Carson J. Reeling

Why Metrics Matter: Evaluating Policy Choices for Reactive Nitrogen in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed †

Despite major efforts, the reduction of reactive nitrogen (Nr) using traditional metrics and policy tools for the Chesapeake Bay has slowed in recent years. In this article, we apply the concept of the Nitrogen Cascade to the chemically dynamic nature and multiple sources of Nr to examine the temporal and spatial movement of different forms of Nr through multiple ecosystems and media. We also demonstrate the benefit of using more than the traditional mass fluxes to set criteria for action. The use of multiple metrics provides additional information about where the most effective intervention point might be. Utilizing damage costs or mortality metrics demonstrates that even though the mass fluxes to the atmosphere are lower than direct releases to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, total damage costs to all ecosystems and health are higher because of the cascade of Nr and the associated damages, and because they exact a higher human health cost. Abatement costs for reducing Nr releases into the air are also lower. These findings have major implications for the use of multiple metrics and the additional benefits of expanding the scope of concern beyond the Bay itself and support improved coordination between the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts while restoring the Chesapeake Bay.

Environmental and Economic Trade-Offs in a Watershed When Using Corn Stover for Bioenergy

There is an abundant supply of corn stover in the United States that remains after grain is harvested which could be used to produce cellulosic biofuels mandated by the current Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). This research integrates the Soil Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) watershed model and the DayCent biogeochemical model to investigate water quality and soil greenhouse gas flux that results when corn stover is collected at two different rates from corn-soybean and continuous corn crop rotations with and without tillage. Multiobjective watershed-scale optimizations are performed for individual pollutant-cost minimization criteria based on the economic cost of each cropping practice and (individually) the effect on nitrate, total phosphorus, sediment, or global warming potential. We compare these results with a purely economic optimization that maximizes stover production at the lowest cost without taking environmental impacts into account. We illustrate trade-offs between cost and different environmental performance criteria, assuming that nutrients contained in any stover collected must be replaced. The key finding is that stover collection using the practices modeled results in increased contributions to atmospheric greenhouse gases while reducing nitrate and total phosphorus loading to the watershed relative to the status quo without stover collection. Stover collection increases sediment loading to waterways relative to when no stover is removed for each crop rotation-tillage practice combination considered; no-till in combination with stover collection reduced sediment loading below baseline conditions without stover collection. Our results suggest that additional information is needed about (i) the level of nutrient replacement required to maintain grain yields and (ii) cost-effective management practices capable of reducing soil erosion when crop residues are removed in order to avoid contributions to climate change and water quality impairments as a result of using corn stover to satisfy the RFS.

Economic Incentives for Managing Filterable Biological Pollution Risks from Trade

Infectious livestock disease problems are “biological pollution” problems. Prior work on biological pollution problems generally examines the efficient allocation of prevention and control efforts, but does not identify the specific externalities underpinning the design of efficiency-enhancing policy instruments. Prior analyses also focus on problems where those being damaged do not contribute to externalities. We examine a problem where the initial biological introduction harms the importer and then others are harmed by spread from this importer. Here, the externality is the spread of infection beyond the initial importer. This externality is influenced by the importer’s private risk management choices, which provide impure public goods that reduce disease spillovers to others—making disease spread a “filterable externality.” We derive efficient policy incentives to internalize filterable disease externalities given uncertainties about introduction and spread. We find efficiency requires incentivizing an importer’s trade choices along with self-protection and abatement efforts, in contrast to prior work that targets trade alone. Perhaps surprisingly, we find these incentives increase with importers’ private risk management incentives and with their ability to directly protect others. In cases where importers can spread infection to each other, we find filterable externalities may lead to multiple Nash equilibria.

Managing Wildlife Faced with Pathogen Risks Involving Multi-Stable Outcomes

Most models designed to understand how to manage infected wildlife systems with bioeconomic multi-stability take the initial conditions as given, thereby treating pathogen invasion as unanticipated. We examine how ex ante management is an opportunity to influence the ex post conditions, which in turn affect the ex post optimal outcome. To capture these ex ante management choices, we extend the Poisson “collapse” model of Reed and Heras (Bull Math Biol 54:185–207, 1992) to allow for endogenous initial conditions and ex post multi-stability. We account for two uncertain processes: the introduction and establishment of the pathogen. Introduction is conditional on anthropogenic investments in prevention, and both random processes are conditional on how we manage the native population to provide natural prevention of invasion and natural insurance against establishment placing the system in an undesirable basin of attraction. We find that both multi-stability of the invaded system and these uncertainty processes can create economic non-convexities that yield multiple candidate solutions to the ex ante optimization problem. Additionally, we illustrate how the nature of natural protection against introduction and establishment risks can play an important role in the allocation of anthropogenic investments.