Miriam Hartlapp

Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?

To what extent are European rules complied with, and what are the reasons for non-compliance with EU law? According to an intergovernmentalist perspective, implementation problems should occur when member states failed to assert their interests in the European decision-making process. Focusing on 26 infringement procedures from the area of labour law, we show that such ‘opposition through the backdoor’ does occur occasionally. However, we demonstrate that opposition at the end of the EU policy process may also arise without prior opposition at the beginning. Additionally, our findings indicate that non-compliance is often unrelated to opposition, and due to administrative shortcomings, interpretation problems, and issue linkage. This study is based on unique in-depth data stemming from a ground-level analysis of the implementation of six EU Directives in all 15 member states.

Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research

Substantial theoretical, conceptual and empirical advances have been made in research on the implementation of EU policies during recent years. However, our findings have remained ambivalent and our theoretical insights disparate. It therefore seems high time to address some methodological issues and to raise awareness of the limits of the various approaches and of the data commonly used. We highlight the challenges of operationalizing and of choosing adequate indicators for the dependent variable (compliance). We also discuss the promises and perils of different types of data used in the field, such as official statistics on notifications and infringements published by the European Commission.

Which policy for Europe? : power and conflict inside the European Commission

1. Introduction 2. Position Formation inside the EU Commission: An Analytical Framework 3. Studying Internal Dynamics 4. Connecting Personal Characteristics and Organizational Structure: Commissioners, Directors-General and Services 5. The Intersection of Social and Common-market Policies 6. Research and Innovation Policy 7. Consumer Policy 8. Expert Groups in the Commission: Knowledge providers or political device/ 9. Insulated, Technocratic Decision-Making? Commission Position Formation and the Public Acceptability of Policy Options 10. Structural Biases? The Link Between Internal Coordination and the Dynamics of Position Formation 11. Many Factors in Position Formation, but Some Matter More Often Than Others: Evidence Across Cases 12. Shaping Policies for Europe: Internal Position Formation Between Problem-Solving, Turf Expansion and Political Ideology 13. Conclusion: Why We Should Care About Power and Conflict Inside the European Commission

On Enforcement, Management and Persuasion: Different Logics of Implementation Policy in the EU and the ILO

This article helps to understand the effectiveness of EU legislation through analysing implementation policies and how they contribute to ensure Member State compliance. Comparing the EU and the ILO it provides new empirical data on instruments used to change Member State behaviour and presents conceptual tools to assess them along the lines of enforcement, management and persuasion.

Linking Agenda Setting to Coordination Structures: Bureaucratic Politics inside the European Commission

Abstract This article provides a detailed study of how bureaucratic politics in the European Commission can systematically affect the substance of the legislative agenda that makes up European integration. Based on an encompassing description of the bureaucratic policy-formulation process within the Commission, it shows how the Commission’s different elements play off against each other and thereby systematically advantage the lead department and the Secretariat-General. Empirical case studies from a sample of 48 policy formulation processes in the Commission during 1999–2008 illustrate how these structural advantages actually change the political substance of policy proposals. Against additional evidence on an uneven distribution of procedural advantages across the Commission departments, it concludes that bureaucratic politics in the Commission may account for systematic biases on the European Union’s legislative agenda.

The implementation of EU social policy: the ‘Southern Problem’ revisited

This article analyses the implementation of EU social policy in the Southern European member states. When studied by implementation research, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain are often treated as a homogeneous group, and some authors speak of a particular ‘Southern Problem’ while others contest this. In this article, we will take issue with central explanatory frameworks of this literature – the existence of a high level of policy misfit, inefficient administrative and political systems, and weak non-state actors and civil societies in Southern Europe. We analyse the effects of these factors on the timeliness and correctness of implementation in the area of social policy. In a first step, we show that images of a homogenous ‘Southern laggard group’ are indeed inappropriate. In a second step, we present a new explanation of why the Southern countries are not as uniform as often supposed: they belong to different ‘worlds of compliance’.

Enforcing Social Europe through Labour Inspectorates: Changes in Capacity and Cooperation across Europe

Despite its central importance for the implementation of EU social policy, the issue of member state enforcement of European regulations has attracted little academic attention. This paper analyses changes in national enforcement systems and horizontal cooperation between them by comparing labour inspectorates in the EU-15 member states over time (2000 versus 2010). Starting from the assumption that, as administrations, enforcement systems are strongholds of national sovereignty, it is argued that member states’ interest in creating a level playing field and in enabling free movement in accordance with the ‘four freedoms’ should nevertheless bring about change. The results show insufficient enforcement capacity overall, but also that important changes have taken place regarding the coordination, steering and pressure capacity of national labour inspectorates, and also regarding cooperation amongst them. This points to the emergence of horizontal cooperation as a distinct feature of the European Administrative Space.

Implementation of EU Social Policy Directives in Belgium: What Matters in Domestic Politics?

Abstract This paper provides insight into the transposition in Belgium of six EU social policy directives adopted during the 1990s. Arguing that domestic politics matter for understanding transposition of EU policies in this country, it addresses the discordant findings concerning propositions about misfit, administrative inefficiencies and difficulties, as well as veto players. On the basis of an in‐depth country analysis, it shows how these concepts can be clarified by taking into account factors that have typically been omitted in quantitative research and by analysing more directly mechanisms that are not easily captured by quantifiable proxies. The paper concludes by describing the efforts that have been undertaken in Belgium to adjust specific features of the national political system so as to cope better with adaptation requirements, which again reinforces the relevance of domestic politics for implementation processes.

Intra-Kommissionsdynamik im Policy-Making: EU-Politiken angesichts des demographischen Wandels

Die Bevolkerung in Europa wird alter. Damit sind vielfaltige Herausforderungen an die Nachhaltigkeit sozialer Sicherungssysteme, das Funktionieren der Arbeitsmarkte und das gesellschaftliche Miteinander verbunden. Nimmt die EU ihr im Lissabon Prozess gesetztes Ziel ernst, der weltweit dynamischste und wettbewerbsfahigste wissensbasierte Raum zu werden, so muss sie politische Antworten auf den demographischen Wandel finden.1 Auf nationaler Ebene gilt die Rentenpolitik als Hauptstellschraube. Im Vergleich mit der nationalstaatlichen Ebene sind die Handlungskompetenzen der EU hier eingeschrankt. Erst seit 2002 verfugt die EU mit der Offenen Methode der Koordinierung Renten (OMK Renten) uber ein weiches, koordinierendes Politikinstrument. Neben der OMK Renten antwortet eine Vielzahl von EU-Instrumenten in verschiedenen Politikfeldern2 auf den demographischen Wandel: eine Leitlinie und quantitative Beschaftigungsziele fur Altere in der Europaischen Beschaftigungsstrategie; eine Richtlinie der Antidiskriminierungspolitik, die Alter als Diskriminierungsgrund ausschliest; Richtlinien uber betriebliche und private Zusatzrenten im Bereich Binnenmarktpolitik sowie wirtschafts- und fiskalpolitische Entscheidungen im Rahmen der Wirtschafts- und Wahrungspolitik. Zusammengenommen zeigt sich ein Bild, in dem die europaische Ebene trotz Kompetenzlucke aktiv Politik fur Altere betreibt. Ich frage, am Beispiel der EU-Politik fur Altere, nach der Rolle von Dynamiken innerhalb der Europaischen Kommission im EU-Policy-Making. Die Dimension des Policy-Making, die dabei im Zentrum steht, ist die Generierung von Kompetenzen.3

Politicization of the European Commission: When, How, and with What Impact?

Classical concepts of public administration define ‘politics’ and administration as opposites (for example, Wilson, 1887). Theoretically, the separation of the administration from party politics is necessary to serve the general public interest when executing political decisions, while discretion is a precondition to cogently implement policies. However, empirical as well as conceptual works have left this dichotomy behind to instead describe politics and administration as closely interwoven. Landmark studies developed ‘images’ (Aberbach et al., 1981) or ‘models of interaction’ (Peters, 1988) to capture the relative autonomy of bureaucracy, how politicians and bureaucrats cooperate or complement each other in policy making, and whether they interact cross-departmentally or in functional policy communities. Today, the ‘growing osmosis between the political and administrative system’ (Bekke and van der Meer, 2000, 281) is frequently captured as the politicization of administration. From a comparative perspective, differences in the politicization of administrations across time and countries prevail, yet overall the picture seems clear: administrations are constantly or even increasingly politicized (for example, Balint et al., 2008, 685; Peters and Pierre, 2004; Schnapp, 2004; Schwanke and Ebinger, 2006). To what extent does this account of a politicized administration hold for the European Union (EU)?