Charles Fried

The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation

collectivity is in certain cases not to try to favor it directly but to concentrate on those to whom one has a special relation? This does not involve tricking oneself, but only recognizing the limitations of what an individual can do and know. But that, it seems to me, is just Mills and Sidgwicks argument all over again. There is no trickery involved, but this is still a kind of deliberate limitation of our moral horizon which leaves us uncomfortable. Do I know in a particular case whether sticking to the narrow definition of my role will in that case further the good of all? If I know that it will not further the general good, then why am I acting as the role demands? Is it to avoid setting a bad example? But for whom? I need not tell others-whether I tell or not could enter into my calculation. For myself then? But that begs the question, since if short-circuiting the role-definition of my obligation and going straight for the general good is the best thing to do in that case, then the example I set myself is not a bad example, but a good example. In short, I do not see how one can at the same time admit that the general good is ones only moral standard, while steadfastly hewing to obligations to friends, family, and clients. What we must look for is an argument which shows that giving some degree of special consideration to myself, my friends, my clients is not merely instrumentally justified (as the utilitarians would argue) but to some degree intrinsically SO.20 I think such an argument can be made. Instead of speaking the language of maximization of value over all of humanity, it will speak the language of rights. The stubborn ethical datum affirming such a preference grows out of the profoundest springs of morality: the concepts of personality, identity, and liberty. C. Self, Friendship, and Justice Consider for a moment the picture of the human person that would emerge if the utilitarian claim were in fact correct. It would mean that in all my choices I must consider the well-being of all humanityactual and potential-as the range of my concern. Moreover, every actual or potential human being is absolutely equal in his claims upon me. Indeed, I myself am to myself only as one of this innumerable multitude. And that is the clue to what is wrong with the utilitarian vision. Before there is morality there must be the person. We must attain and maintain in our morality a concept of personality such that 20. See generally D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973); Harrod, Utilitarianism Revised, 45 MIND 137 (1936); Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939).

Equality and rights in medical care

In this article I present arguments intended to support the following conclusions: 1. To say there is a right to health care does not imply a right to equal access, a right that whatever is available to any shall be available to all. 2. The slogan of equal access to the best health care available is just that, a dangerous slogan which could be translated into reality only if we submitted either to intolerable government controls of medical practice or to a thoroughly unreasonable burden of expense. 3. There is sense to the notion of a right to a decent standard of care for all, dynamically defined, but still not dogmatically equated with the best available.

The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty

One would think there is nothing new to say about the First Amendment. The principal lines of doctrine are clear. Government may not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its content-unless it is obscene or demonstrably defamatory. If government regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take sides between competing ideas. And if a government regulation directed at other ends has the effect of restricting speech, that regulation too must be neutral.