Cheryl Long

Are There Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in China

We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a firm-level data set from a World Bank survey. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 2500 specifications which take into account forward and backward linkages, we fail to find evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI.

Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in China

Executive turnover and its link to firm performance can provide a crucial measure of how effectively a firm solves the two sets of principal-agent problems: (a) the diverging interests between top management and shareholders, which may result in managerial entrenchment; and (b) the diverging interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which may lead to the expropriation of the latter by the former or “tunneling,” as referred to in the literature. Tying the personal fortune of top executives to the firm’s performance aligns the interests of shareholders and those of management. It also breaks up the “insider” alliance between the controlling shareholder and management, thereby helping protect the interests of minority shareholders. Although there is a large literature on executive turnover in Western firms, research on executive turnover in non-Western firms is limited, and this paper is the only one on China. A closer look at the executive turnoverperformance link in China (one of the two major internal discipline mechanisms in corporate governance) is particularly relevant, since effective markets for corporate control are missing in China, the largest developing and transitional economy in the world. Furthermore, China is an interesting case because both types of agency problems are acute due to poorly defined property rights and weak investor protection, which result largely from its command economy legacy.

Measuring Public Corruption in the American States: A Survey of State House Reporters

We use a survey of State House reporters to measure corruption in state government and assess the priority federal prosecutors place on corruption investigations. The reliability and validity of the corruption measures are assessed, as are the relationships among corruption level, federal prosecutorial effort, and the number of federal prosecutions. Federal corruption prosecutions are positively correlated with both corruption and prosecutorial effort. Hence, we argue that federal prosecution data provide a potentially biased and unreliable measure of state public corruption.

ARE THERE PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA?: spillovers from foreign direct investment

We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a firm-level data set from a World Bank survey. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 2500 specifications which take into account forward and backward linkages, we fail to find evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI.spillovers from FDI. We do, however, find robust evidence that Chinese private firms tend to invest less in innovation in the presence of FDI. Combined with our previous findings that domestic private firms tend to be more involved in providing inputs and intermediary goods for foreign firms (Hale and Long, 2006), these results suggest a more passive role played by domestic firms in the global division of labor than envisioned by the Chinese government. ; Formerly titled: What determines technological spillovers of foreign direct investment: evidence from China

Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors*

We examine the relation between local labor markets and the behavior of federal prosecutors. Empirical evidence is provided that assistant U.S. attorneys in districts with high private salaries are more likely to take cases to trial than are assistants in districts with low private salaries. We explain this finding as follows. In high‐salary districts, government salaries are not competitive relative to the private sector. Therefore, federal prosecutor positions are sought by individuals who want the trial experience needed to secure desired private‐sector employment. The following additional evidence further supports this explanation. First, the turnover of assistant U.S. attorneys is higher in high‐private‐salary districts than in low‐private‐salary districts. Second, individuals who leave their employment as assistant U.S. attorneys are of higher quality in districts with higher private‐lawyer salaries. Third, assistant U.S. attorneys with more trial experience are more likely to take positions in large private law firms.

Foreign Direct Investment and the Incentives to Innovate and Imitate

We propose a new channel of FDI spillovers on domestic firms, which operates through imitation of original products. Domestic heterogeneous firms may not introduce any new products, introduce a new product line (innovate), or develop a variety that is a close substitute to an existing product line (imitate). The presence of foreign firms generates incentives for imitation because they introduce original products that are vertically differentiated from domestic products. Using firm-level panel data for China, we find that increased FDI presence in a given industry leads to more imitation, but not necessarily more innovation, by domestic firms.

Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China

Using firm-level data from a World Bank survey, this paper examines how legal development in China relates to various firm decisions. I find that a more active court system is associated with more investment, more adoption of technology, more innovation, and more complex transactions. Specifically, when a higher percentage of business disputes are resolved through the court system, firms tend to have higher investment rates, higher propensities to adopt new automated technology, and higher probabilities of developing new products. In addition, they tend to have more nonlocal sales. These findings are consistent with a sophisticated version of the rights hypothesis, in which the rule of law eventually replaces relation-based governance as a superior governance mechanism. I find two limitations of China’s legal system. The court system does a better job facilitating the growth of state-owned enterprises than of private firms, and it protects local firms better than nonlocal firms.

What are the Sources of Financing of the Chinese Firms

It appears to be common knowledge that external financing in China is mostly limited to state-owned firms and is hard to obtain for smaller private firms. In this paper we take a closer look at internal and external, formal and informal, financing sources of Chinese firms during the period of rapid economic reform in 1997-2006. To this end we analyze balance-sheet data from Chinese Industrial Surveys of Medium-sized and Large Firms for 2000-2006 and survey data from the Large-Scale Survey of Private Enterprises in China that was conducted in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. The following stylized facts emerge from our analysis: (1) State-owned firms continue to enjoy significantly more generous external finances than other types of Chinese firms; (2) Chinese private firms have resorted to various ways to overcome financial constraints, including increasingly more mature informal financial markets, cost-saving through lower inventory and other working capital requirements, and greater reliance on retained earnings; (3) There are substantial variations in financial access among private firms: While the small private firms face more financial constraints, the more established large private firms seem to have access to finances that are more equal to their SOE counterparts; and, (4) There is some evidence that financial access of small private firms, especially to formal bank loans, has improved moderately in the past decade.

Control Modes and Outcomes of Transformed State‐Owned Enterprises in China: An Empirical Test

The transformation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into efficient entities has been an important approach in transition economies. However, the transition literature reveals little about how control structure affects firm performance of transformed SOEs. Drawing on agency theory, we distinguish three modes of control in transformed SOEs: state-controlled, dispersedly controlled, and privately controlled modes and argue that actual control after transformation plays a critical role in determining performance. Examining the impact of different control modes in China, we find that the key is who controls the transformed firm. Non-state-controlled (dispersedly controlled and privately controlled) firms are more likely to have enhanced post-transformation performance and reduced agency costs than state-controlled firms.

FDI Spillovers and Firm Ownership in China: Labor Markets and Backward Linkages

Using firm–level data, we find that the presence of foreign firms in China is positively associated with the performance of domestically owned private firms but is negatively associated with the performance of state–owned enterprises (SOEs). In particular, we find: (1) the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) is associated with larger differences in the wages and the quality of skilled workers between SOEs and private firms; and, (2) FDI presence is positively associated with private firms’ sales to foreign firms and foreign consumers, but not with the sales of SOEs. We argue that these differences could be due to the fact that private firms have more flexible wage and personnel policies, which allows them to attract talent that facilitates positive FDI spillovers.