Carl Klarner

Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-appraisal:

Berry et al.s (1998) measures of U.S. state citizen and government ideology rely on unadjusted interest-group ratings for a states members of Congress to infer information about (1) the ideological orientation of the electorates that selected them or (2) state legislators and the governor from the same state. Potential weaknesses in unadjusted interest-group ratings prompt the question: Are the Berry et al. measures flawed, and if so, can they be fixed by substituting alternative measures of a members ideology? We conclude that a version of the Berry et al. state government ideology indicator relying on NOMINATE common space scores is marginally superior to the extant version. In contrast, we reaffirm the validity of the original state citizen ideology indicator and find that versions based on NOMINATE common space scores and adjusted ADA and COPE scores introduced by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) are weaker.

The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government

This note examines problems associated with measuring the partisan balance of state government. A description of a new publicly available dataset is given, as well as of the methods used to collect these data. The results of three data analyses using different measures of state government partisan balance demonstrate that sometimes measurement error on this variable can influence substantive findings.

Forecasting the 2008 U.S. House, Senate and Presidential Elections at the District and State Level

This paper applies the forecasting models of Klarner and Buchanan ( 2006a ) for the U.S. Senate and Klarner and Buchanan ( 2006b ) for the U.S. House of Representatives to the upcoming 2008 elections. Forecasts are also conducted for the 2008 presidential race at the state level. The forecasts presented in this article, made July 28, 2008 (99 days before the election), predicted an 11-seat gain for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, a three-seat gain for the Democrats in the Senate, and that Barack Obama would obtain 53.0% of the popular vote and 346 electoral votes. Furthermore, Obama was forecast to have an 83.6% chance of winning the White House and an 85.9% chance of winning the popular vote.

A New Measure of State Government Ideology, and Evidence that Both the New Measure and an Old Measure Are Valid

We modify Berry et al.’s congressional-delegation-based measure of state government ideology to construct a new measure—which we call the state-legislative-based state government ideology measure—by relying on Shor and McCarty’s National Political Awareness Test common space estimates of the ideal points of U.S. state legislators. We conduct tests of convergent and construct validity for the two measures. We find that they correlate highly in each year for which the state-legislative-based indicator is available (1995–2008), and when observations are pooled across all years. We also replicate numerous published studies assessing the impact of state government ideology using each indicator of ideology and find that the two measures nearly always yield similar conclusions about the effect of government ideology. Because the state-legislative-based measure is based on more direct estimates of the ideal points of state legislators than is the congressional-delegation-based measure—which uses estimates of ideal points for members of Congress from the same state as a proxy—we believe the state-legislative-based measure is superior, and we recommend that scholars use it when it is available for the state-years being studied. Because our empirical evidence indicates that Berry et al.’s congressional-delegation-based measure is also valid—and it is available for a much longer period (annually beginning in 1960)—we advise that it be used when the state-legislative-based measure is not available.

Overcoming Fiscal Gridlock: Institutions and Budget Bargaining

We argue that the costs of bargaining failure are important determinants of legislative delay and gridlock. When these costs are high, elected officials have a greater incentive to reach legislative bargains, even if doing so means compromising on their policy objectives. We develop and evaluate this claim in the context of state budgeting, treating late budgets as examples of fiscal gridlock. Specifically, we argue that budgetary gridlock imposes political and private costs on lawmakers, the magnitudes of which are shaped by institutions and features of the political environment. Our expectations are tested and confirmed using an original dataset of the timing of budget adoption for all states over a 46-year period. Though our investigation is set in the context of the states, we show that differences in the costs of bargaining failure can also account for variation in the patterns of budgetary delay across levels of government and (to a lesser extent) variation in fiscal gridlock within the federal government.

Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences

Studies of presidential veto use advance two competing theoretical perspectives: the “president-centered” approach and the “presidency-centered” approach. We assess the applicability of these approaches to gubernatorial veto activity. Our analysis of forty-eight states between 1971 and 2002 provides strong support for the institutional perspective and less support for the individual perspective. The governors formal powers, the partisan alignment of the legislature, and the electoral cycle all contribute to veto activity. The results suggest that conflict between the legislature and the governor is a product of systematic forces and that governors who face similar institutional constraints will behave in similar ways.

Forecasting the 2010 State Legislative Elections

This article offers forecasts made on July 22, 2010, for the 2010 state legislative elections. Most work in the election forecasting field has been done on presidential and U.S. House elections. Less has been done for U.S. Senate elections, and almost none for gubernatorial or state legislative elections. This year will see much attention directed at the 43 state legislatures holding elections, because many will have the responsibility for drawing new district lines based on the 2010 census. Furthermore, of those chambers with elections scheduled in 2010, seven currently contain one party with less than a 5% margin of control. With so much at stake, these will clearly be contests to watch.

Forecasting the 2006 Elections for the United States Senate

“To arrive at some understanding of what is going on is hard enough,” says Abraham Kaplan, “without having also to meet the demand that we anticipate what will happen next” (1964, 351). Despite Kaplans warning, attempts at forecasting American elections by political scientists have grown in recent years. Foreshadowing election results is not just a casual interest for political scientists. It both sparks interest in the work of our discipline, and serves as a pedagogical tool. We admit that many challenges present themselves when we attempt to predict complicated social phenomena; but if we, instead, limit our research to description and explanation, the danger is that repeated analysis of the same datasets will track patterns again and again that do not exist in the reality outside our samples. One guard against this is to take theories about politics and employ them to predict future events. In this spirit, this paper utilizes well-known patterns of congressional elections to predict those of the 2006 Senate.

Forecasting the 2006 Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives

o arrive at some understanding ofwhat is going on is hard enough,”said Abraham Kaplan, “without havingalso to meet the demand that we antici-pate what will happen next” ~1964, 351!.Political scientists have been taught todescribe and to explain phenomenarather than to predict them. Kaplan, forone, appeared to think that this wasenough. But within the rich soil of expla-nation, Kaplan admitted ~346!, lay theseed of prediction. Indeed, Carl G.Hempel and Paul Oppenheim ~1948,138!, whom Kaplan took to task for say-ing so, flatly stated that “an explanationis not fully adequate” unless it alsoserved as the basis for prediction ~quotedin Kaplan, 346!.We admit that many challengespresent themselves when we attempt topredict complicated social phenomena.But we argue that there is a danger inlimiting our research to description andexplanation. That danger is that repeatedanalysis of the same datasets will trackpatterns again and again that do not existin the reality outside our samples. Oneguard against this is to take theoriesabout politics and employ them to pre-dict events that have not yet happened.In this spirit, this paper utilizes well-known insights about congressional elec-tions to predict the 2006 elections in theU.S House of Representatives.Methods of predicting congressionalelection outcomes have fallen into twocategories. In the first, experts useddistrict- or state-level information to tryto call elections. Sometimes these predic-tions were aided by district-level polls~of varying quality!.

Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation: A Re-analysis

This note examines two modeling alterations of Barabas and Jerits (2004) analysis of the influence of redistricting principles on minority representation in congressional districts. The size of states and the fact that some states cannot have majority-minority or minority-influence districts is taken into account in these new analyses. Overall, even with these two important alterations, Barabas and Jerits findings are largely replicated. However, two of their most prominently reported findings—that a compactness requirement for redistricting is associated with both fewer majority-minority and minority-influence districts—are not corroborated.