Carina Kreitz

Inattentional Blindness and Individual Differences in Cognitive Abilities

People sometimes fail to notice salient unexpected objects when their attention is otherwise occupied, a phenomenon known as inattentional blindness. To explore individual differences in inattentional blindness, we employed both static and dynamic tasks that either presented the unexpected object away from the focus of attention (spatial) or near the focus of attention (central). We hypothesized that noticing in central tasks might be driven by the availability of cognitive resources like working memory, and that noticing in spatial tasks might be driven by the limits on spatial attention like attention breadth. However, none of the cognitive measures predicted noticing in the dynamic central task or in either the static or dynamic spatial task. Only in the central static task did working memory capacity predict noticing, and that relationship was fairly weak. Furthermore, whether or not participants noticed an unexpected object in a static task was only weakly associated with their odds of noticing an unexpected object in a dynamic task. Taken together, our results are largely consistent with the notion that noticing unexpected objects is driven more by stochastic processes common to all people than by stable individual differences in cognitive abilities.

Does working memory capacity predict cross-modally induced failures of awareness?

People often fail to notice unexpected stimuli when they are focusing attention on another task. Most studies of this phenomenon address visual failures induced by visual attention tasks (inattentional blindness). Yet, such failures also occur within audition (inattentional deafness), and people can even miss unexpected events in one sensory modality when focusing attention on tasks in another modality. Such cross-modal failures are revealing because they suggest the existence of a common, central resource limitation. And, such central limits might be predicted from individual differences in cognitive capacity. We replicated earlier evidence, establishing substantial rates of inattentional deafness during a visual task and inattentional blindness during an auditory task. However, neither individual working memory capacity nor the ability to perform the primary task predicted noticing in either modality. Thus, individual differences in cognitive capacity did not predict failures of awareness even though the failures presumably resulted from central resource limitations.

Working-memory performance is related to spatial breadth of attention

Working memory and attention are closely related constructs. Models of working memory often incorporate an attention component, and some even equate working memory and attentional control. Although some attention-related processes, including inhibitory control of response conflict and interference resolution, are strongly associated with working memory, for other aspects of attention the link is less clear. We examined the association between working-memory performance and attentional breadth, the ability to spread attention spatially. If the link between attention and working memory is broader than inhibitory and interference resolution processes, then working-memory performance might also be associated with other attentional abilities, including attentional breadth. We tested 123 participants on a variety of working-memory and attentional-breadth measures, finding a strong correlation between performances on these two types of tasks. This finding demonstrates that the link between working memory and attention extends beyond inhibitory processes.

Some See It, Some Don't: Exploring the Relation between Inattentional Blindness and Personality Factors

Human awareness is highly limited, which is vividly demonstrated by the phenomenon that unexpected objects go unnoticed when attention is focused elsewhere (inattentional blindness). Typically, some people fail to notice unexpected objects while others detect them instantaneously. Whether this pattern reflects stable individual differences is unclear to date. In particular, hardly anything is known about the influence of personality on the likelihood of inattentional blindness. To fill this empirical gap, we examined the role of multiple personality factors, namely the Big Five, BIS/BAS, absorption, achievement motivation, and schizotypy, in these failures of awareness. In a large-scale sample (N = 554), susceptibility to inattentional blindness was associated with a low level of openness to experience and marginally with a low level of achievement motivation. However, in a multiple regression analysis, only openness emerged as an independent, negative predictor. This suggests that the general tendency to be open to experience extends to the domain of perception. Our results complement earlier work on the possible link between inattentional blindness and personality by demonstrating, for the first time, that failures to consciously perceive unexpected objects reflect individual differences on a fundamental dimension of personality.

Does semantic preactivation reduce inattentional blindness

We are susceptible to failures of awareness if a stimulus occurs unexpectedly and our attention is focused elsewhere. Such inattentional blindness is modulated by various parameters, including stimulus attributes, the observer’s cognitive resources, and the observer’s attentional set regarding the primary task. In three behavioral experiments with a total of 360 participants, we investigated whether mere semantic preactivation of the color of an unexpected object can reduce inattentional blindness. Neither explicitly mentioning the color several times before the occurrence of the unexpected stimulus nor priming the color more implicitly via color-related concepts could significantly reduce the susceptibility to inattentional blindness. Even putting the specific color concept in the main focus of the primary task did not lead to reduced inattentional blindness. Thus, we have shown that the failure to consciously perceive unexpected objects was not moderated by semantic preactivation of the objects’ most prominent feature: its color. We suggest that this finding reflects the rather general principle that preactivations that are not motivationally relevant for one’s current selection goals do not suffice to make an unexpected object overcome the threshold of awareness.

The Influence of Attention Set, Working Memory Capacity, and Expectations on Inattentional Blindness.

The probability of inattentional blindness, the failure to notice an unexpected object when attention is engaged on some primary task, is influenced by contextual factors like task demands, features of the unexpected object, and the observer’s attention set. However, predicting who will notice an unexpected object and who will remain inattentionally blind has proven difficult, and the evidence that individual differences in cognition affect noticing remains ambiguous. We hypothesized that greater working memory capacity might modulate the effect of attention sets on noticing because working memory is associated with the ability to focus attention selectively. People with greater working memory capacity might be better able to attend selectively to target items, thereby increasing the chances of noticing unexpected objects that were similar to the attended items while decreasing the odds of noticing unexpected objects that differed from the attended items. Our study (N = 120 participants) replicated evidence that task-induced attention sets modulate noticing but found no link between noticing and working memory capacity. Our results are largely consistent with the idea that individual differences in working memory capacity do not predict noticing of unexpected objects in an inattentional blindness task.

Inattentional blindness is influenced by exposure time not motion speed

Inattentional blindness is a striking phenomenon in which a salient object within the visual field goes unnoticed because it is unexpected, and attention is focused elsewhere. Several attributes of the unexpected object, such as size and animacy, have been shown to influence the probability of inattentional blindness. At present it is unclear whether or how the speed of a moving unexpected object influences inattentional blindness. We demonstrated that inattentional blindness rates are considerably lower if the unexpected object moves more slowly, suggesting that it is the mere exposure time of the object rather than a higher saliency potentially induced by higher speed that determines the likelihood of its detection. Alternative explanations could be ruled out: The effect is not based on a pop-out effect arising from different motion speeds in relation to the primary-task stimuli (Experiment 2), nor is it based on a higher saliency of slow-moving unexpected objects (Experiment 3).

What's past is past: Neither perceptual preactivation nor prior motivational relevance decrease subsequent inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness-the phenomenon that clearly visible, yet currently unexpected objects go unnoticed when our attention is focused elsewhere-is an ecologically valid failure of awareness. It is currently subject to debate whether previous events and experiences determine whether or not inattentional blindness occurs. Using a simple two-phase paradigm in the present study, we found that the likelihood of missing an unexpected object due to inattention did not change when its defining characteristic (its color) was perceptually preactivated (Experiment 1; N = 188). Likewise, noticing rates were not significantly reduced if the objects color was previously motivationally relevant during an unrelated detection task (Experiment 2; N = 184). These results corroborate and extend recent findings questioning the influence of previous experience on subsequent inattentional blindness. This has implications for possible countermeasures intended to thwart the potentially harmful effects of inattention.