Carl J. Ungerer

The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead

Despite its inauspicious start and virtual abandonment by the new Coalition government in Australia, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons continued to attract international attention in arms control and disarmament circles.

Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons elimination: The Canberra Commission and dilemmas of disarmament

This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commissions Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post-Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia: A Preliminary Assessment

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the agroterrorism threat to Australia. Based on primary research conducted among Australias biotechnology and agriculture sectors, it examines current threat scenarios and existing vulnerabilities within Australia. It argues that the threat of agroterrorism to Australia is real, and, for prudential reasons, should be taken more seriously by government authorities. The article concludes with a series of broad policy options to mitigate the threat of agroterrorism to Australia.

Influence without power: Middle powers and arms control diplomacy during the Cold War

This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity—particularly during the early stages of the Cold War—limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Moscow.

Australia's policy responses to terrorism in Southeast Asia

Terrorism has become a central and defining issue in Australia’s relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Since September 2001, Australian diplomacy has worked at a frenetic pace in the region to secure greater cooperation across the full range of political, military and development assistance sectors. Overall, the results have been mixed. On the positive side, Australia has negotiated no fewer than 12 separate bilateral ‘memoranda of understanding’ on counter-terrorism cooperation with Asian and Pacific countries; co-hosted four Ministerial regional summits; and provided more than

Book review of "Countering terrorism: Dimensions of preparedness / edited by Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, pp. xiii,477, ISBN 0 262 58239 2."

100 million in aid projects to assist counter-terrorism efforts. However, on the other side of the ledger, and despite the above efforts, the terrorist threat to Australian interests remains multifaceted and real. The complex intersection of localized grievances and separatist movements in Southeast Asia combined with globalized Islamist ideology and support poses a set of very difficult challenges for regional states and their allies. The direct challenge to Australia has two separate, but overlapping dimensions. The first is the immediacy of the threat: although American commentators often refer to Southeast Asia as the ‘second front’ in the global war on terror, for Australia it is the front door. As the most recent annual report from the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) notes, there has been at least one aborted, disrupted or actual terrorist attack against Australians or Australian interests in Southeast Asia every year for the past five years. And this pattern is unlikely to change soon. In ASIO’s assessment, ‘Australia and its interests here and around the world will continue to be at threat from terrorist attacks, not only against diplomatic missions but also against a range of soft targets and critical infrastructure.’ The second challenge arises from the enhanced levels of regional cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, required to confront this common security danger. Despite the recent pace of diplomatic activity and the occasional successes, Australian officials continue

The "Middle power" concept in Australian foreign policy

Among the most under-reported and misunderstood wars of the twentieth century was the conflict over East Timor, a tiny ex-Portugese colony that was invaded and annexed by its powerful neighbour, Indonesia, in 1975. Until it achieved its independence through a UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, East Timor had been largely abandoned by the international community and consequently had slipped off the international agenda. It was left to a diverse and vocal network of activists across the US, Europe and Australia to make East Timor an issue long after the great powers had forgotten about it. Joseph Nevins, a noted scholar of East Timor and author of two previous works on the country (under the pen name Matthew Jardine), belongs to this community, and in this new volume he offers his reflections on the responsibility of the international community for what happened to the people of East Timor and on the processes of remembering and forgetting that so often accompany mass violence. The chief virtue of this book lies in his detailed and revealing account of the history of East Timor’s occupation. Intermixing personal observation and history, Nevins paints a picture of a society driven to the point of exhaustion and collapse by Indonesia’s repression. He also characterises the indifference of the US, UK, Australia and other states with careful attention to detail and a well-grounded sense of indignation. His accounts of UNAMET’s (UN Mission in East Timor) preparation for the ballot is truly harrowing, and he sheds considerable light on the ambivalence of Western governments when they realised that East Timor had indeed won its independence. In stark contrast to later accounts offered by American and Australian officials, he portrays both states as only reluctantly, almost grudgingly, assuming responsibility for this orphaned state. Nevins is understandably angered by the indifference and complicity of the established powers with respect to East Timor. Certainly this is justified: the US, Australia, the UK and other major powers in the West cannot acquit themselves of blame for complicity in East Timor’s occupation, nor for permitting arms sales to Indonesia during this period. However, Nevins tends to overestimate their responsibility for the crimes against East Timor and their options for influencing Indonesia’s behaviour. He also tends to overlook inconvenient facts that may explain*/if not justify*/some of the policy choices made. For example, the original Indonesian invasion was announced on the Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 282 291, June 2007