Charles S. Gochman

Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976

This article offers an empirical description and discussion of interstate conflict behavior. The basis is a recently completed data set consisting of all recorded instances of threats, displays, and uses of military force among states since 1816. We detail historical trends in the data and describe major dimensions of dispute behavior, including patterns of participation, duration, severity and escalation, regional distribution, and national dispute proneness. The following conclusions are suggested: First, patterns of dispute behavior have been more persistent over time than we often assume. Second, when these patterns have changed, the changes have been evolutionary in nature and have paralleled changes in the size and composition of the interstate system. Third, despite the diversity of the political units that constitute the interstate system, patterns of dispute behavior are generalizable across geographic boundaries.

The Correlates of War (Cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0

This research note summarizes version 3.0 of the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data set, which covers the geographic proximity of all directly contiguous states in the international system during the period 1816-2000. After a brief discussion of the role that geographic proximity plays in international relations, the coding rules and procedures used for this data set are reviewed. The changes and additions to this updated version of the data are then explained. This note concludes with a basic statistical summary of the updated data set

Interstate metrics: Conceptualizing, operationalizing, and measuring the geographic proximity of states since the congress of Vienna

This article introduces and describes data on the geographic proximity of states (i.e., countries) during the 150‐year period from the Congress of Vienna through 1965. The 144 countries that are members of the interstate system during those years are coded as being noncontiguous, contiguous by land, or within 6, 24, or 150 miles by water from all other states in the system. Descriptive information is provided concerning the distribution of proximate states within the interstate system as a whole, within its various regional subsystems, by historical period, and with respect to the dominating states (i.e., major powers) in the system. In addition, several conceptual issues concerning the definition of “geographic proximity” are discussed, and the author speculates about empirical associations that are likely to exist between geographic proximity and interstate interactions. In concluding, the author outlines a few ways in which geographic proximity data might be used to contribute to an understanding of na...

Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior

The authors address the question of why some militarized interstate disputes evolve into wars, while others do not. They note from previous investigations that the probability of such disputes ending in war is associated with the types of bargaining behavior adopted by disputants. Particularly important are the degrees of escalation and reciprocity that characterize that behavior. This leads them to ask two questions: first, why do statesmen involved in militarized interstate disputes adopt the bargaining behavior they do?; second, what accounts for variations in outcomes for those disputes in which similar patterns of bargaining behavior are observed? Based upon an analysis of 30 militarized interstate disputes, the authors conclude that (1) escalation in interstate bargaining is strongly associated with the nature of the issues in contention and the types of threat of force initially employed in dispute bargaining, that (2) there exists an association between the relative capabilities of disputants and the degree of reciprocity in bargaining exchanges, and that (3) variations in the outcomes of disputes largely can be accounted for in terms of the interests at stake and the diplomacy of the great powers. These findings prove to be consistent with the basic tenets of political realism, and suggest that the behavior of decision makers engaged in militarized interstate disputes is generally rational in that they respond to cost-benefit considerations. This study combines quantitative methods with a traditional realpolitik perspective in order to investigate the factors that lead to war-or its avoidance-in militarized interstate disputes. In undertaking this investigation we work from two basic assumptions.

Dangerous Disputes: A Study of Conflict Behavior and War*

The authors address the question of why some interstate disputes evolve into wars while others do not. They propose that factors accounting for different outcomes can be divided into two groups: those associated with the bargaining behavior of the disputants and those associated with the attributes of the dispute and disputants. They develop a typology of bargaining behavior and show that eight ideal types of bargaining behavior can be ranked with respect to their propensities to entangle disputants in war. While there exists predictable variance in dispute outcomes across these categories of bargaining behavior, there also exists some variance within the categories. The authors suggest that this withingroup variance largely is accounted for by the relative capabilities of the disputants, the relative determination of opposing regimes to pursue their objectives, and the willingness of the great powers to intervene in or mediate ongoing disputes.

The evolution of disputes

What do we know about the process by which militarized interstate disputes evolve? The author explores this subject by reviewing findings from systematic, empirical research on the expansion and escalation of subwar conflicts. A conceptual model is proffered linking contextual attributes, decision processes, bargaining behavior, and dispute evolution. The model serves as an ordering device for the literature review. The survey reveals that much of the research on conflict evolution has focused on the relationship between contextual attributes and conflict evolution, implicitly assuming that decision processes and bargaining behavior do not distort the relationship. Research on conflict decision processes can be divided into two schools—proponents of rational choice models and those who believe that organizational, political, and cognitive influences make such models untenable. Finally, research on bargaining behavior has produced a consensus that reciprocating strategies (particularly a firm‐but‐fair stra...

Studies of International Violence

7Uhe study of international violence-and war, in particular-is a time-honored profession. Among its practitioners have been philosophers and historians, economists and mathematicians, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and political scientists. Not surprisingly, this wide representation of disciplines has produced an equally diverse array of explanations as to why international violence occurs, or does not occur. These explanations range from the metaphysical belief in fate to the

Militarized disputes, incidents, and crises: Identification and classification

The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset was generated as part of the broader data‐generation efforts of DDIR. The paper (1) briefly lays out the underlying rationale and procedures used in developing the MID dataset, (2) highlights some conceptual and empirical problems associated with the dataset, (3) discusses the conceptual and empirical distinctions made among incidents, disputes, crises, and wars, and (4) offers suggestions for updating and expanding the MID dataset.