A. John Simmons

On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society

This book completes A. John Simmonss exploration and development of Lockean moral and political philosophy, a project begun in The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton paperback edition, 1994). Here Simmons discusses the Lockean view of the nature of, grounds for, and limits on political relations between persons.Originally published in 1993.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

CONSENT THEORY FOR LIBERTARIANS

This paper argues that libertarian political philosophers, including Robert Nozick, have erred in neglecting the problem of political obligation and that they ought to embrace an actual consent theory of political obligation and state legitimacy. It argues as well that if they followed this recommendation, their position on the subject would be correct. I identify the tension in libertarian (and especially Nozicks) thought between its minimalist and its consensualist strains and argue that, on libertarianisms own terms, the consensualist strain ought to prevail. I then describe the form of the consent theory that I recommend to libertarians. The paper concludes with an extended defense of this form of consent theory against contemporary liberal-egalitarian criticisms of it (both explicit and implicit), including those of Dworkin, Rawls, and their followers.

Original-Acquisition Justifications of Private Property

My aim in this essay is to explore the nature and force of “original-acquisition” justifications of private property. By “original-acquisition” justifications, I mean those arguments which purport to establish or importantly contribute to the moral defense of private property by: (a) offering a moral/historical account of how legitimate private property rights for persons first arose (i.e., at a time prior to which no such rights existed); (b) offering a hypothetical or conjectural account of how justified private property could arise (or have arisen) from a propertyless condition; or (c) simply defending an account of how an individual can (or did) make private property in some previously unowned thing (where “things” might include not only land, natural resources, and artifacts, but also, e.g., ideas or other individuals). The “original acquisition” to which such justifications centrally refer, then, may be either the first instance(s) of legitimate private property in human history (typically assumed to have been many centuries ago on earth), or only the first legitimate acquisition of some particular thing (which might, for instance, have occurred yesterday or occur in the future on Mars). But in either case, the justification will involve or entail the defense of one or more moral principles specifying how unowned (or collectively owned) things can become privately owned — that is, the defense of the kind of principles Robert Nozick has called “principles of justice in acquisition.”

Just and Unjust Laws

G iven my specification that we have a moral duty to obey only the just laws of a legitimate regime, it is natural to explore what types of laws are in fact just. This matter is especially pressing for those who draw on samaritanism because a critic might worry that samaritan considerations are too restricted to justify most of the functions that modern bureaucratic states legitimately perform. In particular, samaritanism appears incapable of justifying all those functions that either require extremely costly sacrifices or do not rescue anyone from peril. To show how an advocate of samaritanism might respond to this challenge, this chapter focuses on two types of laws: those that require citizens to vote and those that draft citizens into compulsory military service. In the end, I conclude that an approach based on samaritanism has more resources to explain governmental functions than might initially be apparent, but that we should nonetheless be open to the possibility that many of the practices of existing states, even liberal democratic ones, are entirely unjustified. Even if samaritan considerations cannot justify many of the functions that modern bureaucratic states regularly assign themselves, there are two reasons not to dismiss the approach on these grounds. First, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no reason why defenders of the samaritan approach cannot appeal to other considerations that justify various additional obligations.

Doing One's Fair Share

E ven if the considerations offered in the preceding chapter conclusively defeat political anarchism, they are not by themselves sufficient to refute philosophical anarchism because they do not explain why one has a duty to obey the law. A citizens political responsibilities have yet to be established because the focus to this point has been exclusively upon the permissibility of a states coercing its constituents, not the political duties of those coerced. I am hopeful that we can develop an adequate account of our duty to obey the law, however, by building upon the defense of statism offered earlier. In particular, I think that just as samaritanism is crucial to justifying the states coercion, it is the key to explaining our political duties. Samaritan Duties and Fairness The first thing to notice is that the peril of others can explain not only why one may permissibly be coerced, it can also explain why one is obligated to assist those who are imperiled. (Indeed, if anything, it is more common and less controversial to posit samaritan duties than to defend the existence of a samaritan right to coerce.) Thus, just as I invoked samaritanism to explain why Beth may permissibly commandeer Cathys car if it is the only way to get Amy to the hospital in time to save her life, samaritanism can help explain why Beth has a duty to take Amy to the hospital and/or why Cathy has a duty to loan her car to the cause.

Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.

Preface PART I: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC 1. The Public Philosophy of Contemporary Liberalism 2. Rights and the Neutral State 3. Religious Liberty and Freedom of Speech 4. Privacy Rights and Family Law PART II: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENSHIP 5. Economics and Virtue in the Early Republic 6. Free Labor versus Wage Labor 7. Community, Self-Government, and Progressive Reform 8. Liberalism and the Keynesian Revolution 9. The Triumph and Travail of the Procedural Republic Conclusion: In Search of a Public Philosophy Notes Index