Marianne Hanson

The future of the NPT1

Despite the 2005 NPT Review Conference ending problematically, there remains no real alternative to that regime for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Any replacement of the current regime would only compound existing problems and challenges. We cannot afford to live in a world where ‘more nuclear weapons are better’. To do so would be to avoid disarmament and create a divisive security environment. A better approach would be for the global community to strive for a true partnership in achieving non-proliferation goals.

The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead

Despite its inauspicious start and virtual abandonment by the new Coalition government in Australia, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons continued to attract international attention in arms control and disarmament circles.

Promoting an agenda for nuclear weapons elimination: The Canberra Commission and dilemmas of disarmament

This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commissions Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post-Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.

Warnings from Bosnia: The Dayton Agreement and the implementation of human rights

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) of 21 November 1995 was able to secure a halt to hostilities between the warring Serb, Croat and Bosniac parties in Bosnia and Hercegovina. However, the plan that emerged from the peace negotiations - to create stability, restore human rights and build enduring peace in the devastated state - might well be judged a monumentally difficult task. It is now over four years since the signing of the agreement (known formally as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina - GFAP) and while there have been some advances toward an integrated society, over a million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to return home, ethnically motivated violence continues, and politically and ethnically biased officials and police forces hamper the integration process. Moreover, the international community’s effort has come under criticism for the extent to which it has allowed the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to increase its powers of intervention in Bosnia, a shift in policy which, it is alleged, has restricted the civil and political rights of the Bosnian people.

Russia and NATO Expansion: The Uneasy Basis of the Founding Act

Russias signature to the Founding Act, which paved the way for NATO expansion, was accompanied by continuing misgivings about Western intentions. Russia, which for decades had pursued the idea of a pan-European security organisation, continues to view NATO expansion as unneccessary and seeks instead to strengthen the OSCE. Reinforcing stability and democracy within its new member states is one of the motivations for NATO expansion, but it is the OSCE which is better designed to encourage stability in these particular states. NATO continues to be seen by Russia as a military organisation, and its expansion may have damaging consequences for future Russian-Western relations.

The utility of the human security agenda for policy‐makers

The idea of “human security” is gaining attention among policy‐makers and security analysts. Little scholarly attention has been given to the questions of why states accept (or reject) a human security agenda or how such an agenda is incorporated into policy practices. The article suggests that a human security approach is most likely to be applied when both humanitarian and national interests combine. Yet when states or organisations adopt a human security approach, they often misjudge the complex and long‐term commitment required of such an approach. There is also the potential for such an agenda to be manipulated to justify questionable courses of action. These issues frame an analysis of six recent case studies.

Normalizing zero nuclear weapons: The humanitarian road to the Prohibition Treaty

ABSTRACT The nuclear age has come to be seen as “normal,” marked by a process of “nuclearism” whereby nuclear weapons and deterrence are seen as inevitable and acceptable elements of international security. Factors which have allowed this to flourish include the relative absence of humanitarian considerations, nuclear decision-making by a select few, and the unequal nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), where the P5 states have shaped the nuclear order on their own terms. The “humanitarian initiative” and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons challenge this “normal” nature of nuclear weapons, re-casting them as incompatible with humanitarian law, and delegitimizing them for all states. This shift away from the structural constraints of the NPT allows non-nuclear states a degree of agency they did not previously possess. Nonetheless, the Treaty faces difficulty in dislodging the practices of the nuclear-weapon states, suggesting that its value lies in its long-term normative influence.

Global Weapons Proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control

We are witnessing an unprecedented amount of activity in the area of controlling, limiting, or eliminating various weapons, but achieving the full benefit of these efforts remains elusive. While there is now an extraordinary push to ban nuclear weapons, with the hope of eventually eliminating them, a renewed focus on chemical weapons disarmament, and a recently concluded treaty on the arms trade, all of which promise global security benefits, entrenched national security positions and special interests make the realisation of these goals almost impossible to execute. Global institutional actors are addressing these issues, but achieving consensus among states and a real commitment to abide by agreements reached continue to be difficult. A case in point is the widening rift between nuclear and non-nuclear states, which threatens to derail the non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless, there are some notable developments which serve to challenge the status quo. The first of these is the increased emphasis being placed on humanitarianism and international law; the second is the seemingly unstoppable march of non-governmental organisations into these debates and their articulation of new directional paths; the third factor is that public oversight of military spending is becoming more widespread, with growing requests for greater transparency and accountability on arms spending. While these are good indicators that change in arms control and disarmament policies is possible, it is unlikely that these goals can be reached without a fundamental reorganization of the current structural imbalances in world politics and the associated institutional agencies.

A pivotal moment for global nuclear arms control and disarmament policies: the contribution of Robert O'Neill

Like the citizens of many nations around the world, Australians are marking the centenary of the Great War of 1914–1918. With rather less fanfare, Australians are also marking the centenary of the start of a tradition of official war histories, which have had a fundamental role in shaping the way that Australians have thought about the nation’s involvement in war since 1914. Robert O’Neill’s contribution to that tradition was a major turning point in the development of that tradition, in at least two important respects.