Carlos Mulas-Granados

Voting against Spending Cuts

This article analyses the electoral consequences of fiscal adjustments for the governments that implement them. Using probit analysis on a panel of 15 EU member states between 1960 and 2000, this article tests whether an improving budgetary situation has any effect on the probability of prime minister re-election. Contrary to what previous influential studies concluded, results from this article confirm that governments are held accountable for their fiscal policy decisions. In Europe, the probability of the prime minister’s re-election decreases when fiscal adjustments have taken place, especially if these consolidations relied on spending cuts. Nevertheless, the strong electoral costs associated with expenditure-based adjustments weakened during the post-Maastricht years. The reason for this was partly a change in voters’ tolerance of fiscal discipline and partly because public opinion put the blame on ‘Brussels’ for the strongest budget cuts.

Do Budget Institutions Matter?: Fiscal Consolidation in the New EU Member States

This paper studies the influence that the recently reformed budgetary institutions in the new EU member states may have had on their public finances. We test if their newly formed institutions have already started to shape their fiscal outcomes, as EU-15 institutions did in the past. To answer this question, this paper develops new institutional indices and performs an empirical analysis on the sample of new EU member states—those that joined in 2004 and 2007—for the period 1993-2004. The results confirm that budgetary institutions have a similar influence in the new member states as they had in the EU-15. The role of a strong finance minister is even more important than previous studies suggest.

Front-Loaded or Back-Loaded Fiscal Adjustments; What Works in Emerging Market Economies?

This paper investigates the political and economic determinants of successful fiscal adjustment in 25 emerging market economies from 1980 to 2001. The results show that large and back-loaded fiscal adjustments have the highest likelihood of success. Fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts increase the probability of approaching and achieving fiscal sustainability but are insufficient to maintain it unless accompanied by revenue reforms. Adjustment episodes launched in countries where governments enjoy a parliamentary majority and do not face imminent elections, are found to be more successful. Fiscal consolidations undertaken under IMF-supported programs also have a higher probability of success.

An enlarged EMU? The procedural sources of fiscal policy in the new Member States

Ten new countries joined the EU in 2004, and some of them will soon also join the euro. Since their incorporation to the single currency is subject to their fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria that current members already fulfilled in 1998, this paper describes and compares these fiscal adjustments. Because fiscal consolidations vary in their timing, their duration and their composition, the article explores these dimensions and presents a model that enables us to explain such variation. Some empirical evidence pointing to the relationship between budgetary procedures and the level of fiscal discipline is shown.