Caroline Schnakers

Baseline brain activity fluctuations predict somatosensory perception in humans.

In perceptual experiments, within-individual fluctuations in perception are observed across multiple presentations of the same stimuli, a phenomenon that remains only partially understood. Here, by means of thulium–yttrium/aluminum–garnet laser and event-related functional MRI, we tested whether variability in perception of identical stimuli relates to differences in prestimulus, baseline brain activity. Results indicate a positive relationship between conscious perception of low-intensity somatosensory stimuli and immediately preceding levels of baseline activity in medial thalamus and the lateral frontoparietal network, respectively, which are thought to relate to vigilance and “external monitoring.” Conversely, there was a negative correlation between subsequent reporting of conscious perception and baseline activity in a set of regions encompassing posterior cingulate/precuneus and temporoparietal cortices, possibly relating to introspection and self-oriented processes. At nociceptive levels of stimulation, pain-intensity ratings positively correlated with baseline fluctuations in anterior cingulate cortex in an area known to be involved in the affective dimension of pain. These results suggest that baseline brain-activity fluctuations may profoundly modify our conscious perception of the external world.

Breakdown of within- and between-network Resting State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Connectivity during Propofol-induced Loss of Consciousness

Background:Mechanisms of anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness remain poorly understood. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging allows investigating whole-brain connectivity changes during pharmacological modulation of the level of consciousness. Methods:Low-frequency spontaneous blood oxygen level-dependent fluctuations were measured in 19 healthy volunteers during wakefulness, mild sedation, deep sedation with clinical unconsciousness, and subsequent recovery of consciousness. Results:Propofol-induced decrease in consciousness linearly correlates with decreased corticocortical and thalamocortical connectivity in frontoparietal networks (i.e., default- and executive-control networks). Furthermore, during propofol-induced unconsciousness, a negative correlation was identified between thalamic and cortical activity in these networks. Finally, negative correlations between default network and lateral frontoparietal cortices activity, present during wakefulness, decreased proportionally to propofol-induced loss of consciousness. In contrast, connectivity was globally preserved in low-level sensory cortices, (i.e., in auditory and visual networks across sedation stages). This was paired with preserved thalamocortical connectivity in these networks. Rather, waning of consciousness was associated with a loss of cross-modal interactions between visual and auditory networks. Conclusions:Our results shed light on the functional significance of spontaneous brain activity fluctuations observed in functional magnetic resonance imaging. They suggest that propofol-induced unconsciousness could be linked to a breakdown of cerebral temporal architecture that modifies both within- and between-network connectivity and thus prevents communication between low-level sensory and higher-order frontoparietal cortices, thought to be necessary for perception of external stimuli. They emphasize the importance of thalamocortical connectivity in higher-order cognitive brain networks in the genesis of conscious perception.

Preserved Feedforward But Impaired Top-Down Processes in the Vegetative State

Discerning the neural correlates of (un)consciousness sheds light on the mechanisms underlying vegetative states. Frontoparietal cortex is involved in the explicit processing (awareness) of stimuli. Frontoparietal activation has also been found in studies of subliminal stimulus processing. We hypothesized that an impairment of top-down processes, involved in recurrent neuronal message-passing and the generation of long-latency electrophysiological responses, might provide a more reliable correlate of consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients, than frontoparietal responses. We measured effective connectivity during a mismatch negativity paradigm and found that the only significant difference between patients in a vegetative state and controls was an impairment of backward connectivity from frontal to temporal cortices. This result emphasizes the importance of top-down projections in recurrent processing that involve high-order associative cortices for conscious perception.

The locked-in syndrome : what is it like to be conscious but paralyzed and voiceless?

The locked-in syndrome (pseudocoma) describes patients who are awake and conscious but selectively deefferented, i.e., have no means of producing speech, limb or facial movements. Acute ventral pontine lesions are its most common cause. People with such brainstem lesions often remain comatose for some days or weeks, needing artificial respiration and then gradually wake up, but remaining paralyzed and voiceless, superficially resembling patients in a vegetative state or akinetic mutism. In acute locked-in syndrome (LIS), eye-coded communication and evaluation of cognitive and emotional functioning is very limited because vigilance is fluctuating and eye movements may be inconsistent, very small, and easily exhausted. It has been shown that more than half of the time it is the family and not the physician who first realized that the patient was aware. Distressingly, recent studies reported that the diagnosis of LIS on average takes over 2.5 months. In some cases it took 4-6 years before aware and sensitive patients, locked in an immobile body, were recognized as being conscious. Once a LIS patient becomes medically stable, and given appropriate medical care, life expectancy increases to several decades. Even if the chances of good motor recovery are very limited, existing eye-controlled, computer-based communication technology currently allow the patient to control his environment, use a word processor coupled to a speech synthesizer, and access the worldwide net. Healthy individuals and medical professionals sometimes assume that the quality of life of an LIS patient is so poor that it is not worth living. On the contrary, chronic LIS patients typically self-report meaningful quality of life and their demand for euthanasia is surprisingly infrequent. Biased clinicians might provide less aggressive medical treatment and influence the family in inappropriate ways. It is important to stress that only the medically stabilized, informed LIS patient is competent to consent to or refuse life-sustaining treatment. Patients suffering from LIS should not be denied the right to die - and to die with dignity - but also, and more importantly, they should not be denied the right to live - and to live with dignity and the best possible revalidation, and pain and symptom management. In our opinion, there is an urgent need for a renewed ethical and medicolegal framework for our care of locked-in patients.

Hemodynamic cerebral correlates of sleep spindles during human non-rapid eye movement sleep

In humans, some evidence suggests that there are two different types of spindles during sleep, which differ by their scalp topography and possibly some aspects of their regulation. To test for the existence of two different spindle types, we characterized the activity associated with slow (11–13 Hz) and fast (13–15 Hz) spindles, identified as discrete events during non-rapid eye movement sleep, in non-sleep-deprived human volunteers, using simultaneous electroencephalography and functional MRI. An activation pattern common to both spindle types involved the thalami, paralimbic areas (anterior cingulate and insular cortices), and superior temporal gyri. No thalamic difference was detected in the direct comparison between slow and fast spindles although some thalamic areas were preferentially activated in relation to either spindle type. Beyond the common activation pattern, the increases in cortical activity differed significantly between the two spindle types. Slow spindles were associated with increased activity in the superior frontal gyrus. In contrast, fast spindles recruited a set of cortical regions involved in sensorimotor processing, as well as the mesial frontal cortex and hippocampus. The recruitment of partially segregated cortical networks for slow and fast spindles further supports the existence of two spindle types during human non-rapid eye movement sleep, with potentially different functional significance.

Perception of pain in the minimally conscious state with PET activation: an observational study.

BACKGROUND Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) show restricted self or environment awareness but are unable to communicate consistently and reliably. Therefore, better understanding of cerebral noxious processing in these patients is of clinical, therapeutic, and ethical relevance. METHODS We studied brain activation induced by bilateral electrical stimulation of the median nerve in five patients in MCS (aged 18-74 years) compared with 15 controls (19-64 years) and 15 patients (19-75 years) in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) with (15)O-radiolabelled water PET. By way of psychophysiological interaction analysis, we also investigated the functional connectivity of the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) in patients and controls. Patients in MCS were scanned 57 (SD 33) days after admission, and patients in PVS 36 (9) days after admission. Stimulation intensities were 8.6 (SD 6.7) mA in patients in MCS, 7.4 (5.9) mA in controls, and 14.2 (8.7) mA in patients in PVS. Significant results were thresholded at p values of less than 0.05 and corrected for multiple comparisons. FINDINGS In patients in MCS and in controls, noxious stimulation activated the thalamus, S1, and the secondary somatosensory or insular, frontoparietal, and anterior cingulate cortices (known as the pain matrix). No area was less activated in the patients in MCS than in the controls. All areas of the cortical pain matrix showed greater activation in patients in MCS than in those in PVS. Finally, in contrast with patients in PVS, those in MCS had preserved functional connectivity between S1 and a widespread cortical network that includes the frontoparietal associative cortices. INTERPRETATION Cerebral correlates of pain processing are found in a similar network in controls and patients in MCS but are much more widespread than in patients in PVS. These findings might be objective evidence of a potential pain perception capacity in patients in MCS, which supports the idea that these patients need analgesic treatment.

Functional connectivity in the default network during resting state is preserved in a vegetative but not in a brain dead patient

Recent studies on spontaneous fluctuations in the functional MRI blood oxygen level‐dependent (BOLD) signal in awake healthy subjects showed the presence of coherent fluctuations among functionally defined neuroanatomical networks. However, the functional significance of these spontaneous BOLD fluctuations remains poorly understood. By means of 3 T functional MRI, we demonstrate absent cortico‐thalamic BOLD functional connectivity (i.e. between posterior cingulate/precuneal cortex and medial thalamus), but preserved cortico‐cortical connectivity within the default network in a case of vegetative state (VS) studied 2.5 years following cardio‐respiratory arrest, as documented by extensive behavioral and paraclinical assessments. In the VS patient, as in age‐matched controls, anticorrelations could also be observed between posterior cingulate/precuneus and a previously identified task‐positive cortical network. Both correlations and anticorrelations were significantly reduced in VS as compared to controls. A similar approach in a brain dead patient did not show any such long‐distance functional connectivity. We conclude that some slow coherent BOLD fluctuations previously identified in healthy awake human brain can be found in alive but unaware patients, and are thus unlikely to be uniquely due to ongoing modifications of conscious thoughts. Future studies are needed to give a full characterization of default network connectivity in the VS patients population. Hum Brain Mapp, 2009.

VOLUNTARY BRAIN PROCESSING IN DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Background: Disentangling the vegetative state from the minimally conscious state is often difficult when relying only on behavioral observation. In this study, we explored a new active evoked-related potentials paradigm as an alternative method for the detection of voluntary brain activity. Methods: The participants were 22 right-handed patients (10 traumatic) diagnosed as being in a vegetative state (VS) (n = 8) or in a minimally conscious state (MCS) (n = 14). They were presented sequences of names containing the patient’s own name or other names, in both passive and active conditions. In the active condition, the patients were instructed to count her or his own name or to count another target name. Results: Like controls, MCS patients presented a larger P3 to the patient’s own name, in the passive and in the active conditions. Moreover, the P3 to target stimuli was higher in the active than in the passive condition, suggesting voluntary compliance to task instructions like controls. These responses were even observed in patients with low behavioral responses (e.g., visual fixation and pursuit). In contrast, no P3 differences between passive and active conditions were observed for VS patients. Conclusions: The present results suggest that active evoked-related potentials paradigms may permit detection of voluntary brain function in patients with severe brain damage who present with a disorder of consciousness, even when the patient may present with very limited to questionably any signs of awareness.

Cerebral processing in the minimally conscious state

We studied a patient in a minimally conscious state using PET and cognitive evoked potentials. Cerebral metabolism was below half of normal values. Auditory stimuli with emotional valence (infant cries and the patient’s own name) induced a much more widespread activation than did meaningless noise; the activation pattern was comparable with that previously obtained in controls. Cognitive potentials showed preserved P300 responses to the patient’s own name.

Diagnostic precision of PET imaging and functional MRI in disorders of consciousness: a clinical validation study

BACKGROUND Bedside clinical examinations can have high rates of misdiagnosis of unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (vegetative state) or minimally conscious state. The diagnostic and prognostic usefulness of neuroimaging-based approaches has not been established in a clinical setting. We did a validation study of two neuroimaging-based diagnostic methods: PET imaging and functional MRI (fMRI). METHODS For this clinical validation study, we included patients referred to the University Hospital of Liège, Belgium, between January, 2008, and June, 2012, who were diagnosed by our unit with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, locked-in syndrome, or minimally conscious state with traumatic or non-traumatic causes. We did repeated standardised clinical assessments with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R), cerebral (18)F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) PET, and fMRI during mental activation tasks. We calculated the diagnostic accuracy of both imaging methods with CRS-R diagnosis as reference. We assessed outcome after 12 months with the Glasgow Outcome Scale-Extended. FINDINGS We included 41 patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, four with locked-in syndrome, and 81 in a minimally conscious state (48=traumatic, 78=non-traumatic; 110=chronic, 16=subacute). (18)F-FDG PET had high sensitivity for identification of patients in a minimally conscious state (93%, 95% CI 85-98) and high congruence (85%, 77-90) with behavioural CRS-R scores. The active fMRI method was less sensitive at diagnosis of a minimally conscious state (45%, 30-61) and had lower overall congruence with behavioural scores (63%, 51-73) than PET imaging. (18)F-FDG PET correctly predicted outcome in 75 of 102 patients (74%, 64-81), and fMRI in 36 of 65 patients (56%, 43-67). 13 of 41 (32%) of the behaviourally unresponsive patients (ie, diagnosed as unresponsive with CRS-R) showed brain activity compatible with (minimal) consciousness (ie, activity associated with consciousness, but diminished compared with fully conscious individuals) on at least one neuroimaging test; 69% of these (9 of 13) patients subsequently recovered consciousness. INTERPRETATION Cerebral (18)F-FDG PET could be used to complement bedside examinations and predict long-term recovery of patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. Active fMRI might also be useful for differential diagnosis, but seems to be less accurate. FUNDING The Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research (FNRS), Fonds Léon Fredericq, the European Commission, the James McDonnell Foundation, the Mind Science Foundation, the French Speaking Community Concerted Research Action, the University of Copenhagen, and the University of Liège.