Russell J. Leng

When Will They Ever Learn

A set of hypotheses derived from experiential learning and a realpolitik orientation to crisis bargaining are employed to investigate the bargaining behavior of pairs of states embroiled in recurring crises. It is proposed that in crisis bargaining, experiential learning focuses on the outcome of the preceding crisis, and the lessons drawn from that experience are interpreted in accordance with a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of a credible demonstration of power and resolve. The hypotheses predict that in crises between states of relatively equal military capabilities, successful outcomes encourage policymakers to repeat the bargaining strategy employed in the previous crisis, while failures lead to more coercive bargaining in the next crisis. Employing events data from a sample of 18 disputes among 6 pairs of states, each pair having been engaged in three successive crises, a significant pattern of shifts to more coercive bargaining following crises with unsuccessful outcomes was found.

Influence Strategies, Success, and War

This article studies the effectiveness of influence strategies in serious dyadic disputes. Influence strategies are classified according to four types: bullying, reciprocating, appeasing, and trial-and-error. The study employs events data from twenty serious disputes occurring in the twentieth century. The findings support the central hypothesis that a reciprocating strategy is the most effective means of avoiding a diplomatic defeat without going to war, especially when it is employed against a bullying opponent. A closer look at the individual cases suggests that this is related to the face-saving properties of this approach, as well as the universal norm of reciprocity in international affairs.

Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior

The authors address the question of why some militarized interstate disputes evolve into wars, while others do not. They note from previous investigations that the probability of such disputes ending in war is associated with the types of bargaining behavior adopted by disputants. Particularly important are the degrees of escalation and reciprocity that characterize that behavior. This leads them to ask two questions: first, why do statesmen involved in militarized interstate disputes adopt the bargaining behavior they do?; second, what accounts for variations in outcomes for those disputes in which similar patterns of bargaining behavior are observed? Based upon an analysis of 30 militarized interstate disputes, the authors conclude that (1) escalation in interstate bargaining is strongly associated with the nature of the issues in contention and the types of threat of force initially employed in dispute bargaining, that (2) there exists an association between the relative capabilities of disputants and the degree of reciprocity in bargaining exchanges, and that (3) variations in the outcomes of disputes largely can be accounted for in terms of the interests at stake and the diplomacy of the great powers. These findings prove to be consistent with the basic tenets of political realism, and suggest that the behavior of decision makers engaged in militarized interstate disputes is generally rational in that they respond to cost-benefit considerations. This study combines quantitative methods with a traditional realpolitik perspective in order to investigate the factors that lead to war-or its avoidance-in militarized interstate disputes. In undertaking this investigation we work from two basic assumptions.

Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining

The findings of a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of reciprocating influence strategies in militarized interstate crises (MICs) suggest that the success of reciprocating strategies in MICs is related to (1) withholding cooperative initiatives until after the reciprocating party has demonstrated its resolve, (2) the use of carrot-and-stick influence attempts and responses combining firmness with flexibility, and (3) overcoming ambiguity through overt communication of intentions. Reciprocating influence strategies are most likely to be employed by democratic states either defending the status quo or following a change in the status quo in their favor through a fait accompli. When reciprocating strategies are employed against different types of influence strategies, the outcomes are consistent with the intersection of the decision rules of the influence strategies employed by the two sides.

Militarized Interstate Crises: The BCOW Typology and Its Applications

The Behavioral Correlates of War data set, which has been recently released for public use, is described and its potential uses are explored. The data set consists of coded descriptions of the actions of states engaged in a sample of thirty-eight interstate crises occurring between 1816 and 1975. The article begins by briefly comparing the BCOW data to extant events data collections, and then turns to detailed descriptions of the structure and content of the typology and coding scheme. The final section of the article discusses statistical techniques employed in analyzing the data, and reports on the most salient findings to date.

Social and Political Cultural Effects on the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes

The article investigates the relationship between cultural similarities and differences on the part of the representatives of contending states and mediators, and outcomes of mediation efforts in militarized disputes. A distinction is made between social culture, defined primarily in terms of religious identity, and political culture, defined according to the states political system. Analysis of 752 mediation attempts in militarized disputes occurring between 1945 and 1995 yields support for the hypothesis that mediation is more likely to succeed when the parties are from similar social cultures. The results, however, suggest that the relationship is more complex than that suggested by a simple categorization of states based on Huntingtons “clash of civilizations” thesis. We also find that mediation is more likely to succeed when the parties share democratic political cultures, a finding that is consistent with the cultural/normative explanation for the democratic peace.

Dangerous Disputes: A Study of Conflict Behavior and War*

The authors address the question of why some interstate disputes evolve into wars while others do not. They propose that factors accounting for different outcomes can be divided into two groups: those associated with the bargaining behavior of the disputants and those associated with the attributes of the dispute and disputants. They develop a typology of bargaining behavior and show that eight ideal types of bargaining behavior can be ranked with respect to their propensities to entangle disputants in war. While there exists predictable variance in dispute outcomes across these categories of bargaining behavior, there also exists some variance within the categories. The authors suggest that this withingroup variance largely is accounted for by the relative capabilities of the disputants, the relative determination of opposing regimes to pursue their objectives, and the willingness of the great powers to intervene in or mediate ongoing disputes.

Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining

This article employs events data to compare two studies of crisis bargaining: a qualitative study by Snyder and Diesing based on comparative case studies, and a quantitative study by Leng and Wheeler. Three propositions are tested: (1) both disputants will adopt increasingly coercive bargaining strategies during the confrontation phase of the crisis; (2) the structure of the crisis will determine the strategies of each side once the crisis turning point is reached; (3) to maximize success, each disputant should follow a strategy consistent with the crisis structure. The authors find strong support for the first proposition, little support for the second, and modest support for the third. Interesting parallels between Snyder and Diesings study and Leng and Wheelers regarding the overall effectiveness of reciprocating bargaining strategies emerge.

Militarized disputes, incidents, and crises: Identification and classification

The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset was generated as part of the broader data‐generation efforts of DDIR. The paper (1) briefly lays out the underlying rationale and procedures used in developing the MID dataset, (2) highlights some conceptual and empirical problems associated with the dataset, (3) discusses the conceptual and empirical distinctions made among incidents, disputes, crises, and wars, and (4) offers suggestions for updating and expanding the MID dataset.

“The future of events data mareiages: A question of compatibility”

What do the growing number of events data research efforts have in common? Is there sufficient compatibility among the extant data collections to combine the data files from different research enterprises? Is the achievement of such compatibility desirable? Four extant events data projects are examined to determine the extent to which there is agreement with regard to the identification and description of international behavior. Following a comparison of the assumptions underlying the constructed typologies employed by each, a “ trial marriage “ is undertaken to provide an empirical test of compatibility in practice. The results indicate that there is sufficient consensus with regard to the identification of an international event and its key components to refer to an “ events data community,” but that differences in the description of international events lead to little compatibility in practice.