Ccp Chris Snijders

On-line Reputation Systems: The Effects of Feedback Comments and Reactions on Building and Rebuilding Trust in On-line Auctions

Previous research on reputation systems primarily focused on their trust-building function. The present research addresses their trust-rebuilding function-specifically, the role of the short text comments given in reaction to negative feedback. Rebuilding trust is often necessary because on-line markets are noisy environments. The results of two experimental studies of eBay users show that trustworthiness judgments are influenced by the text comments accompanying negative feedback and also by whether a trust violation is perceived as competence-based or morality-based. Plain apologies were more successful than denials in repairing trust. These effects were mediated by the perceived believability of the comments. Thus, to avoid the detrimental effect of noise on trust, operators of on-line marketplaces should encourage text feedback comments and reactions.

Do you trust? Whom do you trust? When do you trust?

We try to provide a broader view on the factors that influence the decision to trust and honor trust. Using the “Trust Game” as our experimental paradigm, we consider three classes of factors that may be related to trust issues. The first one considers individual differences with regard to the probability to trust others (and honor trust of others), or disposition factors. Which kinds of people are more likely to trust? Second, we examine who is more likely to be trusted (anticipation factors), focusing on the appearance of the person who is to be trusted. And third, we analyze the circumstances under which trust is more likely to evolve (situation factors). Trusting is easy if there is not much at stake, but if the stakes and the risk increase, then how does that affect the willingness to trust? In short, we consider the decision to trust to be dependent on who you are, on who it is that has to be trusted, and on the specific situation. Moreover, we analyze which of these three classes is more important, using a set of experiments designed to measure the impact of disposition, anticipation, and situation factors. The data suggest that disposition factors play a minor role; the differences between people with regard to their likelihood to trust are relatively small. Anticipation factors, operationalized by varying alters appearance, had a larger but somewhat paradoxical effect. Those with a trustworthy appearance are indeed trusted more easily, but they do not actually behave more trustworthy. By far the strongest influences were found among the situation factors. Both the payoffs and the structure of the game have a large impact on trust and honoring trust.

Does the online collection of ego-centered network data reduce data quality? An experimental comparison

We analyze whether differences in kind and quality of ego-centered network data are related to whether the data are collected online or offline. We report the results of two studies. In the first study respondents could choose between filling out ego-centered data through a web questionnaire and being probed about their network in a personalized interview. The second study used a design in which respondents were allocated at random to either online or offline data collection. Our results show that the data quality suffers from the online data collection and the findings indicate that this is the consequence of the respondents answering “mechanically”. We conclude that network researchers should avoid to simply copy traditional network items into a web questionnaire. More research is needed about how new design elements specific for web questionnaires can motivate respondents to fill out network questions properly.

Ties that tear apart: The social embeddedness of strategic alliance termination

Abstract Strategic alliances between firms are inherently unstable, and many alliances fail before the planned termination date. Most studies of the instability of strategic alliances focus on internal factors, such as tensions between alliance partners. In the present study social networks, in particular the centrality of firms in an alliance network, are considered as factors explaining alliance instability. The study examines 1061 ICT-alliances that were formed in the period 1975–1989. As expected, it was found that differences in centrality increase alliance instability. Contrary to the expectation, the sum of centralities of firms in an alliance does not affect alliance instability.

Effective User Interface Designs to Increase Energy-efficient Behavior in a Rasch-based Energy Recommender System

People often struggle to find appropriate energy-saving measures to take in the household. Although recommender studies show that tailoring a systems interaction method to the domain knowledge of the user can increase energy savings, they did not actually tailor the conservation advice itself. We present two large user studies in which we support users to make an energy-efficient behavioral change by presenting tailored energy-saving advice. Both systems use a one-dimensional, ordinal Rasch scale, which orders 79 energy-saving measures on their behavioral difficulty and link this to a users energy-saving ability for tailored advice. We established that recommending Rasch-based advice can reduce a users effort, increase system support and, in turn, increase choice satisfaction and lead to the adoption of more energy-saving measures. Moreover, follow-up surveys administered four weeks later point out that tailoring advice on its feasibility can support behavioral change.

Effects of Network Characteristics on Reaching the Payoff-Dominant Equilibrium in Coordination Games: A Simulation study

We study how payoffs and network structure affect reaching the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a

Determinants of trust

2\times 2

Gossip and Reputation in Business Networks

2×2 coordination game that actors play with their neighbors in a network. Using an extensive simulation analysis of over 100,000 networks with 2–25 actors, we show that the importance of network characteristics is restricted to a limited part of the payoff space. In this part, we conclude that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is chosen more often if network density is larger, the network is more centralized, and segmentation of the network is smaller. Moreover, it is more likely that heterogeneity in behavior persists if the network is more segmented and less centralized. Persistence of heterogeneous behavior is not related to network density.