Charles W. Calomiris

The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements

Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.

Building an incentive-compatible safety net

Abstract Bank safety nets, originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems, have become an important destabilizing influence. Government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk, particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values. Reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered, both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility. Requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance, and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net.

Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk. Local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre-1933 bank failures, even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact.

Consequences of Bank Distress During the Great Depression

The consequences of bank distress for the economy during the Depression remain an area of unresolved controversy. Since John M. Keynes (1931) and Irving Fisher (1933), macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the Depression. As the intermediaries controlling money and credit, banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors. But the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested. Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963) saw the contraction in the money multiplier—driven, in their view, by panicked depositors’ withdrawals of deposits—as the primary mechanism through which banking distress affected the real economy. They described the mechanism transmitting banking distress to the real sector as operating at the national level through changes in the aggregate supply of money and interest rates. Bank distress reduced the money supply available to the public either through the closure of banks and the consequent freezing of bank deposits, or the withdrawals of deposits by depositors that feared bank failure. Ben S. Bernanke (1983), building on Fisher (1933), emphasized the transmission of monetary shocks via their effects on the balance sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit by banks. Borrowers’ balance sheets were worsened by debt deflation as the result of fixed dollar debt obligations—borrowers’ net worth and cash flow declined with the rising value of debt service costs relative to income. Borrowers with positive net present value projects, but weak balance sheets, had less internally generated retained earnings to invest and could not qualify for credit. Furthermore, Bernanke argued that the contraction of the money supply produced contraction of nominal income and prices relative to fixed debt service, which weakened borrowers’ balance sheets, and in turn, weakened banks. Not only did firms’ financial distress reduce the number of qualified borrowers, the contraction in banks’ net worth forced a reduction in the supply of bank loans to qualified borrowers. Many firms and individuals relied on banks for credit, and as those banks suffered losses of capital (due to asset value declines) and contractions in deposits (as depositors reacted to bank weakness by withdrawing their funds), even borrowers with viable projects and strong balance sheets experienced a decrease in the effective supply of loanable funds. Bernanke termed the combined weakening of borrowers’ balance sheets and the contraction in bank credit supply a rise in the “cost of credit intermediation.” The scarcity of perfect substitutes for the positive net present value investments of firms with weak balance sheets, and for the credit supplied by existing banks, implies that the weakening of firms’ and banks’ balance sheets, the disappearance of banks, and the contraction in surviving banks’ lending made it more difficult for the economy to channel funds to their best use. Thus, what began as a contraction in aggregate demand became a contraction in aggregate supply, which magnified adverse economic shocks and prolonged and deepened the Depression. The financial distress of firms and banks, and the decline in bank lending, were not only symptoms of the Depression, but means for magnifying the shocks that caused the Depression. Bernanke’s statistical evidence in support of this story is derived from time-series analysis at the national level, in * Calomiris: Graduate School of Business, 601 Uris Hall, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: cc374@columbia.edu); Mason: Department of Finance, Drexel University, 3141 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: joe.mason@drexel.edu). We thank Valerie Ramey, David Wheelock, Charles Himmelberg, Steve Zeldes, Gary Gorton, two referees, and seminar participants at Columbia University, Wharton, Northwestern University and the 2001 Economic History Association Meetings for helpful comments on an earlier draft. We gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation, the University of Illinois, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective

The motivation and structure of various banking insurance experiments in U.S. history are analyzed, along with their political alternative, branch banks. In both the antebellum period and in the 1920s, insurance systems that relied on self-regulation, made credible by mutual liability, were successful, while compulsory state systems were not. Branch banking increased stability and resiliency to shocks.

The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort

Throughout history, financial collapses have been defining moments for public policy. Crises promote action, embodied in new financial institutions or policy doctrines. The motives that underlie such policies are sometimes short-sighted--driven by short-run pressures rather than long-run principles--and it is easier to enact unwise policy in the midst of crisis than to reverse course after the crisis has passed, after policies become embodied in institutions or statutes.

The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment

We explain the origins of the Panic of 1857, examine its spread, and compare state banking systemss responses. We describe the decline in western land and railroad investments and the consequent stress on securities brokers and banks in eastern cities, and trace the transmission of the shock to other regions. Bank performance depended not only on regional conditions and links to eastern banks, but on the ability to coordinate behavior. Southern branch banks and coinsuring banks in Ohio and Indiana were particularly successful.

Housing-finance intervention and private incentives: helping minorities and the poor

DESPITE THE PLETHORA of government programs and heated policy debates over the last several decades, little has been settled about the proper role for government in housing markets in general, and the mortgage market in particular. Government, it is argued, can play an important role in encouraging homeownership and eliminating discrimination in credit markets. Yet, hard evidence on the existence of discrimination is weak, as is the existing theoretical literature explaining discrimination in the credit market. Without an understanding of the magnitude and origin of discriminatory behavior in the marketplace, any policy response is merely a shot in the dark. Moreover, while being a minority is not synonymous with being poor, many programs designed to deal explicitly with poverty and its effect on housing market access are often shrouded with racial overtones in policy debates, further complicating discussion of their relative merits. This paper provides a survey and analysis of government interventions in the housing credit market. I We propose several possible goals behind government inter-

The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning from the Suffolk System

This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each others notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New Englands banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system.

Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement

We develop a proposal for a contingent capital (CoCo) requirement. A proper CoCo requirement, alongside common equity, would be more effective as a prudential tool and less costly than a pure common equity requirement. CoCos can create strong incentives for the prompt recapitalization of banks after significant losses of equity but before the bank has run out of options to access the equity market. That dynamic incentive feature of a properly designed CoCo requirement would encourage effective risk governance by banks, provide a more effective solution to the “too-big-to-fail” problem, reduce forbearance risk (supervisory reluctance to recognize losses), and address uncertainty about the appropriate amount of capital banks need to hold, and the changes in that amount over time. If a CoCo requirement had been in place in 2007, the disruptive failures of large financial institutions, and the systemic meltdown after September 2008, could have been avoided. To be maximally effective, (a) a large amount of CoCos (relative to common equity) should be required, (b) CoCo conversion should be based on a market value trigger, defined using a moving average of a “quasi market value of equity ratio” (QMVER), (c) all CoCos should convert if conversion is triggered, and (d) the conversion ratio should be dilutive of preexisting equity holders.