Nathalie Chappe

Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction

This paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one when information acquisition is easy.

The Informational Role of the Arbitration Clause

We analyse the role of an arbitration clause as a quality signal. We model a contractual relationship between one buyer and two sellers, one of which offers a high-quality product, the other a low-quality product. With a certain probability, the product is defective. The sellers have the choice of either taking the case to court if the product is defective, or including an arbitration clause in which case an arbitrator determines the indemnity payment. Under some conditions, only the high-quality seller offers an arbitration clause, which then serves as a quality signal.

Efficacité et compétences spécifiques des dirigeants: l'arbitrage entre incitations externes et incitations internes

Nous etudions la politique de r emun eration optimale des dirigeants den- treprises lorsquils peuvent d etourner une partie des revenus sous la forme de b en efices priv es. Nous consid erons egalement que les dirigeants disposent dopportunit es dem- bauche ext erieures, li ees au caract`ere sp ecifiques ou transf erables de leurs comp etences. Dans ce cadre, nous faisons apparaˆitre trois r egimes caract eris es par des niveaux de b en efices priv es et de salaire diff erents. Nos r esultats mettent en evidence la sensibilit e du contrat manag erial a` la nature des comp etences des dirigeants. Nous montrons que la transf erabilit e des comp etences des dirigeants apparaˆit comme socialement optimale. En revanche, le r esultat est plus ambigu du point de vue des actionnaires.

Court Congestion and the Decision to Litigate or Settle

This paper analyses the problem of court congestion. We focus on how individuals decision whether to commit an illegal act and victims decision whether to bring a suit are influenced by the presence of court congestion. We show that the standard results of the perception models may be totally reverse in presence of congestion.

The Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines with Court Congestion

This paper extends the law enforcement model to include court congestion. Society suffers harm from court congestion since delay affects the credibility and the reliability of the criminal justice system. The core result of the paper is that the probability of apprehension and the probability of conviction should be considered separately by the enforcement authority. Because the level of congestion is affected by the probability of apprehension only, the use of fines and conviction should be exhausted before resorting to the costlier (in terms of court congestion costs) instrument of apprehension.

Arbitration and Incentives: How to Preclude the Chilling Effect?

We seek to establish a mechanism for an arbitrator, as a set of rules used to control parties incentives. We assume that the arbitrator is allowed to commit himself to a decision rule ex ante. The results show that the parties messages reveal their private information if the costs of lie are high enough and if the decision rule is random. The decision rule described can apply to conventional arbitration and to final-offer arbitration.