Christian Rauh

Which policy for Europe? : power and conflict inside the European Commission

1. Introduction 2. Position Formation inside the EU Commission: An Analytical Framework 3. Studying Internal Dynamics 4. Connecting Personal Characteristics and Organizational Structure: Commissioners, Directors-General and Services 5. The Intersection of Social and Common-market Policies 6. Research and Innovation Policy 7. Consumer Policy 8. Expert Groups in the Commission: Knowledge providers or political device/ 9. Insulated, Technocratic Decision-Making? Commission Position Formation and the Public Acceptability of Policy Options 10. Structural Biases? The Link Between Internal Coordination and the Dynamics of Position Formation 11. Many Factors in Position Formation, but Some Matter More Often Than Others: Evidence Across Cases 12. Shaping Policies for Europe: Internal Position Formation Between Problem-Solving, Turf Expansion and Political Ideology 13. Conclusion: Why We Should Care About Power and Conflict Inside the European Commission

Linking Agenda Setting to Coordination Structures: Bureaucratic Politics inside the European Commission

Abstract This article provides a detailed study of how bureaucratic politics in the European Commission can systematically affect the substance of the legislative agenda that makes up European integration. Based on an encompassing description of the bureaucratic policy-formulation process within the Commission, it shows how the Commission’s different elements play off against each other and thereby systematically advantage the lead department and the Secretariat-General. Empirical case studies from a sample of 48 policy formulation processes in the Commission during 1999–2008 illustrate how these structural advantages actually change the political substance of policy proposals. Against additional evidence on an uneven distribution of procedural advantages across the Commission departments, it concludes that bureaucratic politics in the Commission may account for systematic biases on the European Union’s legislative agenda.

There is No such Thing as a Free Open Sky: Financial Markets and the Struggle over European Competences in International Air Transport†

Aviation is a prime example of a policy area where the clash over supranational regulatory responsibilities had pronounced economic repercussions. In this article, we examine the economic effects of the European Commission’s struggle to obtain competences in international air transport. Stock market reactions to key events in the political conflict between 1995 and 2004 unravel whether investor beliefs about the distribution of power in the EU follow the basic conjectures of neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism or institutionalism. The event studies show that particularly judicial proceedings and the involvement of the ECJ send credible integration signals to financial markets. This supports the hypothesis that investors consider the subtleties of the EU’s decision-making apparatus carefully and only react to developments that definitively alter the political regime and thus also the market situation. These findings are in line with an institutionalist interpretation of a reform that has radically changed the international aviation regime.