Jeroen Weesie

The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making

Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.

AN EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECTS OF EMBEDDEDNESS IN TRUST SITUATIONS: BUYING A USED CAR

This article describes a vignette experiment on the effects of temporal embeddedness and network embeddedness in trust situations. The experiment uses a setting in which a buyer wants to buy a used car from a car dealer. We distinguish between effects on trust of the past relation and the effects of the expected future relation between the buyer and the dealer. A buyer can learn about the trustworthiness of the dealer from past transactions of the dealer. Moreover, the buyer can control the dealer if the buyer and the dealer expect more transactions in the future, because the buyer may sanction the dealer if the dealer would act untrustworthy in the present transaction, for example, by refraining from future transactions. Temporal embeddedness facilitates learning and control through the bilateral relation of the buyer and the dealer, while network embeddedness facilitates learning and control through third parties. In the experiment, subjects are asked to compare different settings for buying a used car, while the relation between the buyer and dealer is varied in these settings. We conclude that both learning and control affect trust at the level of the dyad (temporal embeddedness) as well as at the group-level (network embeddedness).

Cost Sharing in a Volunteer's Dilemma

Many interesting situations of public good provision such as a bystanders decision to help a victim, a committee members decision to veto, or a companys decision to develop innovative products can be described by the volunteers dilemma (VOD). The authors analyze a variant of the VOD in which the costs of producing a public good are shared equally among the volunteers rather than paid in full by each of the volunteers. The game theoretic solution predicts that the probability of volunteering is larger under the condition of sharing than when each volunteer pays the full cost. It is predicted that, even when cost sharing, the individual probability to volunteer decreases with group size, and larger groups still underproduce the public good. Predictions are tested using data collected via a mailed questionnaire to students of Berne University. The quantitative predictions of the game-theoretic models do not describe the data well, even when the models are extended with risk preferences. However, the less informative qualitative prediction that cost sharing increases the individual probability to volunteer is supported by the data.

Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games*

Hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond) is a commitment device that allows for cooperation of rational actors in economic and social relations with incentive problems, like in the Prisoners Dilemma. This paper provides, first, an informal discussion of hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperatioa We then analyze noncooperative 2‐ and n‐person games with complete information where players can post a hostage prior to their interaction. We compare rather general hostage ‘institutions’ that specify the conditions under which hostages are declared forfeited and, if forfeited, whether the hostages are transferred to another player or are lost. The problem of designing efficient hostage institutions is addressed and solved for 2‐person settings. The minimal institutional requirement for individually rational hostage posting and subsequent cooperation is, roughly, that a players hostage is forfeited if hostages have been posted by everyone and if the player deviates unilaterally from cooperation. Fur...

Consent or Conflict: Coevolution of Coordination and Networks:

Societies are sometimes divided into groups that behave in different ways or have strongly opposing opinions. At other times, everyone seems to behave according to similar principles and opinions. It is likely that individual decisions on behavior or opinions are affected by social networks through influence and selection processes. However, the outcomes are not necessarily optimal for the society as a whole. Two types of problems might arise: (a) polarization of the society into two camps that do not reach consensus, possibly leading to conflict; (b) actors choosing suboptimal behavior, because changing behavior is too risky if done unilaterally. Simulations show that if a society is rather segregated initially, there exists a heightened probability that this situation will worsen. The effect of network density is twofold. First, density has a positive effect on reaching a uniform opinion and, therefore, decreases the likelihood of polarization. Second, density increases the likelihood that actors do not change their behavior, worsening the inefficiency of already suboptimal initial situations.

Incomplete Information and Timing in the Volunteer's Dilemma

We analyze the supply of a public good that can be privately produced at costs smaller than the benefits. Without a coordinating mechanism, the selection of a volunteer poses a social dilemma. By varying two conditions, we obtain four scenarios. First, we distinguish whether or not players observe each others behavior. Under the condition that behavior is observed, strategies involve timing decisions, namely how long to wait before volunteering, hoping that someone else volunteers first, but incurring costs for delayed production. If behavior cannot be observed, players effectively choose simultaneously, and rational players will either volunteer immediately or not at all. Second, we distinguish complete information with respect to the costs and benefits of the other players from incomplete information. For each of the four scenarios, we discuss a game theoretic model that assumes (ex ante) symmetrical costs and benefits. Remarkably, the probability that a player volunteers may increase with the degree of uncertainty. Moreover, in contrast with the complete information models, if uncertainty is sufficiently high, the probability that the collective good is produced may actually increase with group size. Finally, the four scenarios are ranked by the extent to which they generate favorable incentives for the production of the public good.

Cooperation via social networks

Abstract Sufficiently frequent interaction between partners has been identified by, a.o., Axelrod as a more-or-less sufficient condition for stable cooperation. The underlying argument is that rational cooperation is ensured if short-term benefits from opportunistic behavior are offset by the long-term costs of sanctions imposed on the culprit. In this paper, we develop a model for ‘embedded trust’ in which a trustee interacts with a number of trustors who may communicate via a social network with each other about the behavior of the trustor. The analysis reconfirms the standard predictions about how the level of trust depends on the payoffs and shadow of the future. We provide new predictions both on between-network effects (“which network is more favorable for cooperation?”) and on within-network effects (“in what network position can you trust more?”).

EMBEDDED PARTNER SELECTION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN FIRMS

This chapter addresses how firms buying information technology (IT) products select their suppliers. We argue that social embeddedness, in the sense of own experiences with suppliers and information about experiences of third parties, influences these types of selection decisions. More specifically, we claim that social embeddedness is more important if: (1) the potential damage for the buyer from receiving an inferior product is larger and (2) if it is more difficult for the buyer to monitor the quality of the product. We use large-scale surveys of IT transactions in the Netherlands and Germany to test these hypotheses. In general, our hypotheses about the effects of social embeddedness on partner selection are supported. We find that buyers tend to assign greater weight to product quality if the potential damage for the buyer is larger. Negative third-party information is particularly important if the buyer has large problems to monitor the quality of a product.

The influence of friends on adolescents’ behavior problems at school: The role of ego, alter and dyadic characteristics

Abstract This paper deals with the influence of friends in class on adolescents’ problematic school behavior (i.e. inattention in class and not doing homework). We examine whether this influence is moderated by ego (i.e. the adolescents indegree), alter (i.e. friends’ indegree) and dyadic characteristics (i.e. friendship reciprocity). Influence processes are analyzed with a stochastic actor-based model (SIENA), while controlling for friendship selection. Using a 4-wave panel dataset, we find that friends influence adolescents’ problematic school behavior. Adolescents with a higher indegree are less likely to be influenced. The influence of friends is not significantly moderated by friends’ indegree and friendship reciprocity.

Inequality and Procedural Justice in Social Dilemmas

This study investigates the influence of resource inequality and the fairness of the allocation procedure of unequal resources on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. We propose a simple formal behavioral model that incorporates conflicting selfish and social motivations. This model allows us to predict how inequality influences cooperative behavior. Allocation of resources is manipulated by three treatments that vary in terms of procedural justice: allocating resources randomly, based on merit, and based on ascription. As predicted, procedural justice influences cooperation significantly. Moreover, gender is found to be an important factor interacting with the association between procedural justice and cooperative behavior.