Francesca Garbarini

At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive science meets neurophysiology

Recent experimental research in the field of neurophysiology has led to the discovery of two classes of visuomotor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. In light of these studies, we propose here an overview of two classical themes in the cognitive science panorama: James Gibsons theory of affordances and Eleanor Roschs principles of categorization. We discuss how theoretical perspectives and neuroscientific evidence are converging towards the current paradigm of embodied cognition. From this perspective, we discuss the role of action and simulation in cognitive processes, which lead to the perceptual recognition of objects, and actions and to their conceptual categorization.

‘Moving’ a paralysed hand: bimanual coupling effect in patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia

Selective neurological impairments can shed light on different aspects of motor cognition. Brain-damaged patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia deny their motor deficit and believe they can still move the paralysed limb. Here we study, for the first time, if the anomalous subjective experience that their affected hand can still move, may have objective consequences that constrain movement execution with the opposite, intact hand. Using a bimanual motor task, in which anosognosic patients were asked to simultaneously trace out lines with their unaffected hand and circles with their paralysed hand, we found that the trajectories of the intact hand were influenced by the requested movement of the paralysed hand, with the intact hand tending to assume an oval trajectory (bimanual coupling effect). This effect was comparable to that of a group of healthy subjects who actually moved both hands. By contrast, brain-damaged patients with motor neglect or actual hemiplegia but no anosognosia did not show this bimanual constraint. We suggest that anosognosic patients may have intact motor intentionality and planning for the plegic hand. Rather than being merely an inexplicable confabulation, anosognosia for the plegic hand can produce objective constraints on what the intact hand does.

Embodiment of an alien hand interferes with intact-hand movements

Summary Can we fully incorporate into our body schema the body parts of others, altering our sense of ownership [1]? And, to what extent, given the tight link between body and motor representations, does an altered sense of body-ownership affect motor awareness [2] and the sense of agency [3,4]? The new study we report here demonstrates that a body part of one individual can become so deeply embedded in anothers sensory-motor circuits as to have objective effects on the latters motor execution. Indeed, we found, in right-brain-damaged hemiplegic patients who identified another persons hand as belonging to themselves, significant interference effects of the alien hand movements on the actual movements of their own intact hand.

Are Movements Necessary for the Sense of Body Ownership? Evidence from the Rubber Hand Illusion in Pure Hemiplegic Patients

A question still debated within cognitive neuroscience is whether signals present during actions significantly contribute to the emergence of human’s body ownership. In the present study, we aimed at answer this question by means of a neuropsychological approach. We administered the classical rubber hand illusion paradigm to a group of healthy participants and to a group of neurological patients affected by a complete left upper limb hemiplegia, but without any propriceptive/tactile deficits. The illusion strength was measured both subjectively (i.e., by a self-report questionnaire) and behaviorally (i.e., the location of one’s own hand is shifted towards the rubber hand). We aimed at examining whether, and to which extent, an enduring absence of movements related signals affects body ownership. Our results showed that patients displayed, respect to healthy participants, stronger illusory effects when the left (affected) hand was stimulated and no effects when the right (unaffected) hand was stimulated. In other words, hemiplegics had a weaker/more flexible sense of body ownership for the affected hand, but an enhanced/more rigid one for the healthy hand. Possible interpretations of such asymmetrical distribution of body ownership, as well as limits of our results, are discussed. Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that the alteration of the normal flow of signals present during movements impacts on human’s body ownership. This in turn, means that movements have a role per se in developing and maintaining a coherent body ownership.

When your arm becomes mine: Pathological embodiment of alien limbs using tools modulates own body representation

Previous evidence has shown that active tool-use can reshape ones own body schema, extend peripersonal space and modulate the representation of related body parts. Here we investigate the effect of tool-use training on length representation of the contralesional forearm in brain-damaged hemiplegic patients who manifested a pathological embodiment of other people body parts. Four patients and 20 aged-matched healthy-controls were asked to estimate the mid-point of their contralesional forearm before and after 15 min of tool-use training (i.e. retrieving targets with a garbage plier). In the case of patients, training was always performed by the examiners (alien) arm acting in two different positions, aligned (where the pathological embodiment occurs; E+ condition) or misaligned (where the pathological embodiment does not occur; E- condition) relative to the patients shoulder. Healthy controls performed tool-use training either with their own arm (action condition) or observing the examiners arm performing the task (observation condition), handling (observation with-tool condition) or not (observation without-tool condition) a similar tool. Crucially, in the E+ condition, when patients were convinced to perform the tool-use training with their own paralyzed arm, a significant overestimation effect was found (as in the Action condition with normal subjects): patients mislocated their forearm midpoint more proximally to the hand in the post- than in the pre-training phase. Conversely, in the E- condition, they did not show any overestimation effect, similarly to healthy subjects in the observation condition (neither in the with-tool nor in the without-tool condition significant overestimation effects were found). These findings show the existence of a tight link between spatial, motor and bodily representations and provide strong evidence that a pathological sense of body ownership can extend to intentional motor processes and modulate the sensory map of action-related body parts.

Pain and Body Awareness: Evidence from Brain-Damaged Patients with Delusional Body Ownership

A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain perception and body awareness. Here we report a novel neuropsychological condition in which right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body ownership. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were present, these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them. We reasoned that this was an ideal condition to examine whether pain perception can be “referred” to an alien arm subjectively experienced as one’s own. Seventeen patients (11 with, 6 without the delusion), and 10 healthy controls were administered a nociceptive stimulation protocol to assess pain perception. In the OWN condition, participants placed their arms on a table in front of them. In the ALIEN condition, the co-experimenter’s left (or right) arm was placed alongside the participants’ left (or right) arm, respectively. In the OWN condition, left (or right) participants’ hand dorsum were stimulated. In the ALIEN condition, left (or right) co-experimenter’s hand dorsum was stimulated. Participants had to rate the perceived pain on a 0–5 Likert scale (0u2009=u2009no pain, 5u2009=u2009maximal imaginable pain). Results showed that healthy controls and patients without delusion gave scores higher than zero only when their own hands were stimulated. On the contrary, patients with delusion gave scores higher than zero both when their own hands (left or right) were stimulated and when the co-experimenter’s left hand was stimulated. Our results show that in pathological conditions, a body part of another person can become so deeply embedded in one’s own somatosensory representation to effect the subjective feeling of pain. More in general, our findings are in line with a growing number of evidence emphasizing the role of the special and unique perceptual status of body ownership in giving rise to the phenomenological experience of pain.

Temporal coupling due to illusory movements in bimanual actions: Evidence from anosognosia for hemiplegia

In anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients may claim having performed willed actions with the paralyzed limb despite unambiguous evidence to the contrary. Does this false belief of having moved reflect the functioning of the same mechanisms that govern normal motor performance? Here, we examined whether anosognosics show the same temporal constraints known to exist during bimanual movements in healthy subjects. In these paradigms, when participants simultaneously reach for two targets of different difficulties, the motor programs of one hand affect the execution of the other. In detail, the movement time of the hand going to an easy target (i.e., near and large), while the other is going to a difficult target (i.e., far and small), is slowed with respect to unimanual movements (temporal coupling effect). One right-brain-damaged patient with left hemiplegia and anosognosia, six right-brain-damaged patients with left hemiplegia without anosognosia, and twenty healthy subjects were administered such a bimanual task. We recorded the movement times for easy and difficult targets, both in unimanual (one target) and bimanual (two targets) conditions. We found that, as healthy subjects, the anosognosic patient showed coupling effect. In bimanual asymmetric conditions (when one hand went to the easy target and the other went to the difficult target), the movement time of the non-paralyzed hand going to the easy target was slowed by the pretended movement of the paralyzed hand going to the difficult target. This effect was not present in patients without anosognosia. We concluded that in anosognosic patients, the illusory movements of the paralyzed hand impose to the non-paralyzed hand the same motor constraints that emerge during the actual movements. Our data also support the view that coupling relies on central operations (i.e., activation of intention/programming system), rather than on online information from the periphery.

The As If in Cognitive Science, Neuroscience and Anthropology A Journey among Robots, Blacksmiths and Neurons

In recent years, neurophysiological and psychological research has highlighted a pragmatic version of the theory of knowledge, a version in which the concept of simulation has been found to play a crucial role. In fact, research on canonical and mirror neurons has shown that an as if simulative schema is required to perceive, categorize and understand the meaning of the external world. The present study compares the cognitive paradigm of embodied cognition with Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory. Specifically, cognitive processes and cultural mechanisms are described as phenomena that emerge from the dynamic interaction that exists between people’s practical abilities and the structure of the local environment in which they act and live. A pragmatic conception of knowledge has also emerged in the field of ethnological investigation. Indeed, the concepts of resonance and empathy have proven to be essential instruments for ethnological knowledge.

Embodiment of others' hands elicits arousal responses similar to one's own hands.

Summary Does ‘my body representation refer only to ‘me or can another persons body parts be incorporated into my own somato-sensory experience? And, if so, does this incorporation elicit physiological reactions similar to those observed for ones own body? The aim of the present study was to test this hypothesis in a monothematic delusion of body ownership, in which brain-damaged patients claim that the examiners hand is their own [1,2]. By recording the skin conductance response (SCR) during noxious stimulations, we have found that an alien hand can be so deeply embedded into a patients somato-sensory experience as to elicit physiological reactions of a kind normally specific to ones own hands.

Bimanual coupling paradigm as an effective tool to investigate productive behaviors in motor and body awareness impairments

When humans move simultaneously both hands strong coupling effects arise and neither of the two hands is able to perform independent actions. It has been suggested that such motor constraints are tightly linked to action representation rather than to movement execution. Hence, bimanual tasks can represent an ideal experimental tool to investigate internal motor representations in those neurological conditions in which the movement of one hand is impaired. Indeed, any effect on the “moving” (healthy) hand would be caused by the constraints imposed by the ongoing motor program of the ‘impaired’ hand. Here, we review recent studies that successfully utilized the above-mentioned paradigms to investigate some types of productive motor behaviors in stroke patients. Specifically, bimanual tasks have been employed in left hemiplegic patients who report illusory movements of their contralesional limbs (anosognosia for hemiplegia). They have also been administered to patients affected by a specific monothematic delusion of body ownership, namely the belief that another person’s arm and his/her voluntary action belong to them. In summary, the reviewed studies show that bimanual tasks are a simple and valuable experimental method apt to reveal information about the motor programs of a paralyzed limb. Therefore, it can be used to objectively examine the cognitive processes underpinning motor programming in patients with different delusions of motor behavior. Additionally, it also sheds light on the mechanisms subserving bimanual coordination in the intact brain suggesting that action representation might be sufficient to produce these effects.