Cesi Cruz

Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform

The challenge of public administration reform is well known: Politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy. Using new data from 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely to succeed in the presence of non-programmatic political parties. Earlier research uses evidence from a small group of countries to conclude that clientelist politicians resist reforms that restrict their patronage powers. We support this conclusion with new evidence from many countries, allowing us to rule out alternative explanations, including the effect of electoral and political institutions. We also examine reforms that have not been the subject of prior research: those that make public sector financial management more transparent. Here, we identify a second mechanism through which non-programmatic parties undermine public sector reform: Clientelist politicians have weaker incentives to exercise oversight of policy implementation by the executive branch.

The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform

Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are essential to political oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties that are organized to allow party members to act collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties.

Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.

Network Ties and the Political Strategies of Firms

It is well established that connections to government officials confer important benefits to firms. However, past work has ignored the crucial role that ties to other firms in the same industry (peer ties) also play in facilitating firms’ political participation. We develop new theory that contrasts the effects of these two distinct types of social ties. We argue that peer ties facilitate collective action, most often with respect to broad policy issues that affect many firms. In contrast, we expect that direct ties to government officials (government ties) are primarily used to pursue narrow, particularistic benefits. Using a new survey of foreign- owned firms operating in the Philippines, we find that peer ties facilitate firms’ political participation at the national level, where issues are more likely to affect large numbers of firms. Government ties are also valuable, though primarily at the local level, where issues are narrower in scope.

Who's Ready for ASEAN 2015? Firm Expectations and Preparations in the Philippines

By December 31, 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has committed to complete the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a plan that was adopted back in 2007. As countries across ASEAN seek to seize the development opportunities associated with the AEC, it is critical for policy makers to understand the perspective of firms towards economic integration and the level and nature of firm preparedness for this new political environment. This paper draws on an original survey of over 300 mostly multinational firms operating in the Philippines. Of particular note, we find widespread optimism about the effects of the AEC on firm profitability, but low levels of firm preparedness. In the last year before AEC implementation, firms’ primary policy demand on the Philippines government was more information and communication. We also develop and test theory regarding variation across firm types in their level of preparedness, their optimism regarding the effects of the AEC on profitability, and their demand for more government-to-firm communication.