David Lyons

Utility as a Possible Ground of Rights

Mary lives with her two small children in a modest, crowded neighborhood. She needs her car for transportation. Many others in her neighborhood have cars, and parking spots are sometimes difficult to find. Given her tight schedule and family circumstances, and despite her limited budget, she feels justified in renting a house that comes with a garage for her car. Access to the garage is provided by a private driveway, which she alone is authorized to use. Sometimes, however, she finds someone elses car parked in the driveway, which prevents her from parking or leaving with her own car. When time permits, she seeks out the driver or leaves a note to ask that the car be moved and the driveway left clear. Sometimes she must have a car towed away. Even so, she may be greatly inconvenienced. Once, when her younger child had an urgent medical appointment, she had to leave her car behind and take the child by cab instead. Marys problem, described in a general way, is commonplace: she has rights that are not always respected by other people. Rights-even ordinary rights like Marys-pose problems for utilitarianism. My purpose in this paper is to suggest how deep these problems are. For present purposes, the rights we speak of may be placed in two classes. Some rights depend for their existence upon social recognition or enforcement. So far as rights are enforceable by law, for example, they fall into this category. I shall call these institutional rights. Other rights that we speak

Redress for historical injustices in the United States : on reparations for slavery, Jim Crow, and their legacies

An exceptional resource, this comprehensive reader brings together primary and secondary documents related to efforts to redress historical wrongs against African Americans. These varied efforts are often grouped together under the rubric “reparations movement,” and they are united in their goal of “repairing” the injustices that have followed from the long history of slavery and Jim Crow. Yet, as this collection reveals, there is a broad range of opinions as to the form that repair might take. Some advocates of redress call for apologies; others for official acknowledgment of wrongdoing; and still others for more tangible reparations: monetary compensation, government investment in disenfranchised communities, the restitution of lost property and rights, and repatriation. Written by activists and scholars of law, political science, African American studies, philosophy, economics, and history, the twenty-six essays include both previously published articles and pieces written specifically for this volume. Essays theorize the historical and legal bases of claims for redress; examine the history, strengths, and limitations of the reparations movement; and explore its relation to human rights and social justice movements in the United States and abroad. Other essays evaluate the movement’s primary strategies: legislation, litigation, and mobilization. While all of the contributors support the campaign for redress in one way or another, some of them engage with arguments against reparations. Among the fifty-three primary documents included in the volume are federal, state, and municipal acts and resolutions; declarations and statements from organizations including the Black Panther Party and the NAACP; legal briefs and opinions; and findings and directives related to the provision of redress, from the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 to the mandate for the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States is a thorough assessment of the past, present, and future of the modern reparations movement. Contributors . Richard F. America, Sam Anderson, Martha Biondi, Boris L. Bittker, James Bolner, Roy L. Brooks, Michael K. Brown, Robert S. Browne, Martin Carnoy, Chiquita Collins, J. Angelo Corlett, Elliott Currie, William A. Darity, Jr., Adrienne Davis, Michael C. Dawson, Troy Duster, Dania Frank, Robert Fullinwider, Charles P. Henry, Gerald C. Horne, Robert Johnson, Jr., Robin D. G. Kelley, Jeffrey R. Kerr-Ritchie, Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., David Lyons, Michael T. Martin, Douglas S. Massey , Muntu Matsimela , C. J. Munford, Yusuf Nuruddin, Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Melvin L. Oliver, David B. Oppenheimer, Rovana Popoff, Thomas M. Shapiro, Marjorie M. Shultz, Alan Singer, David Wellman, David R. Williams, Eric K. Yamamoto, Marilyn Yaquinto

Mill’s Theory of Justice

It is time we reconsidered the relations between justice and utilitarianism. Thanks to a convergence of political and philosophical developments, interest in political philosophy and the problem of justice is greater than it has been for many years. Significant contributions have recently been made to the field.2 But our understanding of the political face of utilitarianism is, by contrast, rather crude. By re-examining Mill’s theory, I shall try in this paper to help us gain a better grasp upon the utilitarian view of justice.

Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning

I. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters. At least since Marbury , in which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitutions being a written document, originalism in one form or another has been a major theme in the American constitutional tradition.

Review of Rosen's Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill

Frederick Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London and New York, Routledge, 2003), pp. xiv + 289.

Non-ideal theory and the application of cautionary precepts

ABSTRACT This paper discusses non-ideal theory as guidance for making bad situations better by morally permissible means. It distinguishes constructive theorizing, which suggests ways of improving specific kinds of bad situation, from cautionary theory, which concerns moral risks of actions under bad conditions. Reflective moral judgment yields cautionary precepts, identifying presumptively unjustifiable modes of action. The paper illustrates the application of precepts cautioning about coercion and the exposure of others to significant risks, by considering the 1955–1956 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, and the ‘Children’s Crusade’ of the 1963 Birmingham desegregation campaign. All such campaigns involve coercive elements, but the paper argues that coercion was not a morally significant factor in either case. Endangerment is another matter: given the violent, sometimes lethal, reactions to civil rights actions under Jim Crow, those two campaigns’ endangerment of innocent persons must be taken very seriously, especially as it concerns Birmingham. And, in fact, potentially lethal anti-reform violence occurred during each campaign. Relevant factors include the preparation and understanding of young participants and the difference in risk that is assumed by engaging in peaceful, nonviolent public actions.

In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and Law.

Introduction: The need for re-examination. Part 1 Benthams utilitarianism: a differential interpretation the consistency of the dual standard the convergence of interests the development of Benthams position. Part 2 Bentham on the nature of law: the imperational theory of law motivation and control.