Christian Downie

Transnational actors in environmental politics: strategies and influence in long negotiations

For scholars of global environmental politics, transnational actors are a central focus, and many ascribe significant influence to them. However, it is not always clear how their influence is felt or what strategies are most effective. Most studies that do consider these issues focus on the influence of either environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or business groups on one international outcome. Very few studies analyse these actors together. This limits the generalisability of conclusions. Remarkably, almost none of this work has considered the influence of these actors and the strategies they could employ in prolonged environmental negotiations that last many years or decades. Drawing on a rich empirical data set from the international climate negotiations, both are addressed. How the influence of transnational environmental NGOs and business groups is felt in long negotiations is considered, and three strategies are identified that these actors can use to influence not only state behaviour but each other as well.

Global energy governance: do the BRICs have the energy to drive reform?

It is widely accepted that the rising power of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—has the potential to re-shape the international system. However, little attention has been given to the BRICs’ role in a growing area of strategic importance: global energy governance. While global governance scholars now argue that the international energy architecture requires substantive reform to keep pace with the rapid transformations in global energy markets, largely driven by the BRICs, it is not clear what role these countries will play in future governance arrangements. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance and international negotiations, interviews with G20 energy officials, and the observations of the author, a past delegate to G20 negotiations, this article examines whether the BRICs as a coalition have the capacity and willingness to drive substantive global energy governance reform. In doing so, it highlights the problems with the BRICs as a coalition on energy and considers the prospects for energy reform in light of Chinas increasing engagement with energy governance ahead of it hosting the G20 Summit in 2016

Global Energy Governance in the G-20: States, Coalitions, and Crises

There is an emerging consensus among global governance scholars that there is a global energy governance gap. The rapid transformation of global energy markets with a new cast of producers and consumers, which now accounts for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions, has left the existing institutional architecture behind. While there has been some discussion in the emerging literature on the potential role of the Group of 20, there is almost no analysis of what conditions need to be met for the G-20 to act in a significant fashion. This article takes up this task. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance, environmental politics, and international negotiations, as well as the observations of the author who is a past delegate to G-20 negotiations, it considers the role of the G-20 in global energy governance and identifies the principal conditions that will need to be met if the G-20 is to drive more than piecemeal change.

US institutional pathways to clean coal and shale gas: lessons for China

Chinas 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) envisages that shale gas and coal will be central to its energy future. However, for China to meet the energy security and climate change objectives set out in its 12th Five-Year Plan it will be reliant on the widespread commercial deployment of two key technologies; hydraulic fracturing combined with horizontal drilling for shale gas, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal. China is moving to acquire these technologies through technology transfer and diffusion from the US, but progress has been slow, and neither is currently available in China on a commercial scale. Drawing on interviews in the US and China, this article argues that Chinas expectation of technology from the US may well be disappointed because of factors unique to the US institutional environment that have made the development of fracking technology possible and hinder the development of CCS technology at a commercial scale. Policy relevance If China is to meet the energy security and climate change objectives set out in its 12th Five-Year Plan it will be reliant on the widespread commercial deployment of fracking and clean coal technologies. While China expects to acquire these technologies via technology transfer and diffusion from the US, progress has been slow. Because of factors unique to the US institutional environment the availability of both technologies on a commercial scale in China is unlikely in the coming years. As a result, Chinese policy makers would be well-advised not to count on these technologies to meet their energy and climate goals.

Toward an Understanding of State Behavior in Prolonged International Negotiations

Many of the most significant international treaty negotiations take years, and sometimes decades, to conclude. The international climate negotiations, trade negotiations and law of the sea negotiations are all examples. Yet notwithstanding their commonality and importance, prolonged international negotiations are not well understood. In these negotiations, state preferences are fluid not fixed, as negotiating positions change. This temporal dimension of prolonged negotiations is insufficiently captured by existing theories of international negotiations, which, by virtue of their focus on individual negotiation outcomes at one point in time, tend to be static in their analysis.This article combines an analysis of existing theories of international negotiations with the findings of an empirical study of the climate change negotiations. In doing so, it reveals a series of internal and external factors distinctive to prolonged international negotiations, emphasises the importance of the temporal dimension, and explains how and why the negotiating positions and the type of agreements states are prepared to sign changes over time. Building on these variables, it is argued that state behaviour in prolonged international negotiations can be usefully conceived of as (at different points in time) either an immature or mature game, in which strategic opportunities arise at different phases of the game for networked actors to constructively influence state behaviour. Eight strategies are suggested that traditionally weak actors can employ to steer prolonged international negotiations toward their preferred outcome.

One in 20: the G20, middle powers and global governance reform

Abstract There is a growing consensus that the international system needs to be reformed to reflect the changing distribution of power with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). The Group of Twenty (G20) has been at the centre of these discussions. Within the G20, emphasis has been on great powers or rising powers and their capacity to drive reform. Less attention has been given to the preferences and strategies of middle powers in the G20 and their capacity to shape global governance reform. Drawing on interviews with G20 officials, this paper considers the role of Australia as president of the G20 in 2014. Australia’s presidency presents a unique opportunity to examine the behaviour of a middle power as it balances the competing global governance claims of the USA and the BRICs.

Aviation and Climate Change: Can the airline industry continue to grow in a carbon-constrained economy?

The aviation industry has grown rapidly over the past 50 years. One of the downsides of this growth has been a substantial increase in aviation greenhouse gas emissions. Concerns about the growth trajectory of the industry and emissions have led to calls for measures to be introduced to restrict demand and prompt innovation. In response, the European Union has announced that both domestic and international flights will be included in its Emissions Trading Scheme from 2012. At the time of writing, no similar measures had been proposed in Australia. This article considers whether the unconstrained growth of the aviation industry in Australia is compatible with reducing the nations greenhouse gas emissions to levels that are required to minimise the risk of dangerous climate change. To do this, the article projects Australias aviation emissions (international and domestic) over the period 2005 to 2050 and compares the projections to likely national emission reduction targets in 2050. The results suggest that total aviation emissions could rise by more than 250 per cent over this period. With such rapid growth, aviation could account for over 30 per cent of Australias entire emissions space by 2050 if there is a desire to reduce emissions by 60 per cent by the middle of this century.

Fighting for King Coal's Crown: Business Actors in the US Coal and Utility Industries

Over the last two decades, business actors have received growing attention in global environmental politics. In the context of climate change, scholars have demonstrated the capacity of business actors to directly shape outcomes at the national, international, and transnational levels. However, very little work has focused exclusively on business actors in the coal and utility industries. This is surprising, given that resistance from these industries could delay or even derail government attempts to address climate change. Accordingly, this article focuses directly on the preferences of business actors in the coal and utility industries. Drawing on interviews with executives across the US energy sector, it considers business preferences on two of the most important attempts by the Obama administration to limit emissions from coal: the Waxman-Markey bill and the Clean Power Plan. In doing so, it provides new insights about the preferences of these actors and the divisions within these industries that could be exploited by policy-makers and activists seeking to enact climate change regulations.

The G20 Chair and the Case of the Global Economic Steering Committee

Global and regional summits occur regularly, yet we know little about the factors supporting an effective summit. This article reviews knowledge about the chair, agenda building and prenegotiation preparation within an institutionalised régime, and then turns to our venue, the G20, and our specific case, the 2014 G20 Australian presidency. Through case analysis, we develop a Prenegotiation Framework, identifying tasks and key issues that are usefully addressed during summit preparation. Furthermore, we identify a linked relationship between the chair, their management of prenegotiation planning, the agenda that is adopted and the way in which that agenda determines public perception of the fundamental nature or “identity” of a particular international organisation. Thus, the prenegotiation process can have significant consequences for our understanding of those institutions engaged in global governance. We conclude that data no longer support a characterisation of the G20 as a global crisis committee, as an analysis of G20 Summit agendas demonstrates that it has evolved into a global steering committee. With its identity established, the effectiveness of the G20 as a global steering committee is the key question, while régime continuity and change constitute the real long-term G20 challenge.

Regulatory Unilateralism: Arguments for Going It Alone on Climate Change

Climate change is a collective action problem that has often been analysed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. States have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet around the globe national and sub-national governments are introducing regulatory measures to reduce emissions that can be fairly characterised as unilateral actions. The US and China, the world’s two largest emitters, are at the forefront. Indeed the evidence of states beginning to depart from business-as-usual behaviour raises the possibility that the characterizations of climate change as a Prisoner’s Dilemma may apply less strongly to the problem and that something else may be starting to happen. Accordingly, this paper considers: (i) to what extent nations are taking unilateral action to address climate change; and (ii) in the context of climate change, which is considered one of the greatest global collective action problems the world has faced, what are the possible economic explanations for nations to act in a unilateral fashion and what are the normative reasons for doing so. We justify regulatory unilateralism on economic, geopolitical and moral grounds, and argue that regulatory unilateralism may offer the best hope of triggering a race to cut emissions. A race rather than prolonged negotiations is what is required at this moment in climate history.