Carlos F. Alves

Are mutual fund investors in jail

The absence of investor reaction to the poor performance of mutual funds is a widely reported phenomenon. This article investigates the role of load costs as an explanation for the phenomenon and concludes that back-end load fees are an obstacle to reaction. We found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that medium and long-term investors do not react to poor performances due to the fact that they are ‘imprisoned’ by back-end load fees.

Mutual funds biased preference for the parent's stock: evidence and explanation

The potential manager-investor conflict of interests in mutual funds is a classic agency problem. Using a database from Portugal, we show that mutual funds tend to overweight the stocks issued by their parent and underweigh the stocks of competitors. This cannot be explained by performance, risk, securities’ characteristics or information advantage; funds invest in the stock of their parent company especially when there is widespread selling, and avoid selling them when the stock is experiencing low performance. This agency relationship is costly for fund investors: compared with the competitors stock, the parents stock underperforms after being acquired by the fund.

Do stress tests matter? A study on the impact of the disclosure of stress test results on European financial stocks and CDS markets

During the recent sovereign debt crisis, the European Banking Authority conducted two stress tests on European banks in order to gauge their capital needs, core Tier-1 ratios and ratios of resilience to adverse shocks. We assess the informational content of the disclosure of the stress test outcomes. We conclude that the stress tests conveyed new information and that the outcomes were not anticipated by the stock market but were partially anticipated by the credit default swap (CDS) market. However, while the stock market reacted to the disclosure of the stress test outcomes, in the CDS market there is some evidence of a ‘reverse’ reaction. Moreover, the publication of the outcomes of the stress tests had a stronger impact on the stock prices of riskier financial institutions. A similar pattern is evident in the CDS market, albeit narrowed to one of the stress tests and amid the financial institutions with higher perceived credit risk.

Evidence for the seasonality of European equity fund performance

The literature provides broad evidence for the seasonality of stock market returns, but is very scarce regarding the potential seasonality of investment funds performance. Using a sample of 5349 Equity Europe or Equity Eurozone investment funds, this article contributes to fill this gap by providing evidence that investment funds globally exhibit higher performances in the first than in the second 6 months of the year, and that they exhibit negative abnormal performances in the first compared to the intermediate and final months of each quarter. Finally, the article reports a summer holiday effect, such that investment funds outperform negatively in August compared to the other intermediate months of the quarter.

DO FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO PREVENT MANAGERS OF OTHER FIRMS FROM PURSUING THEIR OWN INTEREST

Purpose – We develop a theoretical model to analyze the role that financial conglomerates may play in reducing agency costs in target firms. Methodology/Approach – We develop a model to analyze the activism of a financial conglomerate (that includes investment banking besides mutual fund management activities) in monitoring the managers of a listed firm. The specific problem we study is this: should the managers of a listed company undertake a new project within the firm or should they develop it outside of the firm with the help of a bank? Should or not the financial conglomerate help the managers undertake the project outside of the existing firm at the expenses of the investors of the mutual fund that it manages, but collecting fees from the investment banking activities? Findings – It will be attractive to both the financial conglomerate and the managers to develop the project outside of the firm if the fees charged by the financial conglomerate for the provision of investment banking services are within a certain range. However, a more intense reaction to performance from the fund investors will translate to a greater space of converging interests between the conglomerate shareholders and mutual fund investors. Additionally, if fees earned by the mutual fund company are a large source of income for the conglomerate, then the lower will be its tendency to assist the managers. Social implications – From a regulatory standpoint, the implementation of measures aimed at transferring capital between funds without cost would allow mutual fund investors to intensify their reaction to fund performance, therefore increasing the likelihood of lower agency costs. We also conclude that supervisory authorities should pay special attention to the banking relationships of firms and banks to whom the asset management component is secondary and with smaller direct stakes in the said firm. Originality/Value of paper – We develop a theoretical framework to explain the absence of activism of institutional investors integrated in financial conglomerates in the governance of listed firms.

Mecanismos de control en la gobernanza corporativa de las empresas estatales: una comparación entre Brasil y Portugal

This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.

Control mechanisms in the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): a comparison between Brazil and Portugal

This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.

Mecanismos de controle na governança corporativa das empresas estatais: uma comparação entre Brasil e Portugal

This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.This study aims to identify how external and internal control mechanisms of corporate governance, typically used in the private business sector, are applied or transformed for the public sector in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on a review of the agency problem and the mechanisms proposed for its mitigation in the business context, the study analyzes the governance situation of SOEs in Brazil and Portugal, with a view to comparing the solutions adopted in the two countries and the needs for development. In addition to sharing common history and cultural foundations, these countries are characterized by a low investor security environment and fragility of dispute settlement mechanisms; by concentrated ownership structures; and by capital markets still insufficient to pressure corporate behavior, conditions which weaken the market mechanisms of external control and amplify the influence of the peculiarities of SOEs’ internal governance issues. The analyses point to significant recent advances in SOEs’ governance practices, but identify challenges yet to be addressed.

Does the Latin model of corporate governance perform worse than other models in preventing earnings management

Traditionally, the Latin model of corporate governance had been a predominant model in some countries; however, this model is increasingly becoming out of fashion. Using a database of Portuguese and Brazilian firms, we investigated whether the Latin model performs worse than other models (i.e. variants of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon models) in terms of preventing earnings management. We conclude that, in general, companies that adopt the Latin model have lower levels of earnings management than other companies and that switching from the Latin model to another model does not cause a generalized decrease in the level of discretionary accruals. Additionally, firms that move away from the Latin model are not predominantly those with extremely high levels of discretionary accruals.

O Efeito da Família Jurídica na Transposição da Directiva das Ofertas Públicas de Aquisição

The Takeovers Directive conferred some degrees of freedom to the EU member countries. The real level of harmonization of the anti-takeover regimen after the transposition of the Directive was, concomitantly, reduced. This study investigates whether, in terms of investor protection, the hierarchy of legal systems established in La Porta et al. (1998) has had any impact on the transposition of the Directive. The paper concludes that countries of civil law of French origin chose solutions which were less favorable to the functioning of the market for corporate control. However, vis-a-vis countries with common law, countries with civilian law of Scandinavian or German origin chose solutions more favorable to the functioning of this market. Moreover, the paper finds evidence that countries made their choices in conformity with the importance of the respective stock markets.