Carsten Fink

An Assessment of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries

The authors analyze the effect of policy reform in basic telecommunications on sectoral performance using a new panel data set for 86 developing countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1985 to 1999. The authors address three questions: 1) What impact do specific policy changes-relating to ownership and competition-have on sectoral performance? 2) How is the impact of change in any one policy affected by the implementation of the other, and by the overall regulatory framework? 3) Does the sequence in which reforms are implemented affect performance? The authors find that both privatization and competition lead to significant improvements in performance. But a comprehensive reform program, involving both policies and the support of an independent regulator, produced the largest gains-an 8 percent higher level of mainlines and a 21 percent higher level of productivity compared to years of partial and no reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform matters: mainline penetration is lower if competition is introduced after privatization, rather than at the same time. The authors also find that autonomous factors, such as technological progress, have a strong influence on telecommunications performance, accounting for an increase of 5 percent a year in teledensity and 9 percent in productivity over the period 1985 to 1999.

W(h)ither the digital divide

The “widening digital divide” has the status of fact in most discussions of the global distribution of information and communications technologies (ICTs), and that this divide is a problem is widely accepted. This paper challenges both assumptions. First, looking at various measures of the digital divide, there is a divide in per‐capita access to ICTs but developing countries show faster rates of growth in network development than developed countries. Moreover, when employing a per‐income measure of access, developing countries already “digitally leapfrog” the developed world. Second, the paper examines the prediction that disparities in absolute access to ICTs between countries will lead to reduced development prospects in poor countries. Past experience has shown that it is very difficult to make predictions of this type. The paper concludes that we may be posing the wrong policy questions when focusing on a “digital divide” as it is commonly understood.

Regional agreements and trade services - policy issues

Every major regional trade agreement now has a services dimension. Is trade in services so different that there is need to modify the conclusions on preferential agreements pertaining to goods reached so far? Mattoo and Fink first examine the implications of unilateral policy choices in a particular services market. They then explore the economics of international cooperation and identify the circumstances in which a country is more likely to benefit from cooperation in a regional rather than multilateral forum. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the implications of liberalizing trade in services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or cfink@worldbank.org.Every major regional trade agreement now has a services dimension. Is trade in services so different that there is need to modify the conclusions on preferential agreements pertaining to goods reached so far? The authors first examine the implications of unilateral policy choices in a particular services market. They then explore the economics of international cooperation and identify the circumstances in which a country is more likely to benefit from cooperation in a regional rather than multilateral forum.

Liberalizing basic telecommunications : the Asian experience

The authors examine the liberalization of the basic telecommunications sector in Asian countries with a view to identifying good policy and determining how multilateral negotiations can promote it. They find that most Asian governments, despite the move away from traditional public monopolies, are still unwilling to allow unrestricted entry, eliminate limits on private and foreign ownership, and establish strong, independent regulators. But where comprehensive reform has been undertaken-including privatization, competition, and regulation-the availability of main lines, the quality of service, and the productivity of labor are significantly higher. Somewhat surprisingly, little unilateral liberalization has occurred since the last round of telecommunications negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The new round therefore faces the challenge of not merely harvesting unilateral liberalization, as in the past, but of negotiating away existing restrictions. Since quantitative restrictions on the number of telecommunications service suppliers are pervasive, deepened GATS rules could help ensure transparent and nondiscriminatory allocation of licenses. There may also be a need to sharpen the regulatory principles established in the last round and to create rules that safeguard not only the rights of foreign suppliers but also those of consumers.

Patent Protection, Transnational Corporations, and Market Structure: A Simulation Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry

This study examines the role of patent protection on the behavior of transnational corporations and market structure in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The method of analysis is the calibration of a theoretical model to firm-level data from two therapeutic groups of the Indian pharmacy market, and a simulation analysis asking the hypothetical question of what the market structure would be if India granted patent protection to pharmaceutical products. The model developed for the simulation analysis explicitly accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods that results from the presence of therapeutic substitute drugs, and product differentiation among chemically equivalent drugs.

Rules of Origin in Services: A Case Study of Five ASEAN Countries

An important question in the design of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) covering services is to what extent nonmembers benefit from the trade preferences that are negotiated among members. This question is resolved through services rules of origin. The restrictiveness of rules of origin determines the degree of preferences entailed in market opening commitments, shaping the bargaining incentives of FTAs and their eventual economic effects. Even though the number of FTAs in services has increased rapidly in recent years, hardly any research is available that can guide policymakers on the economic implications of different rules of origin. After outlining the key economic tradeoffs and options for rules of origin in services, the paper summarizes the main findings of a research project that has assessed the rules of origin question for five countries in the ASEAN region. For selected service subsectors and a number of criteria for rules or origin, simulation exercises evaluated which service providers would or would not be eligible for preferences negotiated under a FTA. Among other findings, the simulation results point to the binding nature of a domestic ownership or control requirement and, for the specific case of financial services, a requirement of incorporation.