Cesare Bertone

How the gaze of others influences object processing

An aspect of gaze processing, which so far has been given little attention, is the influence that intentional gaze processing can have on object processing. Converging evidence from behavioural neuroscience and developmental psychology strongly suggests that objects falling under the gaze of others acquire properties that they would not display if not looked at. Specifically, observing another person gazing at an object enriches that object of motor, affective and status properties that go beyond its chemical or physical structure. A conceptual analysis of available evidence leads to the conclusion that gaze has the potency to transfer to the object the intentionality of the person looking at it.

Intentions in the Brain: The Unveiling of Mister Hyde

Is it possible to understand the intentions of others by merely observing their movements? Current debate has been mainly focused on the role that mirror neurons and motor simulation may play in this process, with surprisingly little attention being devoted to how intentions are actually translated into movements. Here, we delineate an alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding, which takes “action execution” rather than “action observation” as a starting point. We first consider whether and to what extent, during action execution, intentions shape movement kinematics. We then examine whether observers are sensitive to intention information conveyed by visual kinematics and can use this information to discriminate between different intentions. Finally, we consider the neural mechanisms that may contribute to intention-from-movement understanding. We argue that by reframing the relationship between intention and movement, this evidence opens new perspectives into the neurobiology of how we know other minds and predict others’ behavior.

The visible face of intention: why kinematics matters

A key component of social understanding is the ability to read intentions from movements. But how do we discern intentions in others’ actions? What kind of intention information is actually available in the features of others’ movements? Based on the assumption that intentions are hidden away in the other person’s mind, standard theories of social cognition have mainly focused on the contribution of higher level processes. Here, we delineate an alternative approach to the problem of intention-from-movement understanding. We argue that intentions become “visible” in the surface flow of agents’ motions. Consequently, the ability to understand others’ intentions cannot be divorced from the capability to detect essential kinematics. This hypothesis has far reaching implications for how we know other minds and predict others’ behavior.

The bilocated mind: new perspectives on self-localization and self-identification

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

The ontology of neglect

As shown by neuroscientific evidence, neglect may occur without elementary sensorimotor impairments. The deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, which prevents the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. By analysing a series of neuropsychological results, in this paper we suggest a crucial role of time for the construction of a world: on this basis, we try to explain how it is possible that half the ontology gets lost. The analysis of the ontological implication of neglect will allow us to shed light on manifestations of the pathology apparently disconnected.

Object temporal connotation

Recent studies show that what connotes an object is first of all a certain spatio-temporal structure. In this paper we describe some of the temporal features characterizing the temporal structure of objects: pre-existence, persistence, conservation of identity in spite of perceptive discontinuity, surviving changes in colour, size, and shape. We argue that time is an indispensable attribute for every type of object and briefly discuss the implication of this view with respect to a specific neuropsychological syndrome: unilateral spatial neglect.

The observability principle and beyond

Is it possible to directly perceive others’ mental states? Mediating the debate between Direct Perception and Inferentialism proponents would require knowing “what counts as an inference and how to tell the difference between inferential and non-inferential processing” [1]. However, few theorists have even attempted to answer the question of what counts as inference. The consequence, as noted by Spaulding [1], is that “given that neither Inferentialists nor DSP [Direct Social Perception, Ed.] proponents specify what they mean by inference, it is hard to tell what exactly each side is affirming and denying. Thus, the debate between Inferentialism and DSP is at an impasse”. Similar considerations apply to distinguishing between what is ‘observable’ versus ‘unobservable’ [2]. The motivation for the work discussed in the target article [2] was partly to reconceptualize the notion of ‘direct perception’ to make the observability of others’ mental states empirically addressable. This resulted in the proposal to reformulate ‘direct perception’ as reflecting the conditional probability of perceiving a given mental state from the observation of certain movement features. We do not claim that this formulation resolves the issue of whether perception of others’ mental states involves inferential steps. As noted by Overgaard [3], in principle, a stimulus may contain discriminatory information about a mental state, the information may be perceptually useful, while identifying the mental state could still involve ‘inferential’ steps. This argument brings us back to the initial impasse of what counts as inference. More radically, one

How Objects Become Social in the Brain: Five Questions for a Neuroscience of Social Reality

Social objects have been at the centre of philosophical discussion and debate over the last decade. So far, however, little empirical work has been conducted on social objects and we are still at the very early stages of understanding how the brain permits us to represent, recognize, and constitute a social reality. In this chapter, we consider five core questions for a neuroscience of social objects: Are social objects a category of objects in the brain? When we use money or see it being used, do we employ similar representations as those of concrete tools such as screwdrivers? How do status functions emerge? Do social objects depend on a uniquely human ability to share goals and intentions? Do social objects influence the sensory-motor system? We speculate on ways in which these questions might be addressed combining behavioural, developmental, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches.