Carolyn Parkinson

Is morality unified? evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust

Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether “moral judgments” are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.

A Test of the Integration of the Hopelessness and Response Styles Theories of Depression in Middle Adolescence

The current study examined several theories of depression in a sample of middle adolescents. At Time 1, 367 ninth graders completed measures assessing depressogenic inferential styles, the tendency to ruminate in response to depressed mood, and depressive symptoms. Six weeks later, participants completed measures assessing negative events and depressive symptoms. In line with the hopelessness theory, a depressogenic weakest link interacted with negative events to predict increases in hopelessness depression symptoms but not in more general depressive symptoms. Further, providing partial support for the response styles theory, the tendency to ruminate in response to depressed mood predicted increases in hopelessness depression symptoms but not in more general depressive symptoms. Contrary to the integrative theory, the relationship between a depressogenic weakest link and increases in hopelessness depression symptoms following negative events was not moderated by a ruminative response style.

Brain activation evoked by erotic films varies with different menstrual phases: an fMRI study.

In humans, fluctuating hormone levels throughout the menstrual cycle are believed to regulate many cyclical sexual behaviors and motivational processes. However, there is a dearth of research investigating the neural correlates of this phenomenon. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify brain regions involved in sexual arousals regulatory process. Fifteen female participants were scanned while viewing erotic film excerpts at three time points during a single menstrual cycle: ovulation, menstruation, and at one additional time point. Tripled two-group differences analysis revealed that significant activation in the comparison was observed in non-ovulatory phases of the menstrual cycle in parts of the right inferior frontal gyrus, right lateral occipital cortex, and left postcentral gyrus, as well as in the bilateral superior parietal lobule. Thus, our results indicate that brain activity differs in the ovulatory phase of the menstrual cycle compared to during other menstrual phases. This finding provides neurological evidence for the ovulatory cycles modulation of the processing of the sexual arousal in female human brain.

Relating Anatomical and Social Connectivity: White Matter Microstructure Predicts Emotional Empathy

Understanding cues to the internal states of others involves a widely distributed network of brain regions. Although white matter (WM) connections are likely crucial for communication between these regions, the role of anatomical connectivity in empathic processing remains unexplored. The present study tested for a relationship between anatomical connectivity and empathy by assessing the WM microstructural correlates of affective empathy, which promotes interpersonal understanding through emotional reactions, and cognitive empathy, which does so via perspective taking. Associations between fractional anisotropy (FA) and the emotional (empathic concern, EC) and cognitive (perspective taking, PT) dimensions of empathy as assessed by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index were examined. EC was positively associated with FA in tracts providing communicative pathways within the limbic system, between perception and action-related regions, and between perception and affect-related regions, independently of individual differences in age, gender, and other dimensions of interpersonal reactivity. These findings provide a neuroanatomical basis for the rapid, privileged processing of emotional sensory information and the automatic elicitation of responses to the affective displays of others.

Old cortex, new contexts: re-purposing spatial perception for social cognition.

Much of everyday mental life involves information that we cannot currently perceive directly, from contemplating the strengths of friendships to reasoning about the contents of other minds. Despite their primacy to everyday human functioning, and in particular, to human sociality, the mechanisms that support abstract thought are poorly understood. An explanatory framework that has gained traction recently in cognitive neuroscience is exaptation, or the re-purposing of evolutionarily old circuitry to carry out new functions. We argue for the utility of applying this concept to social cognition. Convergent behavioral and neuroscientific evidence suggests that humans co-opt mechanisms originally devoted to spatial perception for more abstract domains of cognition (e.g., temporal reasoning). Preliminary evidence suggests that some aspects of social cognition also involve the exaptation of substrates originally evolved for processing physical space. We discuss the potential for future work to test more directly if cortical substrates for spatial processing were exapted for social cognition, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of how humans evolved mechanisms for navigating an exceptionally complex social world.

Associations between Auditory Pitch and Visual Elevation Do Not Depend on Language: Evidence from a Remote Population

Associations between auditory pitch and visual elevation are widespread in many languages, and behavioral associations have been extensively documented between height and pitch among speakers of those languages. However, it remains unclear whether perceptual correspondences between auditory pitch and visual elevation inform these linguistic associations, or merely reflect them. We probed this cross-modal mapping in members of a remote Kreung hill tribe in northeastern Cambodia who do not use spatial language to describe pitch. Participants viewed shapes rising or falling in space while hearing sounds either rising or falling in pitch, and reported on the auditory change. Associations between pitch and vertical position in the Kreung were similar to those demonstrated in populations where pitch is described in terms of spatial height. These results suggest that associations between visual elevation and auditory pitch can arise independently of language. Thus, widespread linguistic associations between pitch and elevation may reflect universally predisposed perceptual correspondences.

When imagining yourself in pain, visual perspective matters: The neural and behavioral correlates of simulated sensory experiences

Via mental simulation, imagined events faithfully reproduce the neural and behavioral activities that accompany their actual occurrence. However, little is known about how fundamental characteristics of mental imagery—notably perspectives of self—shape neurocognitive processes. To address this issue, we used fMRI to explore the impact that vantage point exerts on the neural and behavioral correlates of imaginary sensory experiences (i.e., pain). Participants imagined painful scenarios from three distinct visual perspectives: first-person self (1PS), third-person self (3PS), and third-person other (3PO). Corroborating increased ratings of pain and embodiment, 1PS (cf. 3PS) simulations elicited greater activity in the right anterior insula, a brain area that supports interoceptive and emotional awareness. Additionally, 1PS simulations evoked greater activity in brain areas associated with visual imagery and the sense of body ownership. Interestingly, no differences were observed between 3PS and 3PO imagery. Taken together, these findings reveal the neural and behavioral correlates of visual perspective during mental simulation.

Visual perspective and the characteristics of mind wandering

When the mind wanders away from the here-and-now toward imaginary events, it typically does so from one of two visual vantage points—a first-person perspective (i.e., the world is seen as it is in everyday life) or a third-person perspective (i.e., the world is seen from the viewpoint of an outside observer). While extant evidence has detailed consequences that ensue from the utilization of these distinct points of view, less is known about their more basic properties. Here, we investigated the prevalence, demographics and qualities associated with the visual perspective that people spontaneously adopt when the mind wanders. The results from a cross-cultural survey (N = 400) revealed that almost half of the participants (46%) typically utilize a third-person perspective when mind wandering. Further, culture and gender were shown to impact the distribution of first- and third-person imagers. Specifically, a first-person perspective was more common among participants from Western nations and females, while participants from Eastern cultures resonated more strongly with a third-person perspective. Moreover, these factors were also shown to impact qualities (e.g., temporal locus, vividness) of mental imagery. Taken together, the current findings elucidate the prevalence of first- and third-person visual perspectives and detail individual differences that influence the qualia of mind wandering.

Emotions are understood from biological motion across remote cultures

Patterns of bodily movement can be used to signal a wide variety of information, including emotional states. Are these signals reliant on culturally learned cues or are they intelligible across individuals lacking exposure to a common culture? To find out, we traveled to a remote Kreung village in Ratanakiri, Cambodia. First, we recorded Kreung portrayals of 5 emotions through bodily movement. These videos were later shown to American participants, who matched the videos with appropriate emotional labels with above chance accuracy (Study 1). The Kreung also viewed Western point-light displays of emotions. After each display, they were asked to either freely describe what was being expressed (Study 2) or choose from 5 predetermined response options (Study 3). Across these studies, Kreung participants recognized Western point-light displays of anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and pride with above chance accuracy. Kreung raters were not above chance in deciphering an American point-light display depicting love, suggesting that recognizing love may rely, at least in part, on culturally specific cues or modalities other than bodily movement. In addition, multidimensional scaling of the patterns of nonverbal behavior associated with each emotion in each culture suggested that similar patterns of nonverbal behavior are used to convey the same emotions across cultures. The considerable cross-cultural intelligibility observed across these studies suggests that the communication of emotion through movement is largely shaped by aspects of physiology and the environment shared by all humans, irrespective of differences in cultural context.

The repurposed social brain

Human social intelligence depends on a diverse array of perceptual, cognitive, and motivational capacities. Some of these capacities depend on neural systems that may have evolved through modification of ancestral systems with non-social or more limited social functions (evolutionary repurposing). Social intelligence, in turn, enables new forms of repurposing within the lifetime of an individual (cultural and instrumental repurposing), which entail innovating over and exploiting pre-existing circuitry to meet problems our brains did not evolve to solve. Considering these repurposing processes can provide insight into the computations that brain regions contribute to social information processing, generate testable predictions that usefully constrain social neuroscience theory, and reveal biologically imposed constraints on cultural inventions and our ability to respond beneficially to contemporary challenges.