Caroline Morris

Reconstituting the constitution

Part 1: Reconstituting the Constitution: An Overview.- Part 2: Reforming Constitutions: Lessons from Abroad.- Part 3: The Republican Question.- Part 4: The Need for a Written Constitution? Strengthening the Bill of Rights Act and the Place of the Treaty of Waitangi.- Part 5: The Future of Electoral Law.- Part 6: Australia: Involving Civil Society in Constitutional Reform.- Part 7: Influence of International Treaties.- Part 8: The Trans-Tasman Relationship.- Part 9: The Role and Governance of Sub-National Government.- Part 10: Protecting Future Generations.- Appendix.

Attempting constitutional reform on the island microjurisdiction of Alderney

Research into state size and democracy has revealed that the very smallest states are more likely to be democratic than their larger counterparts. Being an island, as well as having a British colonial past, is also associated with a state’s observance of democratic measures. With these observations in mind, this article examines an unsuccessful attempt to reform the political and constitutional governance of the Channel Island of Alderney, a self-governing dependency of the British Crown. Why was political reform rejected on this island microjurisdiction? Was the post-Brexit agenda too crowded to permit reform? Did Alderney have other priorities? Might smallness itself be the explanation?

Referendums in Oceania

Referendums in Oceania are generally used as a means for states to move towards or achieve independence from the colonial power, and, once independent, to change their constitution — sometimes in the details, sometimes in the fundamentals. Some states, notably New Zealand and Guam (which would appear to have little else in common), also refer questions of conscience, controversy or morality to the people.

Misbehaving Members of Parliament and How to Deal with Them

The recent scandals in the United Kingdom and New Zealand Parliaments involving the misuse of parliamentary and ministerial expenses regimes have provided an opportunity to revisit the question of how best to monitor and regulate the conduct of Members of Parliament. Four possible forms of regulation are examined: Codes of Conduct, parliamentary privilege, an independent external regulator, and the device of the recall election. In the wake of the 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal, an independent regulator (the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority) has been established in the United Kingdom, and legislation introducing the recall election has been promised. The New Zealand Parliament has not moved towards either of these forms of regulation, preferring to rely on parliamentary privilege and various codes of conduct. This essay explores various policy design issues that will have to be addressed in the legislation governing recall elections and considers its suitability for application to the New Zealand Parliament elected using the Mixed Member Proportional system. It concludes that ultimately, the system chosen for regulating the conduct of Members of Parliament will reflect decisions about constitutional priorities.

A Dunne Deal? Politicians, the Media, and the Courts

The relationship between the media and aspiring or established politicians is at times an uneasy one. The relationship intensifies during election campaigns when political hopefuls are highly dependent on favourable media coverage to raise their profile with the electorate and improve their parliamentary chances. When the media purposely exclude politicians from coverage, the politicians have traditionally had little recourse to any remedy. However, a recent decision of the New Zealand High Court held that the holding of a party leaders’ debate by a private television company was a ‘public function’ with important democratic consequences, requiring the broadcaster to include two Members of Parliament in its programme. This article considers that decision in light of New Zealand and international case law, and discusses the consequences for the media in future election campaigns.