Christian At

Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction

This paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one when information acquisition is easy.

The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company

We study the role of security-voting structure when a government wants to privatize a company. Our results show that the one share–one vote structure is optimal for allocating control rights to the most efficient pretender. However, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale’s revenue.

Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

This paper determines the optimal tenurial contract between a monopoly landlord and a tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenants ability) and moral hazard (based on the tenants choice of effort). We identify different optimal contracts depending on the tenants outside option. For intermediate values, there is a threshold of tenant ability depending on the outside option level below which the optimal contract is a separating sharecropping contract, and a pooling one otherwise. We also find that an increase in the outside option does not monotonically increase the tenants optimal effort.