Christina J. Schneider

The analysis of policy convergence, or: how to chase a black cat in a dark room

Political science research on policy convergence has largely remained inconclusive. While many studies found support for the convergence hypothesis, an almost equally large number of studies rejected it. Convergence thus could be a less general phenomenon than many theorists believe. This article identifies a second possible explanation. The variance approach, which dominates political science research on policy convergence, is likely to lead to wrong inferences. Analysing various artificially generated convergence processes, we find that neither the variance approach nor the coefficient of variation detects convergence when it is conditional or when theoretically unidentified convergence clubs exist. Our analysis suggests that researchers should estimate rather than measure convergence. By estimating convergence researchers may (a) test the causal relationship, (b) account for conditional convergence, (c) control for the existence of convergence clubs, and (d) examine convergence to an equilibrium level of a policy.

The Politics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model

This paper perceives the politics of EU eastern enlargement to be a twofold process, in which governments of transition countries decide whether or not to apply for membership and in turn EU members decide whether or not to accept these applicants. Specifically, we argue that the level of democracy and the extent of market reforms together determine the first decision, while the second decision is largely determined by the EU observing the reform process in applicant countries imposed by the acquis communautaire conditionality. The natural procedure to test this theory is a Heckman selection model. We use a Heckman specification with panel probit estimators in both stages. The data supports our argument that uncontested reforms signal the policy support of relevant political parties to the EU and increase the likelihood of joining the Union. We also test for specification errors and check the robustness of our findings.

Too Much to Die, Too Little to Live Unemployment, Higher Education Policies and University Budgets in Germany

Abstract German educational spending per student has dramatically declined since the early 1970s. In this paper, we develop a theory of fiscal opportunism and argue that state governments exploit higher educational policies as an instrument of active labour market policy. By ‘opening’ universities to the masses and the extensive propagation of broader university enrolment during times of economic distress, state governments have an instrument at their disposal for lowering unemployment without generating negative budgetary implications. Thereby, the government pockets voter support not only by diminishing unemployment, but also by providing public goods particularly to the socially disadvantaged. At the same time, the state government risks a deterioration of educational quality owing to decreasing educational spending per student. We test our theoretical claims for the German states in a period ranging from 1975 to 2000 by means of panel fixed-effects models. The empirical results robustly support the hypothesis that rising unemployment ratios lead to increased university enrolment, but also significantly reduce the spending per student.

Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union

This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of EU member states’ annual budget negotiations from 1977 to 2006 supports the existence of conditional electoral cycles in distributional bargaining and generally points to the importance of accounting for such cycles when analyzing patterns of international cooperation.

Accession Rules for International Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-Off?

Powerful states often accept unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature attributes this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, the authors demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also has a strategic component. The authors formally show that unanimous accession rules can profit powerful states by creating uncertainty as to the minimal level of reform that enables accession. If accession is valuable enough and the membership candidate is uncertain about the resolve of weak states, it plays safe by implementing ambitious reforms that improve the efficacy of the international institution. In this case, a legitimacy-efficacy trade-off does not exist: the unanimity rule enhances legitimacy while allowing powerful states to induce significant reforms by applicants to the benefit of current members.

Multi-bi Aid in European Development Assistance: The Role of Capacity Constraints and Member State Politics

We analyse the patterns of multi‐bi aid in the European Union. Using newly available multi‐bi aid data and a large number of staff interviews at the European Commission, the World Bank and bilateral donors, we draw three conclusions. First, the Commissions capacity constraints and lack of specific expertise have prevented it from becoming an important host of trust funds like other international development organizations. Second, the same capacity constraints can generally explain its extensive participation in trust funds at other international development organizations. In the case of large global funds, however, Commission participation often reflects the outcome of member state politics. Third, once the Commission delegates its aid to multilateral agencies, it does not impose strong substantive earmarking, but requires a high level of legal and administrative controls.

Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation

This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments’ incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation.

Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union

ABSTRACT This contribution analyzes the relationship between European Union (EU) enlargement, preference heterogeneity of EU members and co-operation in the EU. I argue that the widening of the EU does not invariably present an obstacle to co-operation. Preference heterogeneity in the Council is not only affected by the accession of new member states, but it also fluctuates over time owing to changes in the domestic political arena. In European countries, governmental coalitions have changed frequently, with important consequences for the ability of EU members to negotiate deeper integration. To test the theoretical hypotheses, I analyze to what extent the changing bargaining dynamics in the Council owing to domestic political circumstances, as compared to the accession of new member states itself, have affected the co-operation between EU member states over time.

Differences Matter: Partisan Heterogeneity and Cooperation in the European Union

Partisanship is a fundamental feature of democratic politics, but the effect of states’ partisan preferences on international cooperation remains poorly understood. This paper analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in the European Union (EU). We argue that partisan heterogeneity in the Council of Ministers increases distributional conflict between EU member states and worsens commitment problems, thereby decreasing the depth of cooperation. We test the theory against data on financial contributions to EU structural funds and development aid. The data indicate that partisan heterogeneity reduces member states’ incentives to contribute to European cooperation. More generally, we provide a new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation and offer an explanation for dynamic fluctuations in international cooperation.