Chaim Gans

Mandatory rules and exclusionary reasons

גשומ ,םיבייחמ םיללכ ריבסהל ידכ זר ףסוי רציש גשומב ןד הז רמאמ םימעט םה םיבייחמ םיללכש ךכל זר לש וינועיטבו ,םיאיצומה םימעטה םיגוס דוסי לע תולועפ עצבל אל םימעט םה םיאיצומ םימעט .םיאיצומ ושארה וקלח .םירחא םימעט לש םימיוסמ לש וירבסה תא גיצמ רמאמה לש ן רבודמ .הלאכ םימעט םה םיבייחמ םיללכש ךכל וינועיט תאו גשומל זר סיסב לע ןועיטה ,םיללכל תוקדצהה דוסי לע ןועיטה :םינועיט העבראב םיללכ ןיב האוושהה סיסב לע ןועיטה ,תושקבו םיללכ ןיב האוושהה וכיספה היגולונמונפה לע ססובמה ןועיטהו תוטלחהו תיוולנה תיגול לש לודגה קלחה אב ךכ רחא .םיליגר םימעטל םיבייחמ םיללכ ןיב תושגנתהל לע תרוקיבל שדקומ ןורחאה וקלח .הלאה םינועיטה תרוקיבב קסועה ,רמאמה תלעותה תדימו ותומימע לע הבסנ וז תרוקיב .םיאיצומה םיללכה ןויער םצע מ ,ןורחאה קלחב ןעטנ ךכ ,איצומה םעטה גשומ .ובש ןיב הנחבהה תא שטשט םימעט ,הלועפל םימעט לש םתוחכונ רבדב תיתדבוע הקידב עצבל אל םימעט םאתהב גוהנל אל םימעטו ,םירחא םימעט דגנכ הלא םימעט לוקשל אל איצומה םעטה ןיא תונושארה ויתויועמשמ יתשב .ולקשנש רחאל םימעטל שו הקידב לש תוילטנמ תולועפ עצבל אל ןושאר רדסמ םעט אלא .הליק ,רחא םעט לע רבוגה ןושאר רדסמ םעט לכ ומכ אוה תישילשה ותועמשמב רחאה םעטה יפל לועפל אל םעט םג חרכהב אוהש .

National Self-Determination: A Sub- and Inter-Statist Conception

The right of national groups to self-government should be universally conceived of in sub-statist forms. Instead of interpreting the right to national self-determination in terms of independent statehood, it should in all cases be conceived of as a package of privileges to which each national group is entitled in its main geographic location, normally within the state that coincides with its homeland. According to this sub-statist conception, self-determination is not a right of majority nations within states vis-a-vis national minorities, but rather a right of homeland groups vis-a-vis non-homeland groups. It is a right to which each national group in the world is entitled, and which must be realized in at least one place.

The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of Zionism

Supporters of a Palestinian right of return assume that Israeli Jews bear responsibility for both the past and present suffering of the Palestinian refugees. Accordingly, the Palestinian claim for return is a demand to realize this responsibility (inter alia) by way of the return of the refugees to their places of origin or to uninhabited regions in the Land of Israel/Palestine. The purpose of this article is to examine the responsibility of the Israeli Jews for the Palestinian return of the refugees in light of the question of the justice of Zionism. Part I presents various approaches rejecting or affirming Zionism. The subsequent parts investigate the implications of the disparities between these approaches rejecting/affirming Zionism and Zionism’s actual history as it unfolded in terms of Jewish responsibility for the Palestinian plight and the question of Palestinian return. I argue that some of the approaches to Zionism are irrelevant to the dispute over the Palestinian right of return as it is understood within the framework of Israeli internal discourse and the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. However, my main point is that those approaches rejecting/ affirming Zionism that are relevant, though they may vary in their implications for the scope of Jewish responsibility for Palestinian suffering, nevertheless lead to very similar conclusions with respect to discharging that responsibility by way of Palestinian repatriation.

The Rights Discourse and the Obligation of States to Admit Immigrants

I argue in this Article that states have two types of moral duties with regard to their intake of immigrants. First, they have a duty to accept quotas of immigrants who have no individual rights to entrance prior to the determination of specific immigration criteria applicable in their case. Second, they have a duty to admit immigrants who are entitled to enter as individuals, namely, refigees and immigrants, who wish to enter the state for family reunification. Howevq under certain conditions, states could be justified in limiting the entrance of refigees and family reunification immigrants, who might eventually be eligible for naturalization by means of various qualijications and even quotas. Initially, I defend the complex thesis stated above by rejecting two positions supported by contemporary liberal immigration theorists. One position advocates a cosmopolitan human right to immigration, namely, every single individuaIk right to immigrate into any country of hisher choosing. The other position claims that states have a universal right to lock their gates to immigration. Finally, I argue for the middle-groundposition stated above.