Thalia Wheatley

Immune neglect : A source of durability bias in affective forecasting

People are generally unaware of the operation of the system of cognitive mechanisms that ameliorate their experience of negative affect (the psychological immune system), and thus they tend to overestimate the duration of their affective reactions to negative events. This tendency was demonstrated in 6 studies in which participants overestimated the duration of their affective reactions to the dissolution of a romantic relationship, the failure to achieve tenure, an electoral defeat, negative personality feedback, an account of a childs death, and rejection by a prospective employer. Participants failed to distinguish between situations in which their psychological immune systems would and would not be likely to operate and mistakenly predicted overly and equally enduring affective reactions in both instances. The present experiments suggest that people neglect the psychological immune system when making affective forecasts.

Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.

Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting

The durability bias, the tendency to overpredict the duration of affective reactions to future events, may be due in part to focalism, whereby people focus too much on the event in question and not enough on the consequences of other future events. If so, asking people to think about other future activities should reduce the durability bias. In Studies 1-3, college football fans were less likely to overpredict how long the outcome of a football game would influence their happiness if they first thought about how much time they would spend on other future activities. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out alternative explanations and found evidence for a distraction interpretation, that people who think about future events moderate their forecasts because they believe that these events will reduce thinking about the focal event. The authors discuss the implications of focalism for other literatures, such as the planning fallacy.

Understanding Animate Agents Distinct Roles for the Social Network and Mirror System

How people understand the actions of animate agents has been vigorously debated. This debate has centered on two hypotheses focused on anatomically distinct neural substrates: The mirror-system hypothesis proposes that the understanding of others is achieved via action simulation, and the social-network hypothesis proposes that such understanding is achieved via the integration of critical biological properties (e.g., faces, affect). In this study, we assessed the areas of the brain that were engaged when people interpreted and imagined moving shapes as animate or inanimate. Although observing and imagining the moving shapes engaged the mirror system, only activation of the social network was modulated by animacy.

The neural basis of implicit moral attitude--an IAT study using event-related fMRI.

Recent models of morality have suggested the importance of affect-based automatic moral attitudes in moral reasoning. However, previous investigations of moral reasoning have frequently relied upon explicit measures that are susceptible to voluntary control. To investigate participants automatic moral attitudes, we used a morality Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants rated the legality of visually depicted legal and illegal behaviors of two different intensity levels (e.g., high intensity illegal = interpersonal violence; low intensity illegal = vandalism) both when the target concept (e.g., illegal) was behaviorally paired with an associated attribute (e.g., bad; congruent condition) or an unassociated attribute (e.g., good; incongruent condition). Behaviorally, an IAT effect was shown; RTs were faster in the congruent rather than incongruent conditions. At the neural level, implicit moral attitude, as indexed by increased BOLD response as a function of stimulus intensity, was associated with increased activation in the right amygdala and the ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, performance on incongruent trials relative to congruent trials was associated with increased activity in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47), left subgenual cingulate gyrus (BA 25), bilateral premotor cortex (BA 6) and the left caudate. The functional contributions of these regions in moral reasoning are discussed.

The tipping point of animacy: How, when, and where we perceive life in a face.

Faces capture humans’ attention; yet, beyond aesthetic appreciation, it is presumably not the face itself that interests people but the mind behind it. Minds think, feel, and act in ways that have direct consequences for well-being, but despite their importance, how minds are perceived in faces is not well understood. We investigated this mechanism by presenting participants with morphed images created from animate (human) and inanimate (mannequin) faces. Life and mind were perceived to “appear” at a consistent location on the morph continuum, close to the human endpoint. This location constituted a categorical boundary, as evidenced by increased sensitivity to differences in image pairs that straddled this tipping point. Additionally, the impression of life was gleaned from the eyes more than from other facial features. These results suggest that human beings are highly attuned to specific facial cues, carried largely in the eyes, that gate the categorical perception of life.

Is morality unified? evidence that distinct neural systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust

Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether “moral judgments” are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.

Music and movement share a dynamic structure that supports universal expressions of emotion

Music moves us. Its kinetic power is the foundation of human behaviors as diverse as dance, romance, lullabies, and the military march. Despite its significance, the music-movement relationship is poorly understood. We present an empirical method for testing whether music and movement share a common structure that affords equivalent and universal emotional expressions. Our method uses a computer program that can generate matching examples of music and movement from a single set of features: rate, jitter (regularity of rate), direction, step size, and dissonance/visual spikiness. We applied our method in two experiments, one in the United States and another in an isolated tribal village in Cambodia. These experiments revealed three things: (i) each emotion was represented by a unique combination of features, (ii) each combination expressed the same emotion in both music and movement, and (iii) this common structure between music and movement was evident within and across cultures.

Mind Perception: Real but Not Artificial Faces Sustain Neural Activity beyond the N170/VPP

Faces are visual objects that hold special significance as the icons of other minds. Previous researchers using event-related potentials (ERPs) have found that faces are uniquely associated with an increased N170/vertex positive potential (VPP) and a more sustained frontal positivity. Here, we examined the processing of faces as objects vs. faces as cues to minds by contrasting images of faces possessing minds (human faces), faces lacking minds (doll faces), and non-face objects (i.e., clocks). Although both doll and human faces were associated with an increased N170/VPP from 175–200 ms following stimulus onset, only human faces were associated with a sustained positivity beyond 400 ms. Our data suggest that the N170/VPP reflects the object-based processing of faces, whether of dolls or humans; on the other hand, the later positivity appears to uniquely index the processing of human faces—which are more salient and convey information about identity and the presence of other minds.

When to Fire: Anticipatory Versus Postevent Reconstrual of Uncontrollable Events:

Three studies examined the conditions under which people engage in anticipatory construal before an evaluative event versus reconstrual after the event. Computer software informed college students that there was a 1.5%, 12%, 88%, or 98.5% chance that an opposite-sex student would pick them for a hypothetical date. When people had extreme expectations (1.5% or 98.5%), they changed their view of the student to be consistent with their expectations before learning the outcome (anticipatory reconstrual). When people had moderate expectations (12% or 88%), they formed relatively unbiased impressions beforehand but reconstrued after learning the outcome of the dating game (postevent reconstrual). Either strategy can ameliorate the pain of a negative event in ways that people do not anticipate. Forecasters predicted that losing would make them feel worse than it did and selected a higher dose of a drug to cope with an anticipated loss than did people who actually lost.