overhaul of the Russian federal system and its impact on federalism and democratisation. Whilst not all of Putin’s reforms have been implemented fully, the reorganisation of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, combined with his creation of seven federal districts, make a mockery of federalism. There are real worries that Putin’s quest for a ‘dictatorship of law’ will be bought at the cost of civil liberties and the consolidation of democracy. At present it would appear that Putin is willing to sacrifice democracy in order to win unity. However, his attack on the sovereignty claims of the ethnic republics are surely just as likely to stir up nationist sentiments as to quell them.

Federalism and Inter-governmental Relations in Russia

Since the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in 2000, the principles and practices of federalism have come under attack and we have witnessed a recentralisation of power in the Kremlin. Over the period 2003–6 a number of major laws were adopted that seriously weakened the powers and competencies of federal subjects. Moreover, any hopes that the centralizing initiatives of the Putin administration would be reversed by President Medvedev have been dashed. Inter-governmental relations in Russia are once again conducted in accord with Soviet style principles of hierarchy and control. Russia is a ‘quasi-unitary’ state masquerading as a federation.

The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in Russia's Regional Assemblies

Whilst there is some debate about the importance of parties in contemporary industrial societies, it is still the case, as McFaul notes, that ‘a party system is an essential attribute of a democratic polity. No parties, no democracy’ (2000, p. 3). Parties are particularly important during regime transitions and the consolidation of democracy where they play a vital role in bolstering system legitimacy at a time of political uncertainty (Pridham & Lewis 1996, p. 5). Scholars in the field have traditionally been divided over which prerequisites are necessary for the creation of a strong party system. One group stresses the external environment in which parties operate, the political culture and the strength of civil society. From this perspective, parties are seen as dependent variables and their ability to develop successfully is determined by these external cultural factors. As Karen Dawisha notes, ‘a strong civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a strong party and system and it is difficult to find examples where parties have been established in states with weak civil cultures’ (1997, p. 55). In contrast, a second group of scholars focus on the internal structures, leadership and operational behaviour of parties. In this second approach, parties are seen as independent variables whose actions can positively or negatively shape civil society and culture. Here as Webb and Lewis observe, ‘parties are far more than passive victims of the vicissitudes of public opinion, and it is widely recognised in the West that they can do much to shape political agendas, voter perceptions and electoral choices’ (1998, p. 256). From this perspective institutions matter: change the institutions, change the culture. Strong cohesive parties can bring about consolidated democracies even in hostile cultural environments. Democratic parties can create democrats. On the other hand, weakly institutionalised parties and party systems can allow authoritarianism to take root. EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 63, No. 3, May 2011, 429–448

Limitations of party control: The government bureaucracy in the USSR

Abstract This paper demonstrates that the communist party, in terms of personnel, only partially penetrated the government bureaucracy in the USSR. Detailed biographies of 212 members of the Soviet government of ministerial status were analysed into four groups depending on their degree of party work experience, and further analysed in terms of their participation by type of ministry, including the military industrial complex, and by the time and tenure of appointment. Their life occupational histories were plotted against their participation in different work sectors. It is concluded that the recruitment of personnel to many of the key sectors of the government bureaucracy appeared to be determined by the applicants previous experience and tenure in the bureaucracy. The party was able to penetrate those government bodies concerned with ideology, coercion, and culture, but was not able to penetrate the elite levels of those ministries with actual control over the means of production (the industrial ministries and the military industrial complex). The research indicates that the government had a relative institutional autonomy and great powers of self-recruitment and renewal, that the attempts by party leaders to control the bureaucracy failed, and that the relative autonomy of the government apparatus was an important contributing factor in the collapse of the communist state.

Regional Elections and Electoral Malpractice in Russia: The Manipulation of Electoral Rules, Voters, and Votes

This study examines the democratic integrity of nine rounds of Russian regional assembly elections which were held over the period October 2008-September 2013. It provides a detailed examination of Birch’s three key aspects of electoral malpractice: the manipulation of rules, the manipulation of voters, and the manipulation of votes. The study demonstrates that elections in Russia have been far from “free and fair” and that the manipulation and falsification of elections have been so great that it is no longer valid to define Russia as some type of qualified democracy. Following Schedler, the study concludes that it is more accurate to classify Russia as an “electoral authoritarian regime.”

The social background and political allegiance of the political elite of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: The terminal stage, 1984 to 1991

OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF POWER in the Soviet Union, the popularly elected soviets were undoubtedly the weakest prior to the reforms instituted by Gorbachev. They were representative and affirmative bodies, rather than decision-making ones. Gorbachevs reforms in 1989, however, strengthened the soviets and weakened the other two pillars of power in the USSR-the partys apparat and the government executive, the Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet and a new body, the Congress of Peoples Deputies, became a springboard for radical political change and an arena for political opposition to the Gorbachev leadership. Most of the discussion of the Supreme Soviet has been in terms of the role of deputies and the rise of political factions (parties) and interest groups outside the Communist Party. And studies of the 1989 Congress and Supreme Soviet have been devoted to an analysis of the institutional power of the parliament and its law-making powers and functions.1 This article has as its frame of reference the elites of the Supreme Soviet as they developed between April 1984 and August 1991.2 Our discussion therefore focuses on two distinct time-periods: that from 1984 to spring 1989, when the traditional structures and processes were in place, and that from spring 1989 to 1991, which was a period when the Supreme Soviet became a major actor in the process of political change.3 The article considers the changes in origin and composition of the positional legislative elite in the terminal period of the USSR.