Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann

Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their relation to later-developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood. Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children, relating their performance to linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate. Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later-developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks.

White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood

The ability to attribute mental states to other individuals is crucial for human cognition. A milestone of this ability is reached around the age of 4, when children start understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. The neural basis supporting this critical step is currently unknown. Here, we relate this behavioural change to the maturation of white matter structure in 3- and 4-year-old children. Tract-based spatial statistics and probabilistic tractography show that the developmental breakthrough in false belief understanding is associated with age-related changes in local white matter structure in temporoparietal regions, the precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex, and with increased dorsal white matter connectivity between temporoparietal and inferior frontal regions. These effects are independent of co-developing cognitive abilities. Our findings show that the emergence of mental state representation is related to the maturation of core belief processing regions and their connection to the prefrontal cortex.

Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds’ but not 2- and 3-year-olds’ false belief-related action anticipation

Highlights • Significant improvement in belief-related anticipation between the ages of 3 and 4.• Children did not anticipate belief-related actions correctly until the age of 4 years.• Correct anticipation only when the agent believed the object to be in its last location.

Matching gluon scattering amplitudes and Wilson loops in off-shell regularization

We construct a regularization for light-like polygonal Wilson loops in N = 4 SYM, which matches them to the off-shell MHV gluon scattering amplitudes. Explicit calculations are performed for the 1-loop four gluon case. The off light cone extrapolation has to be based on the local supersymmetric Wilson loop. The observed matching concerns Feynman gauge. Furthermore, the leading infrared divergent term is shown to be gauge parameter independent on 1-loop level.