Carlotta Fossataro

Are Movements Necessary for the Sense of Body Ownership? Evidence from the Rubber Hand Illusion in Pure Hemiplegic Patients

A question still debated within cognitive neuroscience is whether signals present during actions significantly contribute to the emergence of human’s body ownership. In the present study, we aimed at answer this question by means of a neuropsychological approach. We administered the classical rubber hand illusion paradigm to a group of healthy participants and to a group of neurological patients affected by a complete left upper limb hemiplegia, but without any propriceptive/tactile deficits. The illusion strength was measured both subjectively (i.e., by a self-report questionnaire) and behaviorally (i.e., the location of one’s own hand is shifted towards the rubber hand). We aimed at examining whether, and to which extent, an enduring absence of movements related signals affects body ownership. Our results showed that patients displayed, respect to healthy participants, stronger illusory effects when the left (affected) hand was stimulated and no effects when the right (unaffected) hand was stimulated. In other words, hemiplegics had a weaker/more flexible sense of body ownership for the affected hand, but an enhanced/more rigid one for the healthy hand. Possible interpretations of such asymmetrical distribution of body ownership, as well as limits of our results, are discussed. Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that the alteration of the normal flow of signals present during movements impacts on human’s body ownership. This in turn, means that movements have a role per se in developing and maintaining a coherent body ownership.

Pain and Body Awareness: Evidence from Brain-Damaged Patients with Delusional Body Ownership

A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain perception and body awareness. Here we report a novel neuropsychological condition in which right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body ownership. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were present, these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them. We reasoned that this was an ideal condition to examine whether pain perception can be “referred” to an alien arm subjectively experienced as one’s own. Seventeen patients (11 with, 6 without the delusion), and 10 healthy controls were administered a nociceptive stimulation protocol to assess pain perception. In the OWN condition, participants placed their arms on a table in front of them. In the ALIEN condition, the co-experimenter’s left (or right) arm was placed alongside the participants’ left (or right) arm, respectively. In the OWN condition, left (or right) participants’ hand dorsum were stimulated. In the ALIEN condition, left (or right) co-experimenter’s hand dorsum was stimulated. Participants had to rate the perceived pain on a 0–5 Likert scale (0 = no pain, 5 = maximal imaginable pain). Results showed that healthy controls and patients without delusion gave scores higher than zero only when their own hands were stimulated. On the contrary, patients with delusion gave scores higher than zero both when their own hands (left or right) were stimulated and when the co-experimenter’s left hand was stimulated. Our results show that in pathological conditions, a body part of another person can become so deeply embedded in one’s own somatosensory representation to effect the subjective feeling of pain. More in general, our findings are in line with a growing number of evidence emphasizing the role of the special and unique perceptual status of body ownership in giving rise to the phenomenological experience of pain.

Dynamic Shaping of the Defensive Peripersonal Space through Predictive Motor Mechanisms: When the "Near" Becomes "Far".

The hand blink reflex is a subcortical defensive response, known to dramatically increase when the stimulated hand is statically positioned inside the defensive peripersonal space (DPPS) of the face. Here, we tested in a group of healthy human subjects the hand blink reflex in dynamic conditions, investigating whether the direction of the hand movements (up-to/down-from the face) could modulate it. We found that, on equal hand position, the response enhancement was present only when the hand approached to (and not receded from) the DPPS of the face. This means that, when the hand is close to the face but the subject is planning to move the hand down, the predictive motor system can anticipate the consequence of the movement: the “near” becomes “far.” We found similar results both in passive movement condition, when only afferent (visual and proprioceptive) information can be used to estimate the final state of the system, and in motor imagery task, when only efferent (intentional) information is available to predict the consequences of the movement. All these findings provide evidence that the DPPS is dynamically shaped by predictive mechanisms run by the motor system and based on the integration of feedforward and sensory feedback signals. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The defensive peripersonal space (DPPS) has a crucial role for survival, and its modulation is fundamental when we interact with the environment, as when we move our arms. Here, we focused on a defensive response, the hand blink reflex, known to increase when a static hand is stimulated inside the DPPS of the face. We tested the hand blink reflex in dynamic conditions (voluntary, passive, and imagined movements) and we found that, on equal hand position, the response enhancement was present only when the hand approached to (and not receded from) the DPPS of the face. This suggests that, through the integration of efferent and afferent signals, the safety boundary around the body is continuously shaped by the predictive motor system.

Anosognosia for hemianaesthesia: A voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping study

Brain-damaged patients affected by hemianaesthesia (i.e., the loss of tactile sensibility on the contralesional side of the body) may deny their deficits (i.e., anosognosia for tactile deficits) even reporting tactile experience when stimuli are delivered on the impaired side. So far, descriptive analysis on small samples of patients reported that the insular cortex, the internal/external capsule, the basal ganglia and the periventricular white matter would subserve anosognosia for hemianaesthesia. Here, we aimed at examining in depth the anatomo-functional nature of anosognosia for hemianaesthesia by means of a voxelwise statistical analysis. We compared two groups of left hemiplegic patients due to right brain damages differing only for the presence/absence of anosognosia for left hemianaesthesia. Our findings showed a lesional cluster confined mainly to the anterior part of the putamen. According to the current anatomical evidence on the neural basis of sensory expectancies, we suggested that anosognosia for hemianaesthesia might be explained as a failure to detect the mismatch between expected and actual tactile stimulation.

Interpersonal interactions and empathy modulate perception of threat and defensive responses

The defensive peripersonal space (DPPS) is a vital “safety margin” surrounding the body. When a threatening stimulus is delivered inside the DPPS, subcortical defensive responses like the hand-blink reflex (HBR) are adjusted depending on the perceived threat content. In three experiments, we explored whether and how defensive responses are affected by the interpersonal interaction within the DPPS of the face. In Experiment 1, we found that the HBR is enhanced when the threat is brought close to the face not only by one’s own stimulated hand, but also by another person’s hand, although to a significantly lesser extent. In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that the HBR is also enhanced when the hand of the participant enters the DPPS of another individual, either in egocentric or in allocentric perspective. This enhancement is larger in participants with strong empathic tendency when the other individual is in a third person perspective. These results indicate that interpersonal interactions shape perception of threat and defensive responses. These effects are particularly evident in individuals with greater tendency to having empathic concern to other people.

Bodily ownership modulation in defensive responses: Physiological evidence in brain-damaged patients with pathological embodiment of other's body parts

Do conscious beliefs about the body affect defensive mechanisms within the body? To answer this question we took advantage from a monothematic delusion of bodily ownership, in which brain-damaged patients misidentify alien limbs as their own. We investigated whether the delusional belief that an alien hand is their own hand modulates a subcortical defensive response, such as the hand-blink reflex. The blink, dramatically increases when the threated hand is inside the defensive peripersonal-space of the face. In our between-subjects design, including patients and controls, the threat was brought near the face either by the own hand or by another person’s hand. Our results show an ownership-dependent modulation of the defensive response. In controls, as well as in the patients’ intact-side, the response enhancement is significantly greater when the threat was brought near the face by the own than by the alien hand. Crucially, in the patients’ affected-side (where the pathological embodiment occurs), the alien (embodied) hand elicited a response enhancement comparable to that found when the threat is brought near the face by the real hand. These findings suggest the existence of a mutual interaction between our conscious beliefs about the body and the physiological mechanisms within the body.

Empathy or ownership? evidence from corticospinal excitability modulation during pain observation

Recent studies show that motor responses similar to those present in ones own pain (freezing effect) occur as a result of observation of pain in others. This finding has been interpreted as the physiological basis of empathy. Alternatively, it can represent the physiological counterpart of an embodiment phenomenon related to the sense of body ownership. We compared the empathy and the ownership hypotheses by manipulating the perspective of the observed hand model receiving pain so that it could be a first-person perspective, the one in which embodiment occurs, or a third-person perspective, the one in which we usually perceive the others. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) by TMS over M1 were recorded from first dorsal interosseous muscle, whereas participants observed video clips showing (a) a needle penetrating or (b) a Q-tip touching a hand model, presented either in first-person or in third-person perspective. We found that a pain-specific inhibition of MEP amplitude (a significantly greater MEP reduction in the “pain” compared with the “touch” conditions) only pertains to the first-person perspective, and it is related to the strength of the self-reported embodiment. We interpreted this corticospinal modulation according to an “affective” conception of body ownership, suggesting that the body I feel as my own is the body I care more about.

Sensing the body, representing the body: Evidence from a neurologically based delusion of body ownership

ABSTRACT Humans experience their own body as unitary and monolithic in nature. However, recent findings in cognitive neuroscience seem to suggest that body awareness has a complex and multifaceted structure that can be dissociated in several subcomponents, possibly underpinned by different brain circuits. In the present paper, we focus on a recently reported neuropsychological disorder of body ownership in which patients misattribute to themselves someone else’s arm and its movements. As first, we briefly review the clinical and functional features of this disorder. Secondly, we attempt to explain the nature of the delusion and to gain new hints regarding the mechanisms subserving the construction and the maintenance of the sense of body ownership in the intact brain functioning.

Anxiety-dependent modulation of motor responses to pain expectancy

Abstract The relationship between pain expectancy and motor system plays a crucial role in the human defensive system. Here, we took advantage of the inhibitory modulation of the motor pathway to the muscle of the hand receiving painful stimuli, by recording motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) to Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). We employed a classical conditioning paradigm in which neutral (visual and auditory) stimuli were conditioned by pairing either painful or not-painful stimuli (electric shocks) in separated groups. Only the Pain Group showed clear motor responses: i.e. a significant decrease in MEPs amplitude, with respect to the neutral condition, not only in conditioning stimuli, when actual shocks were paired with neutral stimuli, but also in conditioned stimuli, when shocks were only expected. Significant differences between the two groups suggest that the MEPs decrease is specific for pain expectancy and does not pertain to anticipation in general. Furthermore, in the Pain Group, a significant negative correlation between physiological responses to conditioned stimuli and the participants’ anxiety traits was found: the lower the MEPs amplitude, the higher the participants’ anxiety scores. The present findings suggest that, in order for defensive motor responses to occur, actual pain is not necessary; rather, anxiety-dependent pain expectancy can be sufficient.

“Inhibition or facilitation? Modulation of corticospinal excitability during motor imagery”

ABSTRACT Motor imagery (MI) is the mental simulation of an action without any overt movement. Functional evidences show that brain activity during MI and motor execution (ME) largely overlaps. However, the role of the primary motor cortex (M1) during MI is controversial. Effective connectivity techniques show a facilitation on M1 during ME and an inhibition during MI, depending on whether an action should be performed or suppressed. Conversely, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) studies report facilitatory effects during both ME and MI. The present TMS study shed light on MI mechanisms, by manipulating the instructions given to the participants. In both Experimental and Control groups, participants were asked to mentally simulate a finger‐thumb opposition task, but only the Experimental group received the explicit instruction to avoid any unwanted fingers movements. The amplitude of motor evoked potentials (MEPs) to TMS during MI was compared between the two groups. If the M1 facilitation actually pertains to MI per se, we should have expected to find it, irrespective of the instructions. Contrariwise, we found opposite results, showing facilitatory effects (increased MEPs amplitude) in the Control group and inhibitory effects (decreased MEPs amplitude) in the Experimental group. Control experiments demonstrated that the inhibitory effect was specific for the M1 contralateral to the hand performing the MI task and that the given instructions did not compromise the subjects’ MI abilities. The present findings suggest a crucial role of motor inhibition when a “pure” MI task is performed and the subjects are explicitly instructed to avoid overt movements. HIGHLIGHTSTMS studies found facilitatory effects on primary motor cortex during Motor imagery.Contrariwise, effective connectivity on fMRI data shows inhibitory effects.In this TMS study, we isolated the MI function from its subliminal EMG activity.When a “pure” MI is performed, a crucial role of motor inhibition was found.This nullifies the conflict between TMS and other neurophysiological techniques.