Mauro Adenzato

Understanding Intentions in Social Interaction: The Role of the Anterior Paracingulate Cortex

Neuroimaging studies have identified the anterior paracingulate cortex (PCC) as the key prefrontal region subserving theory of mind. We adopt an evolutionary perspective hypothesizing that, in response to the pressures of social complexity, a mechanism for manipulating information concerning social interaction has emerged in the anterior PCC. To date, neuroimaging studies have not properly distinguished between intentions of persons involved in social interactions and intentions of an isolated person. In two separate fMRI experiments, we demonstrated that the anterior PCC is not necessarily involved in the understanding of other peoples intentions per se, but primarily in the understanding of the intentions of people involved in social interaction. Moreover, this brain region showed activation when a represented intention implies social interaction and therefore had not yet actually occurred. This result suggests that the anterior PCC is also involved in our ability to predict future intentional social interaction, based on an isolated agents behavior. We conclude that distinct areas of the neural system underlying theory of mind are specialized in processing distinct classes of social stimuli.

The intentional network: how the brain reads varieties of intentions.

Social neuroscience provides insights into the neural correlates of the human capacity to explain and predict other peoples intentions, a capacity that lies at the core of the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism. Results from neuroimaging research describe a widely distributed neural system underlying ToM, including the right and left temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), the precuneus, and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Nevertheless, there is disagreement in the literature concerning the key region for the ToM network. Some authors point to the MPFC, others to the right TPJ. In the effort to make a contribution to the debate, we propose a model of a dynamic ToM network consisting of four regions. We also introduce a novel theoretical distinction among varieties of intention, which differ by the nature of an individuals pursued goal (private or social) and by the social interactions temporal dimension (present or future). Our results confirm the crucial role of both the MPFC and the right TPJ, but show that these areas are differentially engaged depending on the nature of the intention involved. Whereas the right TPJ and the precuneus are necessary for processing all types of prior intentions, the left TPJ and the anterior paracingulate cortex are specifically involved in the understanding of social intention. More specifically, the left TPJ is activated only when a subset of social intentions are involved (communicative intentions). Taken together, these results demonstrate the progressive recruitment of the ToM network along the theoretical dimensions introduced in the present paper.

At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive science meets neurophysiology

Recent experimental research in the field of neurophysiology has led to the discovery of two classes of visuomotor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. In light of these studies, we propose here an overview of two classical themes in the cognitive science panorama: James Gibsons theory of affordances and Eleanor Roschs principles of categorization. We discuss how theoretical perspectives and neuroscientific evidence are converging towards the current paradigm of embodied cognition. From this perspective, we discuss the role of action and simulation in cognitive processes, which lead to the perceptual recognition of objects, and actions and to their conceptual categorization.

Theory of Mind ability in the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: An analysis of the neural, cognitive, and social levels.

The paper reviews convergent evidence on the ability to attribute mental states to ones self and to others (i.e., theory of mind, ToM) in patients affected by the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD). This disease represents a particular challenge for researchers and clinicians, due to its insidious onset and ambiguous clinical features, which frequently render difficult a precise and timely diagnosis. The paper proposes a way to shed new light on the hypothesis that the neuropsychiatric profile of individuals with bv-FTD can be at least partially explained by a deficit in ToM ability. We examined both neuroimaging data on the neural correlates of ToM ability in healthy participants and studies investigating the progressive cerebral atrophy in patients with bv-FTD. Our findings suggest a link between the progressive degeneration of the anterior regions of medial frontal structures characterising the early stages of the bv-FTD and the ToM deficit these patients show. They also suggest the importance of using ToM tests during the diagnostic process of bv-FTD.

Visual experience is not necessary for efficient survey spatial cognition: Evidence from blindness

This study investigated whether the lack of visual experience affects the ability to create spatial inferential representations of the survey type. We compared the performance of persons with congenital blindness and that of blindfolded sighted persons on four survey representation-based tasks (Experiment 1). Results showed that persons with blindness performed better than blindfolded sighted controls. We repeated the same tests introducing a third group of persons with late blindness (Experiment 2). This last group performed better than blindfolded sighted participants, whereas differences between participants with late and congenital blindness were nonsignificant. The present findings are compatible with results of other studies, which found that when visual perception is lacking, skill in gathering environmental spatial information provided by nonvisual modalities may contribute to a proper spatial encoding. It is concluded that, although it cannot be asserted that total lack of visual experience incurs no cost, our findings are further evidence that visual experience is not a necessary condition for the development of spatial inferential complex representations.

Theory of Mind in Parkinson's disease

The ability to infer other peoples mental states (i.e. Theory of Mind, ToM) is a major topic of interest in various neurological and psychiatric disorders. However, it is only recently that there has been an assessment of cognitive and affective components of ToM ability in neurodegenerative disorders. In this review, we examine studies investigating the ToM ability in Parkinsons disease (PD). Taken together, these studies provide preliminary evidence that ToM difficulties may occur in PD patients. In particular, these difficulties principally involve the cognitive component of ToM in the early stages of the disease. The spatio-temporal progression of dopamine depletion supports the hypothesis that the affective component may only be affected in the advanced stages of the disease. The relationships between executive functioning, dopaminergic therapies, and ToM in PD as well as the relationships between frontostriatal circuits and ToM processing are discussed.

Intention processing in communication: A common brain network for language and gestures

Human communicative competence is based on the ability to process a specific class of mental states, namely, communicative intention. The present fMRI study aims to analyze whether intention processing in communication is affected by the expressive means through which a communicative intention is conveyed, that is, the linguistic or extralinguistic gestural means. Combined factorial and conjunction analyses were used to test two sets of predictions: first, that a common brain network is recruited for the comprehension of communicative intentions independently of the modality through which they are conveyed; second, that additional brain areas are specifically recruited depending on the communicative modality used, reflecting distinct sensorimotor gateways. Our results clearly showed that a common neural network is engaged in communicative intention processing independently of the modality used. This network includes the precuneus, the left and right posterior STS and TPJ, and the medial pFC. Additional brain areas outside those involved in intention processing are specifically engaged by the particular communicative modality, that is, a peri-sylvian language network for the linguistic modality and a sensorimotor network for the extralinguistic modality. Thus, common representation of communicative intention may be accessed by modality-specific gateways, which are distinct for linguistic versus extralinguistic expressive means. Taken together, our results indicate that the information acquired by different communicative modalities is equivalent from a mental processing standpoint, in particular, at the point at which the actors communicative intention has to be reconstructed.

Intentional minds: a philosophical analysis of intention tested through fMRI experiments involving people with schizophrenia, people with autism, and healthy individuals.

In this paper we show how we empirically tested one of the most relevant topics in philosophy of mind through a series of fMRI experiments: the classification of different types of intention. To this aim, firstly we trace a theoretical distinction among private, prospective, and communicative intentions. Second, we propose a set of predictions concerning the recognition of these three types of intention in healthy individuals, and we report the experimental results corroborating our theoretical model of intention. Third, we derive from our model predictions relevant for the domain of psychopathological functioning. In particular, we treat the cases of both hyper-intentionality (as in paranoid schizophrenia) and hypo-intentionality (as in autistic spectrum disorders). Our conclusion is that the theoretical model of intention we propose contributes to enlarge our knowledge on the neurobiological bases of intention processing, in both healthy people and in people with impairments to the neurocognitive system that underlies intention recognition.

Social Cognition in Anorexia Nervosa: Evidence of Preserved Theory of Mind and Impaired Emotional Functioning

Background The findings of the few studies that have to date investigated the way in which individuals with Anorexia Nervosa (AN) navigate their social environment are somewhat contradictory. We undertook this study to shed new light on the social-cognitive profile of patients with AN, analysing Theory of Mind and emotional functioning. Starting from previous evidence on the role of the amygdala in the neurobiology of AN and in the social cognition, we hypothesise preserved Theory of Mind and impaired emotional functioning in patients with AN. Methodology Thirty women diagnosed with AN and thirty-two women matched for education and age were involved in the study. Theory of Mind and emotional functioning were assessed with a set of validated experimental tasks. A measure of perceived social support was also used to test the correlations between this dimension and the social-cognitive profile of AN patients. Principal Findings The performance of patients with AN is significantly worse than that of healthy controls on tasks assessing emotional functioning, whereas patients’ performance is comparable to that of healthy controls on the Theory of Mind task. Correlation analyses showed no relationship between scores on any of the social-cognition tasks and either age of onset or duration of illness. A correlation between social support and emotional functioning was found. This latter result seems to suggest a potential role of social support in the treatment and recovery of AN. Conclusions The pattern of results followed the experimental hypothesis. They may be useful to help us better understand the social-cognitive profile of patients with AN and to contribute to the development of effective interventions based on the ways in which patients with AN actually perceive their social environment.

Empathy and Emotion Recognition in Semantic Dementia: A Case Report.

Recent studies have demonstrated that patients suffering from frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) show impairments in empathy and emotional processing. In this study, we examined two different aspects of these abilities in a patient with semantic dementia (SD), a variant of FTLD. The first aspect was the assessment of the cognitive and emotional components of empathy through the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The second was the naming and comprehension of emotions using the Ekman 60 Faces Test. The patients emotion word knowledge was spared and the emotional aspects of empathy preserved. Conversely, the patient performed below average for all of the basic emotions when an emotion word had to be matched with a picture. When picture-to-picture matching was tested, however, the patient was able to recognize happiness. This case is a good example of a dissociation of covert and overt emotional functioning in SD. Results are discussed in terms of the impaired empathic behavior and emotional functioning in FTLD.