Christine Horne

The enforcement of norms : Group cohesion and meta-norms

Group cohesion is generally thought to contribute to social order. One explanation for this correlation suggests that it can be attributed to higher rates of sanctioning found in solidary communities. In the present paper I suggest a mechanism that may be at least partially responsible for the relationship between group cohesion and sanctioning. I argue that ties among potential sanctioners and other nondeviant group members are key. The strength of these relationships affects the level of support that group members give to those who punish antisocial behavior, and in turn, influences the likelihood that such sanctioning will occur. Thus group cohesion affects punishment indirectly by increasing the rewards that are given to sanctioners. This increase in rewards then affects sanctioning decisions. I test these predictions using experimental methods. The results support the hypotheses.

Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement

Under what conditions are norms likely to be enforced? What processes lead to the punishment of deviant behavior? While social relations are thought to be a key part of the answer, their role is not well understood. In this article I develop one approach to explaining how exchange interests contribute to norm production. I argue that when the benefits resulting from enforcement enhance the ability of individuals to engage in profitable exchange, metanorms and norms are more likely to be enforced. Predictions are tested using experimental methods and are confirmed.

Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement An Experimental Test

This article focuses on the relationship between the costs of norm enforcement and the extent to which such enforcement actually occurs. We predict that as costs increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior is less likely. In addition, however, costs have a positive effect on the strength of meta-norms that encourage sanctioning. These meta-norms, in turn, lead to more frequent enforcement. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods and, for the most part, are supported.

Explaining Norm Enforcement

This article presents a theory of norm enforcement. Dominant accounts explain norms by referring to their consequences. On this view, norms are enforced when doing so increases the welfare of group members. While useful, such approaches do not explain much of what we observe. The theory developed here argues that while sanctioning consequences are part of the explanation, characteristics of social relations — in particular, interdependence — have significant effects. Hypotheses are tested using unique data that include quantitative behavioral measures of norm and metanorm enforcement. The results show that the effects of sanctioning benefits and costs vary depending on the level of interdependence between group members. Further, concern with social relations, not sanctioning benefits and costs, explains metanorm enforcement. The research therefore suggests that explanations that focus on the direct consequences of sanctioning, and that fail to incorporate characteristics of social relations, may produce inaccurate predictions. Accordingly, understanding the role of social relations is essential for explaining norm enforcement.

Gender and Cooperation: Explaining Loan Repayment in Micro-Credit Groups*

Does gender affect cooperation? In this paper we analyze the effects of gender and group gender composition on prosocial behavior. We make two competing predictions: one based on literature suggesting that women are more cooperative than men, the other building on research regarding the effect of expectations on behavior. Using data drawn from micro-credit borrowing groups, we find that gender composition, not gender per se, is correlated with the likelihood that individuals will default on loan payments. The findings suggest that behavior which might appear to be a consequence of inherent gender differences more likely results from expectations associated with group gender composition. Are women more cooperative than men? Observation suggests that they may be. At a minimum, people expect to see differences, but the evidence is decidedly mixed. Some studies find that women cooperate more than men; others find that they cooperate less. Still other research suggests that it is not gender itself that affects behavior; rather, the composition of groups accounts for differences in cooperation levels. In the present study we provide new data regarding this issue, with a focus on cooperation in micro-credit borrowing groups. We distinguish between gender and the gender composition of these groups to evaluate their effects on one kind of cooperative behavior, the repayment of loans.

A normative explanation of antisocial punishment

While much research shows that people punish free-riders, recent studies find evidence that people also engage in antisocial punishment. That is, they sometimes punish those who contribute generously to collective actions. Such sanctioning is puzzling because generous individuals increase the welfare of all group members. When and why are such individuals punished? In this paper, we propose that descriptive norms are part of the explanation. People may sanction those whose behavior is atypical - even when that behavior benefits the group. We test our theory with a laboratory experiment. We examine the effect of descriptive norms on sanctioning of generous and stingy deviants and find that descriptive norms encourage antisocial punishment, but not punishment of free-riders.

A Social Norms Approach to Legitimacy

Rulers seek to develop legitimacy. Legitimacy is a murky concept, however, and just how rulers might attain it is not well understood. This article explores the implications of conceptualizing legitimacy as a social norm that encourages people to support the ruler. This conceptualization points to the importance of social relations as well as characteristics of the ruler and his or her behavior. These factors together are argued to affect the extent to which norms supporting the ruler are enforced and, in turn, the extent to which people obey and respond to calls to action by the ruler. On this view, a ruler seeking legitimacy should consider (a) the messages he or she sends to citizens about himself or herself and (b) the ways in which his or her policies affect ties between citizens.

Values and Evolutionary Psychology

Scholars suggest that evolutionary psychology may provide a foundation for assumptions regarding human values. I explore this suggestion by developing two arguments regarding the permissiveness of norms regulating male and female sexual activity. The first relies on the standard rational choice assumption that people value resources, and the second relies on an assumption suggested by evolutionary psychology that actors value seeing their children successfully reach adulthood. These two assumptions produce contrasting predictions regarding sex norms. I describe the implications of these predictions for explaining cross-cultural variation and present evidence that supports the evolutionary psychology-based predictions in this context. I also suggest implications of the two approaches for explaining norms cross-nationally and within the United States. The article provides support for the utility of evolutionary psychology in developing assumptions about values.

NORM ENFORCEMENT IN HETEROGENEOUS GROUPS : SANCTIONING BY MAJORITIES AND ISOLATED MINORITIES

Research shows that two factors are important for norm enforcement in homogeneous groups — the consequences of an individuals behavior for group members and the interdependence of those members. I extend existing theory to make predictions about norm enforcement in heterogeneous groups. Predictions for both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups are tested using experimental methods. The findings show that, in homogeneous groups, the two causal factors interact to affect both enforcement and compliance with social norms. In heterogeneous groups, they lead isolated minorities to enforce majority norms but not follow them, and they encourage majorities to follow norms but not enforce them.

Metanorms and antisocial punishment

Abstract Contributions to public goods benefit all group members, yet research shows that generous group members are sometimes punished. We argue that when such antisocial punishment efforts are public, the consistency of group member contributions will encourage individuals to punish atypically generous group members. Similarly, when behavior of group members is consistent, the publicness of punishment will increase antisocial punishment. Both of these effects will be weaker for individuals who are interested in getting to know the generous deviant. We test our hypotheses in a public goods experiment and find support. Our findings contribute to the norms literature, in particular, to understanding of antisocial punishment.