Christine N. Smith

Neural Substrates Mediating Human Delay and Trace Fear Conditioning

Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies with human subjects have explored the neural substrates involved in forming associations in Pavlovian fear conditioning. Most of these studies used delay procedures, in which the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) coterminate. Less is known about brain regions that support trace conditioning, a procedure in which an interval of time (trace interval) elapses between CS termination and UCS onset. Previous work suggests significant overlap in the neural circuitry supporting delay and trace fear conditioning, although trace conditioning requires recruitment of additional brain regions. In the present event-related fMRI study, skin conductance and continuous measures of UCS expectancy were recorded concurrently with whole-brain blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) imaging during direct comparison of delay and trace discrimination learning. Significant activation was observed within the visual cortex for all CSs. Anterior cingulate and medial thalamic activity reflected associative learning common to both delay and trace procedures. Activations within the supplementary motor area (SMA), frontal operculum, middle frontal gyri, and inferior parietal lobule were specifically associated with trace interval processing. The hippocampus displayed BOLD signal increases early in training during all conditions; however, differences were observed in hippocampal response magnitude related to the accuracy of predicting UCS presentations. These results demonstrate overlapping patterns of activation within the anterior cingulate, medial thalamus, and visual cortex during delay and trace procedures, with additional recruitment of the hippocampus, SMA, frontal operculum, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule during trace conditioning. These data suggest that the hippocampus codes temporal information during trace conditioning, whereas brain regions supporting working memory processes maintain the CS-UCS representation during the trace interval.

Amygdala and hippocampal activity during acquisition and extinction of human fear conditioning.

Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have characterized brain systems involved in conditional response acquisition during Pavlovian fear conditioning. However, the functional neuroanatomy underlying the extinction of human conditional fear remains largely undetermined. The present study used fMRI to examine brain activity during acquisition and extinction of fear conditioning. During the acquisition phase, participants were either exposed to light (CS) presentations that signaled a brief electrical stimulation (paired group) or received light presentations that did not serve as a warning signal (control group). During the extinction phase, half of the paired group subjects continued to receive the same treatment, whereas the remainder received light alone. Control subjects also received light alone during the extinction phase. Changes in metabolic activity within the amygdala and hippocampus support the involvement of these regions in each of the procedural phases of fear conditioning. Hippocampal activity developed during acquisition of the fear response. Amygdala activity increased whenever experimental contingencies were altered, suggesting that this region is involved in processing changes in environmental relationships. The present data show learning-related amygdala and hippocampal activity during human Pavlovian fear conditioning and suggest that the amygdala is particularly important for forming new associations as relationships between stimuli change.

Functional MRI of Human Amygdala Activity During Pavlovian Fear Conditioning: Stimulus Processing Versus Response Expression

Although laboratory animal studies have shown that the amygdala plays multiple roles in conditional fear, less is known about the human amygdala. Human subjects were trained in a Pavlovian fear conditioning paradigm during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Brain activity maps correlated with reference waveforms representing the temporal pattern of visual conditional stimuli (CSs) and subject-derived autonomic responses were compared. Subjects receiving paired CS-shock presentations showed greater amygdala activity than subjects receiving unpaired CS-shock presentations when their brain activity was correlated with a waveform generated from their behavioral responses. Stimulus-based waveforms revealed learning differences in the visual cortex, but not in the amygdala. These data support the view that the amygdala is important for the expression of learned behavioral responses during Pavlovian fear conditioning.

Medial Temporal Lobe Activity during Retrieval of Semantic Memory Is Related to the Age of the Memory

We measured brain activity using event-related fMRI as participants recalled answers to 160 questions about news events that had occurred during the past 30 years. Guided by earlier findings from patients with damage limited to the hippocampus who were given the same test material, we looked for regions that exhibited gradually decreasing activity as participants recalled memories from 1–12 years ago and a constant level of activity during recall of more remote memories. Regions in the medial temporal lobe exhibited a decrease in brain activity in relation to the age of the memory (hippocampus, temporopolar cortex, and amygdala). Regions in the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, and parietal lobe exhibited the opposite pattern. The findings for all of these regions were unrelated to the richness of the memories, to how well test questions were remembered later (encoding for subsequent memory), nor to how frequently semantic memories were accompanied by personal, episodic recollections. Last, activity in a different group of regions (perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and inferior temporal gyrus) was associated with how well the test questions were subsequently remembered. The results support the idea that medial temporal lobe structures play a time-limited role in semantic memory.

Functional MRI of human Pavlovian fear conditioning: patterns of activation as a function of learning.

fMRI was used to study human brain activity during Pavlovian fear conditioning. Subjects were exposed to lights that either signaled painful electrical stimulation (CS+), or that did not serve as a warning signal (CS-). Unique patterns of activation developed within anterior cingulate and visual cortices as learning progressed. Training with the CS+ increased active tissue volume and shifted the timing of peak fMRI signal toward CS onset within the anterior cingulate. Within the visual cortex, active tissue volume increased with repeated CS+ presentations, while cross-correlation between the functional time course and CS- presentations decreased. This study demonstrates plasticity of anterior cingulate and visual cortices as a function of learning, and implicates these regions as components of a functional circuit activated in human fear conditioning.

Declarative Memory, Awareness, and Transitive Inference

A characteristic usually attributed to declarative memory is that what is learned is accessible to awareness. Recently, the relationship between awareness and declarative (hippocampus-dependent) memory has been questioned on the basis of findings from transitive inference tasks. In transitive inference, participants are first trained on overlapping pairs of items (e.g., A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, and D+E-, where + and - indicate correct and incorrect choices). Later, participants who choose B over D when presented with the novel pair BD are said to demonstrate transitive inference. The ability to exhibit transitive inference is thought to depend on the fact that participants have represented the stimulus elements hierarchically (i.e., A>B>C>D>E). We found that performance on five-item and six-item transitive inference tasks was closely related to awareness of the hierarchical relationship among the elements of the training pairs. Participants who were aware of the hierarchy performed near 100% correct on all tests of transitivity, but participants who were unaware of the hierarchy performed poorly (e.g., on transitive pair BD in the five-item problem; on transitive pairs BD, BE, and CE in the six-item problem). When the five-item task was administered to memory-impaired patients with damage thought to be limited to the hippocampal region, the patients were impaired at learning the training pairs. All patients were unaware of the hierarchy and, like unaware controls, performed poorly on the BD pair. The findings indicate that awareness is critical for robust performance on tests of transitive inference and support the view that awareness of what is learned is a fundamental characteristic of declarative memory.

Experience-Dependent Eye Movements, Awareness, and Hippocampus-Dependent Memory

We asked what kind of memory is operating when eye movements change as the result of experience. Participants viewed scenes that were either novel, repeated, or manipulated (i.e., a change was introduced in one region of the scene). Eye movements differed depending on the past viewing history of each scene. Participants made fewer fixations and sampled fewer regions when scenes were repeated than when scenes were novel. When scenes were altered, participants made more fixations in the altered region, spent more time looking at the altered region, and made more transitions into and out of the altered region than in unchanged (matched) regions in the repeated scenes. Importantly, these effects occurred only when individuals were aware that a change had occurred. Participants who were unaware that the scene had been altered looked at the changed scenes in the same way that they looked at repeated scenes. Thus, there was no indication that eye movements could reveal an unaware (unconscious) form of memory. Instead, eye movements reflected conscious memory of whether the scene was repeated or manipulated. The findings were the same when awareness was assessed after viewing all the scenes (experiment 1) and when awareness was assessed after each scene was presented (experiment 2). In experiment 3, memory-impaired patients with damage limited to the hippocampus were impaired at deciding whether scenes were novel, repeated, or manipulated. Thus, the ability to consciously recollect recent encounters with scenes reflects a form of hippocampus-dependent memory. The findings show that experience-dependent eye movements in response to altered scenes reflect conscious, declarative memory, and they support the link between aware memory, declarative memory, and hippocampus-dependent memory.

The Hippocampus Supports Both Recollection and Familiarity When Memories Are Strong

Recognition memory is thought to consist of two component processes—recollection and familiarity. It has been suggested that the hippocampus supports recollection, while adjacent cortex supports familiarity. However, the qualitative experiences of recollection and familiarity are typically confounded with a quantitative difference in memory strength (recollection > familiarity). Thus, the question remains whether the hippocampus might in fact support familiarity-based memories whenever they are as strong as recollection-based memories. We addressed this problem in a novel way by using the Remember/Know procedure, which allowed us to explicitly match the confidence and accuracy of Remember and Know decisions. As in earlier studies, recollected items had higher accuracy and confidence than familiar items, and hippocampal activity was higher for recollected items than for familiar items. Furthermore, hippocampal activity was similar for familiar items, misses, and correct rejections. When the accuracy and confidence of recollected and familiar items were matched, the findings were dramatically different. Hippocampal activity was now similar for recollected and familiar items. Importantly, hippocampal activity was also greater for familiar items than for misses or correct rejections (as well as for recollected items vs misses or correct rejections). Our findings suggest that the hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity when memories are strong.

Acquisition of differential delay eyeblink classical conditioning is independent of awareness.

There has been debate about whether differential delay eyeblink conditioning can be acquired without awareness of the stimulus contingencies. In 4 experiments, the authors reexamined this question. Older participants were tested with a tone and white noise (Experiment 1) or with 2 tones (Experiment 2). In addition, younger participants were tested with 2 tones (Experiment 3) or with 2 tones plus the parameters from an earlier study that had reported a relationship between conditioning and awareness (Experiment 4). Participants who were designated aware of the stimulus contingencies and participants who were designated unaware exhibited equivalent levels of differential eyeblink conditioning. Awareness of stimulus contingencies is not required for differential delay eyeblink conditioning when simple conditioned stimuli are used.

Comparison of explicit and incidental learning strategies in memory-impaired patients

Significance Declarative memory for rapidly learned, novel associations is thought to depend on structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL). A recent study suggested that rapidly learned associations can nevertheless be supported by structures outside the MTL when a promising, incidental encoding procedure termed “fast mapping” (FM) is used. In two experiments with memory-impaired patients, we found that the FM procedure yielded the same deficits in learning and memory that have been obtained with the use of other more traditional paradigms. We suggest that the effects of the FM procedure are not robust and, if replicable, depend on yet-unknown aspects of how the test is given. Declarative memory for rapidly learned, novel associations is thought to depend on structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), whereas associations learned more gradually can sometimes be supported by nondeclarative memory and by structures outside the MTL. A recent study suggested that even rapidly learned associations can be supported by structures outside the MTL when an incidental encoding procedure termed “fast mapping” (FM) is used. We tested six memory-impaired patients with bilateral damage to hippocampus and one patient with large bilateral lesions of the MTL. Participants saw photographs and names of animals, plants, and foods that were previously unfamiliar (e.g., mangosteen). Instead of asking participants to study name–object pairings for a later memory test (as with traditional memory instructions), participants answered questions that allowed them to infer which object corresponded to a particular name. In a second condition, participants learned name–object associations of unfamiliar items by using standard, explicit encoding instructions (e.g., remember the mangosteen). In FM and explicit encoding conditions, patients were impaired (and performed no better than a group that was given the same tests but had not previously studied the material). The same results were obtained in a second experiment that used the same procedures with modifications to allow for more robust learning and more reliable measures of performance. Thus, our results with the FM procedure and memory-impaired patients yielded the same deficits in learning and memory that have been obtained by using other more traditional paradigms.