Chiraphol New Chiyachantana

Earnings Management Surrounding Seasoned Bond Offerings: Do Managers Mislead Ratings Agencies and the Bond Market?

We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

Permanent Price Impact Asymmetry of Trades with Institutional Constraints

Dynamic institutional trading constraints related to capital, diversification, and short-selling asymmetrically affect the incorporation of new information as reflected in the permanent price impact of their trades. The sign of the permanent price impact asymmetry between institutional buys versus sells is positive at the initial stage of a price run-up and reverses due to changing constraints with a prolonged price run-up in a stock. Idiosyncratic volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, trading intensity, price dispersion, and bullish market conditions further sharpen the initial asymmetry, as well as its reversal after a price run-up.

On the Informativeness of Credit Watch Placements

This study examines the informational role of credit watch placements in the overall bond rating process. We show that the act of a company’s bond being put on a credit watch is, in itself, associated with significant abnormal returns in the company’s stock and bond rating revision that are associated with their initial inclusion on credit watch, are more informative than rating changes solely without credit watch. Furthermore, institutional trading in equities displays opportunism around the event of the corresponding companies’ bonds being included on the watchlist, around its subsequent upgrade or downgrade, as well as over the interim transitional period. More importantly, institutions earn economically and statistically significant profits from their trades following credit watch events. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of credit watch placements in the overall fabric of credit ratings adjustments and on informed trading behavior.